Forging the Civil Rights Frontier: How Truman\u27s Committee Set the Liberal Agenda for Reform 1947-1965 by Riehm, Edith S
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
History Dissertations Department of History
Spring 5-5-2012
Forging the Civil Rights Frontier: How Truman's
Committee Set the Liberal Agenda for Reform
1947-1965
Edith S. Riehm
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in History Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Riehm, Edith S., "Forging the Civil Rights Frontier: How Truman's Committee Set the Liberal Agenda for Reform 1947-1965."
Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2012.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss/30
FORGING THE CIVIL RIGHTS FRONTIER:  HOW TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE SET THE 
LIBERAL AGENDA FOR REFORM 1947-1965 
 
 
by 
 
 
EDITH SHELBY RIEHM 
 
 
Under the Direction of Michelle Brattain 
 
ABSTRACT 
At the close of 1946, a year marked by domestic white-on-black violence, Harry S. Truman, in a 
dramatic move, established the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR).  Five years be-
fore, his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt had formed the Fair Employment Practices Commit-
tee (FEPC), under pressure from civil rights groups mobilized against racial discrimination in the 
defense industry.  The FEPC was the first major federal civil rights legislation since Reconstruc-
tion.  However, when race riots later erupted in cities across the country in 1943, Roosevelt ig-
nored his staff's recommendation to appoint a national race relations committee.  Instead, he 
agreed to a “maypole” committee, which was, in actuality, a decentralized network of individu-
als, including Philleo Nash, whose purpose was to anticipate and diffuse urban racial tensions in 
order to avert further race riots.  Superficially, Truman's PCCR seemed to resemble Roosevelt's 
rather conservative race relations strategy of appointing a committee rather than taking direct 
action under the authority of the federal government.   But, as this project will argue, Truman's 
PCCR represented a major, historical change in the approach to civil rights that would have a 
profound effect on activists, such as Dorothy Tilly and Frank Porter Graham, and the movement 
itself.  Where FDR's committees were created to avoid further racial confrontations, Truman’s 
committee invited and ignited controversy.  Its groundbreaking report, To Secure These Rights 
(TSTR), unequivocally declared the federal government as the guardian of all Americans’ civil 
rights.
 
 In essence, Truman’s PCCR elevated the civil rights dialogue to a national level by re-
casting the civil rights issue as an American problem rather than just a black-American problem.  
Moreover, TSTR attacked segregation directly, and challenged the federal government to take the 
lead by immediately desegregating the armed services. These radical recommendations came on-
ly six years after a reluctant FDR formed the FEPC and six and one-half years before the Unites 
States’ Supreme Court’s landmark ruling, Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 
and the ensuing backlash.  
 
Thus, Truman’s PCCR and TSTR, in 1947, forged a new “civil rights 
frontier.” 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Civil rights, Human rights, Truman, Roosevelt, To Secure These Rights, Pres-
ident’s Committee on Civil Rights, Dorothy Tilly, Frank P. Graham, Philleo Nash, Post-war civil 
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1 
INTRODUCTION  
Decades after World War II ended, Robert Tye, a white American World War II veteran, 
who was among those servicemen to enter the concentration camps in Europe at war’s end, 
spoke with Barbara Howard, a National Public Radio correspondent.  Tye recalled his feelings 
after the triumphant victory over the Nazis and the traumatic and emotional experience of seeing 
the devastation brought on by the Nazi racist regime.  Tye remembered that in the evenings, after 
returning to base camp, he and his friends would discuss these events over coffee at the USO.  
Despite seeing the effects of the Nazi’s racism and genocide, they were optimistic about the fu-
ture and, specifically American society.  Tye remembered their optimism and 
…how wonderful it was going to be now that we had eliminated  
bigotry.  We figured that nobody would dare be a bigot now  
because he would automatically be associating himself with the  
Nazis.  It would be great to go back to a country now where  
nobody would be bigoted.
1
   
 
Tye’s sentiments and those of his colleagues were echoed by many who saw World War II as a 
moral battle of good against evil.  Against the backdrop of a more progressive nation, informed 
by Gunnar Myrdal’s popular study, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy, and as the horrifying details of what racism had done to the population of European 
Jews were revealed, the logical conclusion for many was that this war would end all racism.
2
  If 
it did not end racism globally, many believed racism would at the very least be ended in the 
                                                          
1
 The Best of NPR:  Eyewitness to History (National Public Radio, 1997; distributed by Time Warner Trade 
Publishing, 1998), sound cassette.       
2
 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:  The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York:  Har-
per and Brothers, Publishers, 1944).  Myrdal expressly indicated that the Negro problem in the United States was a 
problem rooted in white racism and could be corrected via education.  Furthermore, whites’ reactions should not 
delay immediate remedies to correct the egregious disparity of rights afforded to minorities versus non-minorities in 
this country.   For more on Myrdal, see Walter A. Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience:  Social En-
gineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938-1987, The Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill:  Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1990).  
2 
United States, which had emerged from the conflict as the bulwark of democracy and the new 
leader of the free world.  “Of course,” Tye concluded sadly in his interview, “them things didn’t 
turn out that way.”3    
Speaking in the 1990s, Tye had the benefit of looking back through the lens of memory 
and recalled the fleeting feeling of optimism in the early post-war era, which was followed 
quickly by decades of struggle associated with the civil rights movement.  Hatred, bigotry, and 
racism were prominent and deep-rooted characteristics in America’s social, economic, and polit-
ical landscape.  Thus the optimistic belief that bigotry was vanquished began to quickly erode as 
World War II ended, and veterans of all races returned back to the United States.  Many African 
Americans returned to the South, having fought and won the war against racist enemies, only to 
face the familiar and entrenched southern brand of racism and discrimination under segregation.   
One of the natural phenomena, described as a law of physics centuries ago by Sir Isaac 
Newton, is that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  Human nature some-
times mirrors this natural behavior.  Historian Glenn Feldman argues that the civil rights move-
ment is “actually … best understood as a two-sided coin:  the drive for civil rights and the mili-
tant reaction against it…. It is difficult, though, to understand either side fully without reference 
to the other.”4  Since the mid-1990s, some scholars have accepted the Brown v. The Board of 
Education of Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court decision as the catalyst that elicited widespread 
white backlash against civil rights efforts.
5
   However, recommendations to eliminate segregation 
made by Harry S. Truman’s President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in October 1947  
                                                          
3
   The Best of NPR:  Eyewitness to History. 
4 
 Glenn E. Feldman, ed.,  Before Brown:  Civil Rights and White Backlash in the Modern South,  (Tusca-
loosa:   University of Alabama Press, 2004), p. 2.
.  
  
 
5  
For more on the reaction to the Brown decision, see for example, Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown 
Changed Race Relations:  The Backlash Thesis,”  Journal of American History 81 (June 1994): 81-116. 
3 
also ignited a severe backlash to federal involvement in civil rights matters.  This reaction por-
tended the firestorm that would ensue after the Brown decision and far outstripped the reaction to 
President Roosevelt’s Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).6  Moreover, in the late 
1940s, the PCCR facilitated the civil rights movement’s adoption of a more coherent and defina-
ble identity with specific federal goals, ones that we ordinarily associate with the 1960s.   This 
shift – toward desegregation and federal action - simultaneously propelled the movement toward 
success and provided a clearer target for a galvanizing opposition.   
Despite the acknowledgment by many historians that the civil rights movement was a 
much longer process, beginning well before the 1960s, scholars with a few notable exceptions 
have paid little attention to the PCCR and its report, To Secure These Rights (TSTR).
7
  William 
Juhnke’s 1974 dissertation, “Creating a New Charter of Freedom:  The Organization and Opera-
tion of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, 1946-1948,” is the most extensive work here-
tofore on the PCCR.  Juhnke details the events leading to Truman’s formation of the committee, 
how the committee was organized, the difficulty in drafting the final report and, to a lesser ex-
tent, some initial reaction to the final report.   Juhnke also reveals Graham’s and Tilly’s dissent. 
In his conclusion, Juhnke states that TSTR “stood for a generation as the basic document for civil 
                                                          
6
  For more on the FEPC, see Merl E. Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement:  The Presi-
dent’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice 1941-1946,  (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 
1991). 
7  
Works that discuss an earlier start of the civil rights movement include:
  
Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defy-
ing Dixie:  The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950, (New York:  W. W. Norton and Co., 2008), Robert Kor-
stad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals and the Early Civil Rights Move-
ment," Journal of American History, 75 (December 1988), Aldon D. Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement:  
Black Communities Organizing for Change, (New York:  The Free Press, 1984), Manning Marable, Race, Reform, 
and Rebellion:  The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1990,   (Jackson:  University of Mississippi, 
1991), John Dittmer, Local People:  The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi, (Urbana and Chicago:  University 
of Illinois Press, 1994), Kathryn Nasstrom, "Down to Now: Memory Narrative, and Women's Leadership in the Civ-
il Rights Movement in Atlanta, Georgia," Gender & History 11, April 1999, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil 
Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History, 91 (March 2005): 1233-1263.   
4 
rights reform.”8  Juhnke’s exposure of Frank Porter Graham’s and Dorothy Tilly’s dissent amidst 
all the other persuasive opinions in Committee meetings begs for more research into their ra-
tionale for dissent and the trajectory of their careers in the post-PCCR era.   
In 1998, Steven F. Lawson and Charles Payne co-authored Debating the Civil Rights 
Movement, 1945-1968.  In this work, Lawson’s essay, “The View from the Nation,” suggests 
that TSTR “sketched out the liberal agenda on civil rights for the next twenty years.”9   In 2004, 
Lawson edited a reprint of To Secure These Rights with an introduction and helpful bibliography.  
Shortly after, in 2005, William E. Leuchtenburg published The White House Looks South:  
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson.   Lawson and Leuchtenburg only 
briefly discuss the PCCR and TSTR, yet they hint at the long-range significance of both with re-
spect to 1960s civil rights legislation.  Michael R. Gardner also alludes to the connection be-
tween the PCCR and the broader civil rights movement when he describes TSTR as a “blueprint” 
for change.
 10
    
The majority of scholars who have written about Truman do mention the PCCR and 
TSTR, but they confine their discussion to the limited scope and timeframe of the Truman presi-
dency.  To a far greater extent, historians have focused on Truman’s motives in taking a contro-
                                                          
8
  William F. Juhnke, “Creating a New Charter of Freedom:  The Organization and Operation of the Presi-
dent’s Committee on Civil Rights, 1946-1948”  (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 1974).  p. 227.   See also, William 
F. Juhnke, “President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights:  The Interaction of Politics, Protest and Presidential 
Advisory Commission,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, I:  The Congress, the Court, and the Presi-
dency at 200 years and II:  Presidential Greatness:  Considerations on the FDR and Truman Presidencies (SUMMER 
1989):  593-610. JSTOR,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574372 (accessed March 31, 2012). 
9
 Steven F. Lawson, “The View from the Nation,” in Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968, ed. 
Steven F. Lawson and Charles Payne (Lanham, Maryland:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998). 
10 Juhnke, “Creating a New Charter of Freedom”, Steven F. Lawson, ed., To Secure These Rights:  The Re-
port of President Harry S Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, (Boston:  Beford/St. Martin’s, 2004), p. 1., William 
E. Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South:  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
(Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2005), p. 367, Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil 
Rights:  Moral Courage and Political Risks (Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), p. 23. 
5 
versial stand supporting civil rights.
 11
   In 2003, for example, Carol Anderson argued that the 
PCCR’s report was little more than a publicity stunt “used repeatedly to counter Soviet criticism” 
of segregation and racial violence.  Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s 2005 article, “The Long Civil Rights 
Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” ignores the PCCR and TSTR. Yet in the article 
Hall urges scholars to extend the study of civil rights beyond the "classical" period in the early 
1960s to understand the deep roots and alternative strategies that ultimately contributed to the 
movement.  Glenda Gilmore’s magisterial work, Defying Dixie:  The Radical Roots of Civil 
Rights, 1919-1950, includes a smattering of references to TSTR within the context of other “Cold 
War casualties” that were drowned by a “wave of anti-Communism” in the late 1940s. 12    
Although the PCCR and TSTR have been marginalized in the literature on civil rights, 
this study demonstrates that both the Committee and its report were emblematic of the critical 
shift in liberal thinking occurring during the 1940s and the illiberal reaction to it.   From the late 
1940s, liberals increasingly focused on new goals articulated by TSTR: dismantling segregation 
and protecting Americans’ civil rights.  At the same time, a rising wave of resistance against the 
nascent civil rights movement emerged.  This opposition worked to shore up support for segrega-
tion and undermine the growing involvement of the federal government in race relations that had 
begun with the FEPC.
 13
  In order to address this gap in the historiography, and to demonstrate 
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the pivotal importance of the PCCR to the history of the civil rights movement, this dissertation 
will examine how race relations changed in the White House in the decade leading to the 
PCCR’s creation, the source and context of the new approach to race relations that the committee 
fostered, the impact it had on the two key southern participants and their subsequent civil rights 
activism at the state and local level, and the resistance that its report, TSTR, galvanized.   
Just as the civil rights movement witnessed unprecedented gains in the 1940s, so did the 
reaction against it.  Although massive resistance to the civil rights movement is normally associ-
ated with the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court decision, advances 
in civil rights even as far back as the 1930s had been challenged, and this pattern continued and 
strengthened in the 1940s.
14
   This dissertation will argue that Truman's PCCR represented a ma-
jor historical change in the approach to civil rights that would have a profound effect on activists 
and the movement itself.  Its groundbreaking report unequivocally declared the federal govern-
ment as the guardian of all Americans’ civil rights –a critical point first enunciated in The Decla-
ration of Independence.
15 
 In essence, Truman’s PCCR elevated the civil rights dialogue to a na-
tional level by recasting the civil rights issue as an American problem rather than just a black-
American problem.  Moreover, TSTR attacked segregation directly and challenged the federal 
government to take the lead by immediately desegregating the armed services. These radical rec-
ommendations came only six years after a reluctant Franklin D. Roosevelt formed the FEPC, and 
six and one-half years before the United States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling, Brown v. the 
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7 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas and the ensuing backlash.
16
  
 
Thus, in 1947 Truman’s 
PCCR and its report, TSTR, forged a new “civil rights frontier.”17 
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CHAPTER 1: FROM SOUTHERN HUMAN RELATIONS TO NATIONAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Between 1938 and 1948, the South as a region became the subject of national, and specif-
ically executive, concern.  During this ten-year period, Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Harry S. Truman had identified the South as a regional problem that was worthy of American 
and federal attention and even intervention.  In 1938 Roosevelt labeled the South “the nation’s 
number one economic problem.”1 Almost ten years later in October 1947, Truman’s Committee 
on Civil Rights reinforced Gunnar Myrdal’s conclusion from his groundbreaking 1944 study, An 
American Dilemma, in which he declared the South to be the nation’s number one moral prob-
lem.
2
  This change in characterization of the South from an economic problem to a moral prob-
lem marks a critical shift in thoughts about race relations and liberalism in America.    Moreover 
Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights would prove to be the fulcrum for the federal government 
to embrace a more assertive and proactive role in ensuring civil rights for all citizens.   
This chapter examines the advent of southern liberalism and the interracial movement in 
the interwar era by looking at several relevant organizations:  the Commission on Interracial Co-
operation, the Women’s Division of the Methodist Church, the Association of Southern Women 
for the Prevention of Lynching, the Committee on Economic Conditions in the South, the South-
ern Conference for Human Welfare, and the Southern Regional Council.  It then explores the 
transition of race relations policies and efforts in the 1930s from the Great Depression and World 
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War II under the Roosevelt administration to civil rights in the early post-war and nascent Cold 
War eras under Truman, culminating in the creation of Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights and 
its seminal report To Secure These Rights. In doing so, this chapter examines how these policies 
were informed by southern liberals, human relations activists and organizations, and the Left, 
and also how northern organizations, the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II also 
influenced race relations policy at the executive level.  Additionally, Gunnar Myrdal’s ground-
breaking work An American Dilemma will be used to illustrate how, in the 1940s, ideas about the 
causes of prejudice shifted and ideas for combatting and curing prejudice also changed.  
Myrdal’s work espoused a far more direct tactic in confronting the problem through assimilating 
blacks directly into American society and then educating non-minorities (whites) to elicit under-
standing and tolerance.
3
   
During the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, these presidents did not simply make 
declarations of existing liberal beliefs about the South.  Rather, during periods of crisis such as 
the Great Depression, domestic racial tension during World War II, and the domestic white-on- 
black violence that characterized the early post-war period, these executives empowered groups 
of experts to bring them the “facts” and offer recommendations about solving the regional prob-
lem.  The ten-year period 1938-1948 is book-ended by two such groups: Roosevelt’s Conference 
on Economic Conditions of the South, which in 1938 published its landmark Report on the Eco-
nomic Conditions in the South (RECS) and the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) 
under Truman, which published the groundbreaking To Secure These Rights (TSTR) in 1947.   
TSTR furnished Truman with the salient points of his civil rights message to Congress in Febru-
ary, 1948.  Moreover, these two groups and their respective reports are emblematic of the dra-
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matic shift in the federal government’s approach and involvement in race relations during the 
critical years spanning 1938 to 1948.   
 
1.2 The Rise and Demise of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation  
After an increase of white-on-black violence that erupted during the post-World War I 
era, a select group of educated and progressive southern white men that included Will W. Alex-
ander, whose affiliations were mainly with the YMCA and the Methodist Church, formed an or-
ganization devoted to improving understanding between the races.  The Commission on Interra-
cial Cooperation (CIC) headquartered in Atlanta but funded with northern money, invited mem-
bers of Atlanta’s African American elite to join the CIC a few months after incorporation.4  The 
founders of this organization birthed “the interracial movement,” and together these southern 
moderates and liberals worked to address racial tensions in the South, without the need for feder-
al intervention.
 5
  In the 1920s, the CIC allowed women to join, and high-ranking members of the 
Women’s Division of the Methodist Church created a female division within the CIC.  During its 
first decade, the CIC expanded to several southern states, instituting field offices in which state-
level interracial committees were formed, representing over fifty percent of southern counties.
6
  
At its zenith, the number of these regional offices numbered approximately eight hundred.
7
  The 
tradition forged by the activists within the CIC and informed by the Women’s Division Method-
ist Church included interracial work in an effort to forge understanding and empathy across ra-
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cial lines.  Although African Americans and whites met and worked together during interracial 
meetings, these activists did not publicly protest segregation.  Segregation was a topic that this 
group tried to avoid because of its divisiveness; merely discussing integration could derail activi-
ties. 
8
    
For almost twenty years the CIC brought together southern liberals (white and African 
American) and southern moderates who increasingly sought ways in which to improve the situa-
tion of African Americans in the South.  CIC members believed their work to be relevant and the 
majority of southern whites expected the southern segregated way of life to extend far into the 
future.   The CIC addressed several critical issues:  ensuring African Americans consistently re-
ceived equal treatment under the law, economic parity with whites, and improved educational 
opportunities.
9
   
As the Great Depression extended into the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
provided opportunities for new ways of resolving the nation’s economic woes.  Southern liberals, 
in particular, perceived Roosevelt’s New Deal as the South’s ticket to the future, and several 
prominent southern liberals, such as Clark Foreman and Alexander, flocked to Washington, D.C. 
to join the Roosevelt administration.  Foreman was hired by the United States Interior Depart-
ment as a “special adviser on the economic status of Negroes” and, in 1934 Alexander co-chaired 
the Committee on Negroes in the Economic Reconstruction.  One year later Alexander was hired 
as the “deputy administrator of the federal Resettlement Administration.”  This agency worked 
on behalf of sharecroppers and tenant farmers “who had been displaced by the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act’s policy of curbing cotton production.”10    In 1937, the Bankhead-Jones Farm Ten-
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ancy Act created the Farm Security Administration, which Alexander headed.
11
  Once distanced 
from the South and the stodgy CIC, Alexander began moving away from the “interracial cooper-
ation model,” as data collected by federally-funded studies increasingly blamed the South’s eco-
nomic ills “directly or indirectly” on segregation.12    
Back in the South, federal funds were being used to study economic and social issues.  
The CIC under noted sociologist Howard Odum, who became its president in 1937, shifted its 
focus from interracial meetings to research.  The purpose of the change in tactics was so the CIC 
could determine the root causes of the economic disparities between the races so they could edu-
cate others on the results and elicit change – gradually moving toward integration.  With Odum 
at its head, the CIC still refused to take any official position against segregation, while his south-
ern liberal counterparts in Washington were using “the New Deal to force change.”13  Odum was 
the department head of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and was 
more absent than present at the CIC headquarters in Atlanta.   With former CIC leaders in Wash-
ington becoming more radicalized in their thinking, their perception of the CIC’s mission be-
came less relevant.  Furthermore, with absentee leadership, the CIC’s focus became fragmented.  
Absent guidance from senior leadership, Jessie Daniel Ames became the defacto management of 
the CIC’s offices in Atlanta and eventually reactivated the CIC’s interracial meetings strategy.  
Ames was a successful organizer of women within the CIC and Women’s Division of the Meth-
odist Church and also the founder of the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching.  Influenced by her experiences in the Women’s Division of the Methodist Church, 
Ames believed that racial tensions could be alleviated by bringing together people of both races 
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to discuss matters and work out resolutions.  Therefore, by the late 1930s the CIC, under Ames, 
was reverting to its original strategy of interracial cooperation and included participation from 
state level councils, all of which focused on the goal of improving human relations between the 
races. 
14
   
 
1.3 Women’s Division of the Methodist Church 
As segregation became firmly entrenched in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, women’s religious groups worked to make inroads in race relations and racial uplift.  The 
Women’s Division of the Methodist Church was one such group that had a long legacy in race 
relations beginning with 1912, when the Women’s Missionary Society (WMS) helped to organ-
ize “the first Settlement House for Negroes,” called Bethlehem Center in Augusta, Georgia.15  
Additionally, a significant shift occurred for WMS’s activities when it overtly selected improved 
race relations as one of its primary goals.  The churchwomen were charged both with learning 
about the hardships African Americans endured under segregation and with devising practical 
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measures to improve these conditions.  Women were to study various areas such as “public 
schools, churches, recreation facilities, jails and courts, housing and sanitation.”16   
At a 1920 meeting held in Memphis, Tennessee, African American women, who were 
leaders in their churches and communities, met with white churchwomen.  As a result of that 
critical meeting, the WMS reinforced and rejuvenated its commitment to improved race relations 
and “social conditions.”17  One result was the creation of Christian Leadership Schools, which 
were designed by the WMS to bring together Methodist women of both races so that African 
American women could be trained as leaders in the Colored Methodist Episcopal women’s so-
cieties.  These schools were set up as week-long experiences in which Methodist women of both 
races lived and studied together.
18
  Attendees were later contacted and the data collected from 
these surveys demonstrated that interracial contacts such as these experienced in these confer-
ences allowed the women to communicate effectively and thoughtfully across racial lines to ad-
dress local issues.  For many, the conference was a spiritually changing experience.
19
   
Dorothy Tilly was one such southern churchwoman who became more involved with the 
WMS sometime shortly after 1910 and expanded her activism within it during the 1930s.   In 
1930, Tilly was sent by the WMS to teach a course at a Christian Leadership School held at this 
historically black Paine College in Augusta.  There she met Thelma Stevens, the conference’s 
organizer, who asked Tilly to luncheon at the school cafeteria with her and the students.  Tilly 
had never before eaten with African Americans, and although she hesitated for an instant, she did 
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so only because she had never done anything like it before.
20
  In the segregated South, a white 
person dining with African Americans was considered a strict social taboo.  Stevens, who was 
about twenty years Tilly’s junior, became the teacher that day to her older colleague.  Stevens 
recognized that Tilly was ready for this experience, and she very calmly but firmly encouraged 
Tilly.  Thanks to Stevens, Tilly, at age forty-seven, had her first meal in the company of African 
American women and, after this experience, Stevens noted that Tilly’s rapport with her African 
American students became “more collegial.”21  The experience changed Tilly inwardly as well, 
and she came to completely renounce segregation during this decade.
22
  Moreover, the manner in 
which Stevens guided Tilly and the environment in which this life-altering experience had oc-
curred allowed Tilly to safely cross the racial boundary and overcome whatever fear she may 
have associated with interracial dining.  Tilly was living proof that through love, education, trust, 
and faith, a person could overcome preconceived racist attitudes and break through entrenched 
racial barriers. 
In the 1930s, Tilly involved herself in a variety of organizations that dealt with human 
rights issues.  In this critical decade for Tilly, she immersed herself in activist work with other 
Methodist women in a variety of organizations.   These women became increasingly aware of the 
dire situation many people – mainly African Americans – faced in the South.  Moreover, these 
churchwomen understood their unique opportunity as white women to improve southern society.   
As part of their growth as activists, Tilly and other churchwomen like her became participants in 
the growing interracial movement, which afforded opportunities for African Americans and 
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16 
whites to meet as equals in social settings and take courses, eat, pray, and work out solutions to 
social problems together.  It is due to these experiences that Tilly, and other southern liberals like 
her, eventually disavowed segregation as morally wrong.   
1930 was a critical year for the WMS because it expanded its interracial work.  The 
WMS’s Bureau on Christian Social Relations charged the churchwomen with “promoting more 
Christian race relations in their home communities by initiating an interdenominational women’s 
study of Negro life in their own community….  After conducting this study, the white women 
were to organize and conduct Bible study classes for black women.”  The goal was for them to 
report back to their respective missionary societies what they had learned in their interracial 
weekly Bible meetings.  By 1932, Jessie Daniel Ames, the head of the Women’s Department of 
the CIC, suggested that the African American and white women begin working together “from 
the start” and that way, better results would be achieved more rapidly.  Testimony from those 
who had already been involved in local interracial meetings demonstrated that these experiences 
allowed for “the growth of community co-operation for better schools, better churches, better 
homes, and better lives for all people.”23   
These interactions also led to increased understanding of the extreme hardships some Af-
rican Americans faced under the Jim Crow system.  When school systems in Alabama were stud-
ied by the WMS’s Bureau of Christian Social Relations as part of a larger effort focused on im-
proving black schools, the churchwomen witnessed the disparities between the adequately fund-
ed white schools and the underfunded black schools.  Additionally, deplorable sanitation condi-
tions in the black schools and in many black homes reinforced the realization that segregation 
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was not only separate but grossly unequal, and this helped to extinguish any misconceptions 
white women had about the Jim Crow system.
24
   
During the Depression, the Methodist women also turned their attention to the issues of 
rural southerners and the plight of tenant farmers, who “faced the most deprivation of adequate 
housing, sanitation, food, health care, and education.”  Tilly was appointed by the WMS to rep-
resent it with the National Rural Administration and assist in creating “sister societies” in the ru-
ral South.  By 1933, Methodist women included an update on the progress of race relations with-
in the Commission on Rural Development, of which Tilly was secretary.  This was a critical ob-
servation because it meant “that within the Bureau of Christian Social Relations, racial issues 
were being considered whenever and wherever they surfaced and would not automatically be 
shunted off to a specialty group.”  Other connections across the racial divide were occurring as 
well, and white women’s missionary societies increasingly invited their African American coun-
terparts to meet with them to engage in activities together, such as “World Day of Prayer.”25   
These white churchwomen eventually branched out their activism to the political arena, 
and even tackled the white primary.  Women were charged with examining the voting practices 
in their own local communities to see the extent of discrimination in the system, and also to 
make recommendations on remedying whatever shortcomings they discovered.  This venture into 
the voting rights arena marked a critical departure for the Methodist women.   This area was no 
longer considered “dangerous” as it had been viewed back in 1920, the first year in which wom-
en could vote in national elections.  Now it was considered yet another opportunity for the wom-
en to explore as part of their work in human relations.
26
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In another bold move, the women shone the investigative spotlight within their own 
homes and examined how they were paying and treating their African American domestic help.  
This study helped convince the WMS that across the South, improvements to the working condi-
tions of domestic labor were necessary.
27
    
Increasingly in the 1930s some white southern Methodist women became more involved 
in improving the lives of all southerners – both black and white.  Their focus shifted early in the 
decade to concentrate on improving human relations in the South.  These women believed the 
best way to achieve this goal was to open the lines of communication between churchwomen of 
both races through interracial experiences such as Christian Leadership Schools, Bible studies, 
and missionary society meetings.  In these organized encounters, women of both races could 
converse intelligently about issues as leaders in their respective churches and as mothers and 
wives in their respective communities.  In these meetings, attendees strove to better understand 
the issues and deliberately selected areas to tackle, such as schools, housing, employment condi-
tions, and lynching, with the goal of making the South a place in which all humans, regardless of 
race, could thrive. 
 
1.4 The Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching 
1930, the first year of the Great Depression, also witnessed a spike in lynching.  In the 
early to mid-1930s, with heavy southern representation in New Deal agencies, the South became 
the benefactor of much-needed federal funding for studies and programs.  Organizations such as 
the CIC shifted its strategy away from interracial work to that of research and educational pro-
grams.  As a result of the increased lynching, certain CIC members, such as Arthur Raper and 
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Jessie Daniel Ames, redirected their activism to focus on this issue.
28
  Raper, a sociologist who 
worked under Howard Odum at Chapel Hill, researched the lynchings that had occurred in the 
South, and in 1933 he published his conclusions in the well-received The Tragedy of Lynching.  
Ames, as the head of the Women’s Department of the CIC, and in conjunction with the Women’s 
Missionary Council (WMC) of the Methodist Church and the National Association of Colored 
Women, helped form an all-white female organization which she called the Association of 
Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL).   
By the end of the 1930s the ASWPL had helped to reduce the incidence of lynching in 
the South, but Ames would not support a federal anti-lynching law.  She believed that the 
ASWPL’s efforts were the surest way to eradicate lynching in the South, and furthermore that 
racial matters should be settled by the individual states and not through the intervention of the 
federal government.
29
  While Ames was the brains behind the ASWPL, a great deal of the field 
work was done by activist Dorothy Tilly.
30
  By the mid-1940s, Tilly would emerge as a leader 
and replace Ames as Director of Women’s Work for the CIC.31    
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1.5 The Great Depression and the New Deal   
During the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program implemented 
specific legislation intended to stimulate the faltering economy.  Some of these initiatives assist-
ed African Americans and this angered southern Democrats.  During the 1930s the combination 
of New Deal programs, legislation, the labor movement, and the Left forged a charged atmos-
phere of hope and progress in the growing black protest movement that was unmatched in prior 
years.  Additionally, New Deal programs elevated the status of African Americans to a national 
level.
 32
  In the 1934 congressional elections, many black voters abandoned the Republican Party 
for the Democratic Party, a dramatic shift that did not go unnoticed by politicians.  For the first 
time since Reconstruction, African American voters were being taken seriously by “urban liber-
als” and those “in the labor movement.”  African Americans also began to demand more from 
New Deal programs, and Franklin Roosevelt responded.
33
  His Federal Council on Negro Af-
fairs, known informally as the “Black Cabinet,” offered guidance to Roosevelt on matters affect-
ing African Americans during the Depression and New Deal.   Southern conservative Democrats 
became increasingly angered by Roosevelt’s attention to African Americans, and this put Roose-
velt in a delicate situation as he attempted to woo African Americans as newfound supporters in 
the Democratic Party and keep his southern white constituents happy.
34
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The Great Depression also brought more whites into economically dire straits, along with 
many blacks.  During this time, the racial problem transformed into an economic problem under 
the larger umbrella of the Depression.
35
   While African Americans’ plight was of some concern 
to President Roosevelt, many of his New Deal programs fell far short of alleviating hard times 
for African Americans.  For example, during Roosevelt’s first term, racial discrimination was 
widely permitted within New Deal agencies and Roosevelt “sanctioned regional wage differ-
ences that resulted in southern blacks under NRA codes being paid less” or being excluded.36   
In the face of the economic crisis, Roosevelt sacrificed reform on behalf of  African 
Americans in order to get legislation passed by southern Democrats in hopes of benefitting the 
majority of Americans.  This practice was most evident in 1934 and again in 1935 when Roose-
velt refused to openly support a federal anti-lynching bill, because in doing so he would alienate 
southern Democrats in Congress and admitted so: 
 I did not choose the tools with which I must work… Had I been 
 permitted to choose them I would have selected quite different ones.   
 But I’ve got to get legislation passed by Congress to save America.  The 
 southerners by reason of the seniority rule in Congress are chairmen or 
 occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and House committees. If 
 I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill I ask 
 Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing.  I just can’t take that risk.37 
 
This byproduct of the political machinations increased the economic division between blacks and 
whites during the Depression, thus exacerbating the racial division.   
Despite Roosevelt’s attempts to keep southern Democrats happy during his second term, 
his wooing of southern liberals caused the growing resentment and distrust of him by southern 
conservatives to reach a breaking point, evidenced in the dwindling support from southern con-
servative politicians for Roosevelt’s continued New Deal policies.  While many New Deal pro-
                                                          
35
 Jackson, p. 6.  
36
 Leuchtenburg, p. 56.  The NRA is the National Recovery Act. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 57-58 and Roosevelt as quoted by Leuchtenburg, p. 58.  
22 
grams were not ostensibly pro-civil rights for African Americans, those that undermined white 
supremacy aroused southern conservative opposition.  When wage-and-hour legislation was pro-
posed, Congressman Martin Dies of Texas balked because of the race issue and exclaimed indig-
nantly, “you cannot prescribe the same wage for the black man as for the white man.” 38   
By 1936 some southern Democrats, especially Harry Byrd and Carter Glass of Virginia, 
“had become caustic opponents of FDR and his programs.”  Georgia’s Governor, Eugene 
Talmadge, also developed a great disdain for Roosevelt, accusing him of being a Bolshevik and 
denouncing programs such as the National Recovery Act (NRA), Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).  In 1936, Talmadge organized a meeting 
with the purpose of “‘blocking Mr. Roosevelt’s renomination.’”  Once elected, Roosevelt faced 
increased criticism from southern whites for actions such as his Supreme Court packing scheme 
and his support of sit-down strikes, “and his intervention in party affairs.”  Despite “ferocious 
southern opposition,” Roosevelt’s Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was passed in 1938, with 
the majority of votes against it coming from southerners.
39
  Nevertheless the Roosevelt admin-
istration made many concessions to the white South – such as excluding domestic workers from 
the FLSA and allowing the administration of federal relief to be carried out locally without fed-
eral oversight.   
 
1.6 The Report on the Economic Conditions of the South 
By 1938 Roosevelt, smarting from his inability to sway many southern senators to his 
ongoing New Deal ideas, sought ways in which he could regain lost political ground in the 
South.  His mission was threefold:  (1) to educate white southerners about the benefits that his 
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New Deal had brought to the South in order to gain support for continued programs; (2) to fur-
ther alleviate regional poverty; and (3) to replace southern conservatives in Congress with south-
ern liberals.
40
  To meet this third goal, Roosevelt met with Clark Foreman in the Spring of 1938.  
Foreman, a Georgia native who had been mentored by Will W. Alexander at the CIC, was now 
director of the Public Works Administration’s (PWA’s) Power Division.  Roosevelt pumped 
Foreman for suggestions on who to run against Senator Walter George in the Georgia primaries.  
Foreman could not come up with any names, but he mentioned a plan that Jerome Frank, legal 
counsel to the Power Division, had devised to create a “pamphlet calling the attention of the na-
tion to the economic problems of the South.”  Foreman argued that such a pamphlet “could be 
used in the southern primaries to demonstrate the benefits the New Deal had brought to the re-
gion.”  Although Roosevelt liked the idea, he suggested that Foreman and his associates instead 
“offer the bare facts of the economic difficulties confronting the South” in a report so that, once 
provided the facts, southerners could figure out their solutions.   Roosevelt envisioned this report 
might be the first of many.  To that end, Roosevelt summoned Lowell Mellett, director of the Na-
tional Emergency Council (NEC) to lead the effort.
41
   
Foreman and Mellett solicited input and assistance from other white southern New Deal-
ers such as Clifford Durr and labor leader Lucy Randolph Mason, and together they compiled a 
draft of the requested report.  The group also assembled an advisory board which would review 
the report’s draft, and they sought noted University of North Carolina (UNC) sociologist and 
southern liberal Howard Odum to chair this effort.  When Odum declined, the group approached 
Frank Porter Graham, the president of UNC at Chapel Hill, who had largely been responsible for 
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turning that University into a “beacon of liberalism in the South.” 42  Roosevelt called this group 
the Conference on Economic Conditions of the South (CECS), and Graham became its chair.
43
  
In this capacity, Graham asked the group to read the draft and make recommendations; then he 
called the group together for a review of it.  This group, now twenty-two members strong, repre-
sented a cross section of southern business, politics, labor, and newspaper professionals, and it 
included notables like First National Bank of Birmingham’s president John C. Persons,  Gover-
nor Carl Bailey of Arkansas, and Barry Bingham, publisher of Louisville’s Courier-Journal.    
Also present at the review of the draft were Lyndon B. Johnson, a junior Congressman from 
Texas and a Roosevelt supporter, and John Sparkman, a soon-to-be second-term Congressman 
from Alabama, although neither was an official committee member. 
44
   
Within a month, the conference members completed their revisions and editing. They 
then presented Roosevelt with the final report published by the National Emergency Council en-
titled, Report on Economic Conditions of the South (RECS),
45
 which contrasted the South dispar-
agingly against other sections of the country.  The CECS’s unfavorable report card, coupled with 
Roosevelt’s statement in early July that year, labeling the South as “the Nation’s No. 1 economic 
problem,” touched the nerves of many white southerners.  They became defensive of their region 
and, resisting change from outsiders, resorted to blaming African Americans for the region’s 
ills.
46
  Roosevelt used the report against two conservative southern Democrats in Georgia, Eu-
gene Talmadge and Walter George, in his visit there during the primary season in the fall of 
1938.
47
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True to its intent, the RECS dealt with southern economic issues for the region as a 
whole.  It also devoted an entire section to the topic of education, which would have been espe-
cially interesting to the CECS chair, Frank Graham, who was an educator and a lifelong propo-
nent of public education.
48
  The report did not highlight the differences between white and Afri-
can American schools in the South, but rather contrasted sharply the southern educational sys-
tems with others outside of the region.  The findings were startling:  New York State outspent 
Mississippi by five times on each student.  The report also noted that southern teachers’ salaries 
were far lower than those earned by their northern counterparts.  The average annual salary for a 
teacher in New York State was $2,361, while Arkansas paid an average annual salary of $465 to 
its teachers.  Additionally, the collective endowments of all secondary educational institutions in 
the South fell short of the combined endowments of Harvard and Yale universities.
49
  The con-
ference concluded that “[T]he South must educate one-third of the Nation’s children with one-
sixth of the Nation’s school revenues.”50   
The report did fault the nation and northern business, claiming both had exploited the 
South.  It also relied extensively on the work of Odum and his “Chapel Hill regionalists,” and 
therefore “conspicuously failed to acknowledge racial antagonisms in the South,” because re-
gionalism relied on the idea that all southerners shared the same problems that were “geograph-
ically based.”51 
Although the RECS side-stepped the South’s obvious racial issues, only mentioning “Ne-
groes” five times in the report, the conference’s liberal members wrote a report that tacitly un-
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dermined the white South’s power and tradition of segregation. Furthermore, “the report did not 
separate economic data by race,” marking a distinction from previous patterns.52  While the 
RECS focused on the South’s economic problems and touched on education, its authors did not 
propose specific solutions, except for recommending that the South enlist and accept help from 
the federal government.
53
  The omission of a set of specific recommendations presented an op-
portunity for the coming together of a unique group of liberal southerners, both African Ameri-
can and white, who had already been focused on the South’s issues.  At the same time that the 
CECS held their first meeting, another organization was already forming, the Southern Confer-
ence for Human Welfare (SCHW).  Not surprisingly, the two groups would share many mem-
bers. 
 
1.7 The Southern Conference for Human Welfare 
Labor activist Joseph Gelders had been beaten brutally in 1937 during an outbreak of vio-
lent acts against southern labor organizers and communist sympathizers, specifically because of 
his testimony in the La Follette Hearings.
 54
  Gelders met with Lucy Randolph Mason early in 
1938 to recommend the formation of a regional group to oppose the anti-labor movement’s vio-
lent tactics.   Mason introduced Gelders to Eleanor Roosevelt, who brokered a meeting for Geld-
ers with her husband in June 1938.  Franklin Roosevelt supported Gelders’ idea, but recom-
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mended that the group expand its outlook to encompass all of the issues that plagued the South, 
especially the issue of voting rights, and he pushed for a larger effort to end the poll tax.  The 
group formed became the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW).  The SCHW expe-
rience was, for many, the first time southern liberals had worked together and collaborated on 
such an important project that looked at the region as a whole.   Moreover, the forming of the 
SCHW also signified a watershed in that it would use the findings of the RECS as a springboard 
to collectively set forth its goals for improving the South.
55
   
The Roosevelts openly supported the SCHW.  In fact, at the first convention of the 
SCHW, Franklin Roosevelt sent the following message to the attendees, acknowledging the 
promise inherent in the South, while simultaneously reminding the group that the South had ben-
efited from federal help (via his New Deal programs).  Nevertheless, Roosevelt alluded that their 
document, the RECS, had revealed to them, as Southerners, that there was much more work to be 
done: 
The long struggle by liberal leaders of the South for human  
welfare in your region has been implemented on an unprecedented 
scale these past five and one-half years by Federal help.  Yet we 
have recognized publicly this year that what has been done is only  
a beginning, and that the South’s unbalance is a major concern not  
merely of the South, but of the whole Nation.  It is heartening,  
therefore, to see the strength of Southern leadership mustered to  
face these human problems…in a united front from Fort Raleigh  
to the Alamo. 
 
If you steer a true course and keep everlastingly at it, the South will  
long be thankful for this day.
56
 
 
In his message Roosevelt characterized the South’s issues as human problems – not racial 
problems or specifically African American problems.  Roosevelt described the South as a region 
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that needed help, and through the CECS and the SCHW Roosevelt succeeded in convening a 
committee, without officially appointing one, to address southern political and economic ills.  
Roosevelt’s support of the SCHW was prominent and significant.57  He ensured that it would be 
southerners addressing the concerns enumerated by the RECS and not outsiders.  Moreover, it 
demonstrated that he envisioned his political solutions within the economic solutions to southern 
poverty, thereby implicitly acknowledging one southern liberal diagnosis of problems as residing 
with the South’s economy.  Modernizing the South economically promised to make Southerners 
more like the rest of the (pro-New Deal) nation, and produce more mainstream (i.e., pro-New 
Deal) Congressmen, who Roosevelt desperately needed to support his New Deal programs.  
Modernizing the South would take more than just economic reform; it went hand in hand with 
democracy.  The fights to eliminate the poll tax (which occurred in Georgia in 1945)  and the 
white primary were also significant markers of modernization.  
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s support was also significant and influential.  She attended 
the first conference of the SCHW, held in Birmingham, Alabama, the weekend after Thanksgiv-
ing 1938 and just three months after the RECS was published.  Over one thousand people attend-
ed the inaugural meeting, and twenty percent of attendees were African Americans.  Among 
those in attendance was Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal and several of his team, who were 
researching American racial issues through a project funded by the Carnegie Institute.
58
  Other 
notable liberals in attendance included Arthur Raper and Virginia Durr.   At this meeting Frank 
Graham was elected the president of the SCHW, a position he initially declined but then later 
accepted “in response to the firestorm that followed the meeting.”  White racists and anti-
Communists opposed the SCHW and many sent “hate mail” to Graham over his involvement in 
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the group.  Graham held the position of SCHW president until 1940.  Howard Odum was con-
spicuously absent from the initial meeting, perceiving the nascent SCHW to be a direct threat to 
the efforts and influence of the CIC, of which he had recently assumed the presidency. 
59
  
During this SCHW gathering, attendees significantly advanced the reform discourse by 
extending it from one of economics into more controversial, yet necessary, areas such as “civil 
liberties.” 60  The delegates discussed and resolved to improve the varied problems that plagued 
the South such as poverty, education, poll tax, and farm tenancy.
61
  At this meeting members 
adopted a resolution against segregation, and they ignored Birmingham’s segregation codes until 
Birmingham’s Commissioner of Public Safety, Theophilus Eugene “Bull” Connor, ordered his 
officers to disrupt the meeting and enforce them.  After the meeting, some attendees including 
Graham came under attack by white supremacists.  The Left also criticized the SCHW for its re-
fusal to tackle segregation except within the confines of the meeting.    
At the end of the 1930s a significant contingent of trailblazing southern liberals, one of 
whom was Frank Graham, supported by Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, was leading the way 
toward segregation’s repudiation and advancing civil liberties, thus sowing the seeds of a recon-
ceived attitude toward race relations in the South and in the White House.
62
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1.8 From Southern Liberalism to Modern Racial Liberalism 
During the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration forged a new national liberalism, 
characterizing the exceptional American experience as the best in the world.
63
  The 1940s wit-
nessed the continuing and accelerated shift in liberalism that had begun in the late 1930s.  World 
War II would hasten the pace of change out of necessity, and a landmark study published in 1944 
would define a new racial liberalism.   
Prior to the late 1940s, many southern liberals – black and white – accepted the tenet of 
separate but equal, as long as the conditions were truly equal.
64
  The 1930s proved to be a decade 
of significant progress for black protest organizations, such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which during the 1930s had increased its member-
ship so it had much more of a mass base presence across the South.
65
    
The NAACP argued cases in state courts and at the United States Supreme Court that  
chipped steadily away at the disparity between higher educational opportunities for blacks versus 
whites in southern states and pay inequity for African American teachers.  These cases highlight 
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the fact that black protests in the 1930s were not always necessarily about integration, but about 
attaining equality under a system that failed to deliver on its promise of separate but equal.
66
  
Two NAACP-fought cases in the late 1930s that tested the separate but equal system re-
sulted in far more radical decisions than expected.  In the 1936 case Pearson v. Murray, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled against the University of Maryland, and since there were no 
other options in that State to provide a separate but equal option, it ordered the desegregation of 
the University of Maryland.  Missouri ex rel Gaines, v. Canada, heard at the United States Su-
preme Court in 1938, also held that if there was only one state-owned law school, then it must 
admit both whites and blacks.  While these decisions did not strike down Plessy v. Ferguson, 
they subverted segregation because they demonstrated that Plessy was not being practiced and 
exposed to the court inequalities of the separate but equal system.
67
     
In 1938, Frank Graham’s leadership in southern liberalism was practically unmatched.  
While his liberal stance was unquestioned, the Pauli Murray case illuminated the limits of Gra-
ham’s southern liberalism. When Pauli Murray, an African American native North Carolinian, 
tested UNC at Chapel Hill by applying to graduate school to study sociology under Howard Od-
um and Guy Johnson, she was rejected solely on the basis of her race.  Murray was inspired to 
action in part because of the Gaines Supreme Court decision and also because of Nazi atrocities 
in Europe.  Murray took her case to the NAACP and simultaneously struck up a correspondence 
with Frank Graham to see if he would influence the University to reverse its decision and allow 
her admission.   Graham was also concerned about Fascist Germany, but given the hate mail 
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Graham had received in the days following the SCHW meeting, he was also concerned that a 
strong and similarly hateful anti-African American sentiment was emerging in North Carolina.  
Graham advised Murray to be patient and move with caution.  Graham was in a precarious posi-
tion, simultaneously coming under attack by white supremacists and also racial liberals frustrated 
by the lack of progress being made in race relations.  Graham warned Murray that if she pushed 
the issue legally, her actions might result in an unraveling of the progress which had already 
been made, or what he termed “an interracial throback [sic].”  He also feared that “Integration 
would blow the lid off things.”  Although Graham refused to intervene on Murray’s part, he ad-
mitted in a letter to her, which she sent to many black newspapers who published it, that “This 
much is certain… that the Constitution of North Carolina is inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the United States and should be changed to meet the ideals set forth by the first citizens of our 
country.”   While Graham’s southern liberalism prevented him from making radical moves, his 
words belied a far more radical personal belief in the need for racial equality in education.
68
     
By the early 1940s southern liberalism floundered as African Americans and the Left in-
creasingly demanded an end to segregation.  These members of “an anti-Fascist Left” pushed the 
South away from the inertia “of interracial cooperation to more radical political action in the late 
1930s.”  Interracial cooperation was failing due to the disturbing revelation that white supremacy 
had the ability for “relentless regeneration.”69  The CIC, lacking clear direction from absentee 
leadership and following defacto management, was an increasingly splintered organization that 
was languishing with membership rolls declining.
70
 Additionally, many state-level councils 
lacked funds and overall interest, especially from their African American members, to continue.  
In 1942, a frustrated southern liberal black activist leadership group, consisting of many CIC 
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members met in Durham, North Carolina and put forth their demands for improvements for Afri-
can Americans in a document entitled “The Durham Statement.”  In this document, black leaders 
clearly stated that they were opposed to segregation itself.   White leaders of the CIC reacted to 
this document by holding their own meeting in Atlanta.  They responded to the Durham confer-
ence by maintaining their opposition to racial inequities but with an unwillingness to challenge 
segregation.  In June 1943, the two groups met in Richmond, Virginia, and the result was the 
death of the outmoded CIC and the birth of the Southern Regional Council (SRC), which was 
chartered in 1944.  Jessie Daniel Ames was ultimately ousted and Dorothy Tilly then replaced 
her as the Director of Women’s Work for the SRC.  The SRC’s mission would be similar to the 
strategy adopted by the CIC in the 1930s under Alexander and Odum - to attain racial equality 
through research and educational programs.  Despite all of the energy expended in transforming 
the CIC into the SRC, the fundamental policy about segregation remained the same and the SRC 
did not forthrightly challenge segregation until 1951.
 71
   
1944 was also the year in which Gunnar Myrdal published his sweeping critique of the 
racial division in America, An American Dilemma:  The Negro Problem and Modern Democra-
cy.  In it, he defined a new racial liberalism, one characterized by both an integrated society and 
racial equality.  In other words, Myrdal concluded that in order for America to solve its racial 
dilemma, it must eliminate segregation and immediately confer full rights to African Americans.  
Funded by the Carnegie Institution, Myrdal, a Swedish social scientist, was specifically selected 
to lead this study since, as a foreigner, he would be free of the attitudes of race division that had 
historically plagued race relations in the United States.  The task took several years of research 
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and included an interracial group of northerners and southern liberals.  While Myrdal accepted 
advice from black and white leaders such as Du Bois and Odum, he purposely did not use this 
top leadership for his research. Rather, he selected those from its second tier, such as Ira De A. 
Reid or Guy B. Johnson, so that his work would not be unduly influenced by either the more rad-
ical black activist approach or by southern liberalism’s cautious and non-confrontational ap-
proach to the racial issues.  Myrdal also utilized the research of two of Odum’s students, Arthur 
Raper and Thomas Woofter.   Myrdal’s remedy of immediate absorption of African Americans 
into mainstream America sounded superficially like a reasonable and logical solution.  The con-
sequence of following this tactic meant that African Americans would have to assimilate and 
therefore abandon their cultural differences in order to do so quickly.   Myrdal’s approach for 
becoming American implicitly meant becoming white.
72
     
 Southern newspaper editors largely ignored An American Dilemma when it was first pub-
lished in 1944.  Several leaders in southern liberal circles dismissed it.  Howard Odum wrote a 
review in Social Forces criticizing Myrdal’s inability to articulate “more concrete recommenda-
tions” in solving the American dilemma.  Rupert Vance, in the Virginia Quarterly Review, 
acknowledged Myrdal’s assertion that African Americans desired integration, but objected to 
Myrdal’s suggestion that the issues be resolved “by political means.”73  These attitudes demon-
strate that some leaders within southern liberal ranks not only wanted to continue to control the 
pace of change with respect to race relations, but they also did not want the federal government 
involved in making those changes.   
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In the 1940s, the use of education to combat prejudice had been espoused by various “so-
cial scientists and social reformers” whose efforts became known collectively as the Intergroup 
Relations Movement.  Spearheaded by American Jewish organizations to fight prejudice in 
America against the backdrop of the growing racial hatred under the Nazi German fascist re-
gime, this movement also included a wide range of other religious organizations and therefore  
became an ecumenical movement.
74
   
The Intergroup Relations Movement was more commonly known as a “community rela-
tions or human relations” movement, and it espoused the use of mass media (mainly radio) “to 
influence individual’s attitudes and behavior” toward people of different races, ethnic back-
grounds, and religions.  The organizations’ members also believed that youth education was a 
critical method in eradicating prejudice, because exposing children to various aspects of differing 
cultures would lead to tolerance and acceptance before they had a chance to learn hatred.
 75
    
When Myrdal published his study of American prejudice in 1944, it was groundbreaking 
because it described prejudice and discrimination as moral and psychological problems – not is-
sues that were rooted in economics.  Myrdal therefore, “had a significant profound influence on 
the way that intergroup relations workers and social scientists understood race and racism in the 
postwar period.”  Furthermore, Myrdal’s belief that prejudice and racism could be eliminated 
through education supported the Intergroup Relations Movement’s efforts.76   
Thus by the mid-1940s, three strategies had been identified as ways in which the racial 
issues in the South might be resolved.  The traditional southern liberal stance was to research is-
sues and then provide education about those issues.  For example, some southern liberals sought 
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economic remedies to bring about economic parity among the races.  Once achieved, they 
thought this would then evolve naturally into the voluntary dissolution of segregation.   Another 
approach adopted by the Women’s Division of the Methodist Church and advanced by women 
activists in the Methodist Church and the CIC involved bringing the two races together in inter-
racial meetings to discuss issues and work out solutions.  This tactic would allow for understand-
ing between the races, acceptance of the commonalities between them as human beings, and re-
spect for differences.  The third approach, which Myrdal proposed in An American Dilemma, 
identified America’s racial problem as a moral issue.  To fix the problem, he recommended a 
short cut to ending segregation – integrate immediately with use of political means to help Afri-
can Americans achieve full rights as citizens and educate whites to assist them in accepting the 
forced change.  This liberal universalist message ultimately, with the assistance of the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Civil Rights in 1947 which advanced it, would become the new national 
liberalism.   
 
1.9 World War II, the FEPC, and the Bureau of Intelligence   
World War II essentially ended the Depression and collided with the growing assertive-
ness of the African American Civil Rights Movement, which had gained support and momentum 
during the 1930s and continued this trajectory into the 1940s.  The United States’ entry into the 
war accelerated the nation’s immediate need to become “the arsenal of democracy,” highlighted 
its emergence as a global leader and its role as a symbol of equality, and brought the racial divi-
sion within the United States to the forefront as it became a matter of “national security, interna-
tional relations, and global justice.”77   
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In the United States millions of unemployed Americans found jobs in the growing de-
fense industry.  This increase in employment gave rise to other issues such as “ghettoization” in 
northern cities, as blacks migrated north to find employment opportunities.
78
 When given a 
chance at employment in the nascent defense industry, African Americans found themselves rel-
egated to the dirtiest, most menial, and lowest paying jobs.  Because of this blatant discrimina-
tion, African American leaders threatened mass protests.  Additionally, the crowding of these 
urban spaces would lead to race riots erupting in cities across the nation.   In response to both 
crises, the federal government would ultimately be forced to act.  
President Roosevelt birthed the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) in 1941 
via executive order, after labor leader A. Philip Randolph’s all-black March on Washington 
Movement threatened to precipitate a massive public protest against discriminatory hiring prac-
tices in the defense industry.  These protests would undermine the war effort and significantly 
damage the United States’ reputation internationally.  The FEPC, which was designed to investi-
gate discrimination in the defense industry, was itself a breakthrough because it was the first fed-
eral agency since Reconstruction appointed to address minorities’ issues.79   Moreover, the pro-
testors who forced Roosevelt to create the FEPC reflected the growing assertiveness and confi-
dence demonstrated by activist African Americans that had started in the 1930s.
80
     
Despite the FEPC, discrimination in the defense industry continued and in 1942 whites 
far outnumbered minorities by a margin of ninety-seven percent to three percent in these jobs.
81
  
Racial tensions continued to mount in urban areas in which minorities and whites vied for em-
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ployment, housing, and recreation in the same constricted areas.  In 1942 episodes of racial con-
flict erupted in cities such as Beaumont, Texas and Detroit, Michigan.
82
  These disturbing events 
prompted Edwin R. Embree, president of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, to appeal to President Roo-
sevelt and press him “to create a committee of race relations experts to advise him on govern-
ment action.”83  While this request was not fulfilled, throughout that year the Bureau of Intelli-
gence conducted a study to determine the attitudes of the American people and how they “sized 
up their major problems during their first year at war….”84  This report was entitled, “Report 
from the Nation December 7, 1942.”85 
The idea for such a report originated with the government’s attempt to understand and re-
act to the “race tension” that was clearly “growing” within certain areas of the country.86  Philleo 
Nash of the Bureau of Intelligence (BOI), Office of Facts and Figures, recalled later that the gov-
ernment was already very concerned with the escalating “race tension.”87  In 1942 Nash had 
conducted an in-depth study of Detroit’s Sojourner Truth housing project riot, concluding that 
the race tension had been “localized.”  More frustrating to Nash and his colleagues was that 
within the White House there was an accepted provincial theory about race riots that held they 
were events that “couldn't be controlled.  They were a thing like tornadoes, you might say, ‘hu-
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man hurricanes;’ unpredictable; unregulatable [sic]; and all you could do was endure it.”  Nash, 
an anthropologist who had studied the Klamath Indians for his doctoral dissertation at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, likened this flawed and limited thinking to that which “made it possible to 
have the Indian wars.”  More important, as a conscientious social scientist, Nash along with his 
colleagues would not accept that there was simply nothing to be done about this problem.  There-
fore, they were determined to get attitudes and opinions on various topics from a cross section of 
Americans, and they amassed a great deal of information into this one study.  Nash recalled their 
goal was to “pinpoint, if at all possible, the tension centers.”  In other words, the researchers be-
lieved that they could get a better answer to the question of what was causing the race tension, 
and they would no longer be satisfied with the generic, vague, dismissive and pat answer that 
they had been receiving, which was “‘Some Negroes are pretty frustrated.’"88 
In this report, BOI offered “a selection of significant opinions” but realized that “[T]he 
story they tell is by no means complete.  Yet taken together, they reveal a pattern of public 
thought.”89   
The report was particularly concerned with attitudes about African Americans, and also 
attitudes held by African Americans concerning their role in assisting the war effort.  Regarding 
the latter, the report revealed that African Americans 
as a group…are patriotic citizens and devoted to  
democratic ideals but that ‘resentment has led a  
substantial minority among them to feel that the war  
is exclusively the concern of whites and that their own  
efforts must be devoted to security opportunity and equality  
for their own people’ hence the “Double-V campaign.”90  
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When it came to the question of discrimination of African Americans, the report concluded   
  There were sharp differences in opinions about Negroes 
  between whites living in the South and whites living in 
  the Northeast and West.  Northerners and westerners  
  were more prone than southerners to acknowledge  
  that Negroes are as patriotic as whites, that they make 
equally good soldiers, and that they are entitled to wage  
equality with whites for equal work.  Southerners were  
more prone than northerners and westerners to believe  
that Negroes are generally satisfied with existing conditions  
and that they are getting all the opportunities they deserve.
91
 
 
While this statement may not be surprising, given the South’s entrenched Jim Crow tradition, 
what was more troubling to the BOI was that attitudes such as this and those held by the “sub-
stantial minority” of African Americans prevented the American people from being “fully inte-
grated” and “fully mobilized for civilian participation in” the war effort.92     
Because of the numerous inputs and analyses that comprised this study, Nash believed it 
was “the first comprehensive study that had ever been made…of race tension in a quantifiable 
form.”93   
We were preparing a weekly intelligence report on information  
problems, and it was agreed in the Bureau that one of these weekly  
issues would be devoted to a complete analysis of the picture of race  
tension. Before that weekly report we threw all the forces of the  
Bureau of Intelligence into operation.  Rensis Likert, and his surveys  
in depth, now at the University of Michigan; Wilson and the  
Opinion Survey; we were doing the most complete opinion survey in  
the United States in existence at this time, because we went into rural  
areas; we had a better sample; we got better results. The media analysis  
divisions were called upon to analyze the content of the press, the  
radio -- TV, of course, didn't exist -- of magazines. And our own  
Groups and Organization Section made an analysis of the attitudes  
of group leaders and members in organization positions with respect  
to Negro participation in the war. The participation in the war, and the  
tension resulting from it or from its absence, were the subjects of inquiry.
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Nash’s work resulted in a breakthrough because, for the first time, a thorough analysis had been 
completed and the report’s summary focused in on the issues based on data and not on opinion or 
hyperbole.  With this information, Nash believed he had the tools to act.   
Despite the amount of effort expended to collect this data,  Nash and his researchers were 
thwarted by his superiors when he and his colleagues attempted to act on the valuable infor-
mation.  Although the study revealed a potentially very explosive situation, Nash recalled that 
“[N]obody wanted to hear about it,” and those that did push the subject were accused of being 
“just agitational [sic].”95    At the time, Congress was rather conservative and, according to Nash, 
at the federal level race relations in the early 1940s was deemed a “no-man’s land” - a political 
hot potato not to be tackled by the federal government.  The states were to handle anything to do 
with African Americans and race relations.  If a federal agency got involved, it did so at great 
risk of losing Congressional funding.
96
  Undaunted, and understanding the urgency of the situa-
tion, Nash persisted and continued his search for support in acting on the BOI report findings.  In 
the spring of 1943 his tenacity paid off, because he found someone within the Office of Civilian 
Defense (OCD) who would listen to him – Jonathan Daniels.  Former editor of Raleigh, North 
Carolina’s News and Observer, Daniels was a southern moderate who counted Frank Graham 
among his friends.  He had been recently transferred from the OCD to the White House and was 
serving as an administrative assistant to Franklin Roosevelt.  Unbeknownst to Nash, Daniels had 
just created the Office of War Information (OWI) department, which would replace Nash’s home 
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department, the Office of Facts and Figures.  By the summer of 1943, Nash’s collaboration with 
Daniels, a White House insider, made the work on the BOI report’s data possible.  The surveil-
lance network Nash and others had established included a cadre of newspaper reporters who 
communicated directly with the OWI within the White House.  The timing of their collaboration 
was serendipitous, because by May 1943 race tensions flared and erupted into riots in Los Ange-
les.   Washington, D.C. also witnessed rising racial tension.  With the accurate forecasts provided 
by Nash’s efforts, the tension was able to be extinguished before it erupted. 97   
The attitudes reflected in the BOI’s report foreshadowed an even larger outbreak of vio-
lence.  Later in 1943 the volatile concoction of whites and African Americans living, working, 
and recreating in the same areas due to war industry expansion exploded into over 240 “racial 
disturbances” that occurred while these groups were “staking out their territory in contested pub-
lic spaces.”98  The most infamous and costly of these occurred in Detroit in June, 1943 and 
threatened Roosevelt’s “arsenal of democracy,” resulting in “one of the worst riots in twentieth-
century America.”99   
When these race riots erupted, “numerous proposals for a national committee on race re-
lations were put forward” from southern liberal Howard Odum, and New Deal liberals Saul K. 
Padover, Harold L. Ickes, and John Collier.
100
  Odum had written Race and Rumors of Race, and 
by the early 1940s there were rumors circulating about a race war and that African Americans 
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were, amongst other things, “stockpiling” arms.101  Charles Johnson, who headed Fisk Universi-
ty’s Institute of Race Relations, scrutinized any “racial conflict and attitudes on a monthly basis 
throughout the 1940s.”102  David K. Niles, another assistant to Roosevelt, wrote an “elaborate 
memorandum” in which he recommended “the formation of a national citizens’ committee to 
work in conjunction with local committees to develop programs to combat racial tensions.”103  
Roosevelt, whose New Deal and FEPC had already angered many southern Democrats, was un-
willing to further alienate them during the war.  Moreover, Nash argued that the FEPC was al-
ready considered by many to be a weak committee, and he reasoned “what was the point of hav-
ing two weak committees or commissions to deal with different aspects of the same problem?”  
Therefore, Roosevelt rejected Niles’ idea for this type of committee.104  The fact that no one 
wanted another formal committee left open the option for an informal one, and here the collabo-
ration between Nash and Daniels would bear fruit.  As Nash observed, it was the Detroit race riot 
that proved ultimately that Nash, Daniels, and the OWI’s work could be utilized in identifying 
areas of racial tension and, more important, was used to prevent such happenings again.
105
   
 
1.10 The Maypole Committee 
During the crisis of the 1943 Detroit riot, all government intelligence agencies reported to 
the OWI and to Daniels.  These agencies wrote intelligence reports for Daniels to review and act 
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upon.  By contrast, in his OWI department, Nash was receiving information from the news wires 
almost real time.  Nash, in turn, would telephone Daniels to provide him with information re-
garding breaking developments - much faster than any intelligence source could provide.  As it 
turned out, in most cases the information being sent by the news reporters was just as accurate as 
the intelligence reports that trailed behind them.  Being a newspaper man, Daniels preferred the 
fast pace of the journalists’ approach and intrinsically trusted this method over the more tedious 
one of report writing utilized by the intelligence sources.  As a result, Daniels and Nash had a 
reliable cadre of news reporters providing them late breaking information, and “for the first 
time” there was “a responsible agency in the White House: an information-gathering service, the 
Office of War Information, and a place to go for action.”106  At this point, Daniels and Nash dis-
cussed what their next steps would be, and Nash suggested that they form a committee.  Daniels, 
who did not care for committees, disagreed with forming an official committee but asked Nash to 
consolidate a list of appropriate agencies Nash would recommend if a committee were to be 
formed.  Nash complied and Daniels then instructed Nash to write a letter to all of the agencies 
Nash had listed, instructing them to designate someone to report directly to Daniels.  This way, 
every agency that was involved with the race riot was to designate a representative whose re-
sponsibility was to keep Daniels and Nash informed.  Daniels told Nash that this committee was 
never to meet because they had no time to waste in meetings; it would be, rather, a “maypole 
committee.”107   Daniels took the idea to Roosevelt, who approved it.   Daniels instructed Nash to 
do whatever he needed to make it work, warning him that if anything went wrong, OWI would 
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be blamed, and if everything worked out, no one would know anything about it.  From that point 
forward, there were no further race riots during the war.
108
  
The letter Nash wrote to members of the “maypole committee” was signed by Daniels.  It 
included a proposal for “a dozen or more federal agencies that were concerned with the human 
needs in short supply in the war production centers:  housing, health, recreation, education, 
transportation, and many others.”  Nash’s goal was to be ever vigilant in looking for signs of ra-
cial violence, identifying the root causes, and removing them where possible.  Nevertheless, if 
their committee could not stop racial violence during the war, there would be no hesitation in 
using federal troops to limit loss of lives and damage to the war effort.
109
  
Daniels and Nash devised a “two-fold program” as part of their efforts.  The first part was 
to “insure the control of violence, if necessary, through the use of federal troops by Presidential 
Order.”110  Nash ordered that a nationwide network be formed consisting of “the Director of 
Domestic Counter-Intelligence, Army Service Forces,” state governors, “mayors of large cities,” 
and “appropriate military authorities” that would be notified in the event federal troops were 
needed.
111
  These organizations were to select a representative whose responsibility was to moni-
tor race tension that might impede the war effort and report these situations immediately to Jona-
than Daniels.
112
  Simultaneously, Nash utilized “standard intelligence sources,” “domestic news 
sources of OWI and the field offices of nearly every Government agency” to compile “signifi-
cant daily” and “sometimes hourly information on the frequency of interracial violence.”113   
                                                          
108
  Oral history, Nash, June 24, 1966, p. 49.  
109
 Nash, “Science, Politics, and Human Values:  A Memoir,” p. 192. 
110
 Nash, “TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WHITE HOUSE LOYALTY BOARD”  n.d., p. 28.  Nash Pa-
pers, Box 188, Folder, “ Lt Gov – Misc”.  
111
  Ibid. 
112
  Nash, “Science, Politics, and Human Values:  A Memoir,” p. 192. 
113
  Nash “TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WHITE HOUSE LOYALTY BOARD”  
46 
Among those sources on whom Nash relied heavily was the African American press and their 
weekly publications.  Nash’s outreach to the African American press is especially interesting 
since members were not permitted access to military bases and, during the war the black press 
was “pressured … to tone down its charge that the United States military was fighting a phony 
war against racism.”114    
 Ted Poston, a ground-breaking African American journalist, proved to be an invaluable 
and well-connected resource and colleague to Nash and Daniels as he “could always think of 
someone who would know or who could find out what really happened in one of these incidents.  
Sometimes it was a black newsman or publisher, sometimes a black community leader, often a 
clergyman.”115  In 1936 Poston began writing freelance articles for the New York Post and in 
time, the newspaper hired him.  During the war, he oversaw the “Negro News Desk” and then 
returned to the New York Post after the war.
116
   
Poston and Nash often worked together following up on leads pointing to potentially ex-
plosive situations in the defense industry.  Examples of those problems they investigated and re-
solved included:  “discrimination in assigning parking spaces; racially separate and unequal toi-
lets; pay differentials; discrimination in hiring; promotions and leave….”  While taken individu-
ally, these issues may seem small and perhaps insignificant but in actuality the collaboration be-
tween Nash, Poston, and Daniels proved successful.
117
  According to Daniels, the threesome “re-
ally made a sort of a White House team to contact with the military, the FBI, and Manpower to 
                                                          
114
  Singh, p.106.  
115
  Nash, “Science, Politics, and Human Values:  A Memoir,” p. 192.  For more on Ted Poston see Kath-
leen A. Hauke, Ted Poston:  Pioneer American Journalist, (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 1998).  
116
  Library of America, “Ted Poston,”  Reporting Civil Rights, 
http://reportingcivilrights.loa.org/authors/bio.jsp?authorId=63 (accessed March 26, 2012).   
117
  Nash, “Science, Politics, and Human Values:  A Memoir,” p. 192.  
47 
try to work out and prevent any kind of racial things in order to keep them from distracting the 
war effort.”118   He further explained: 
we tried to work these things out in various ways before they blew up. It was a 
very -- well, I would say, a very undercover operation, not in any sense of secre-
cy, but we just didn't want to have high visibility for purposes of attracting the 
lightning. But I think we did a very useful job in minimizing problems of race 
which might have impeded the war effort.
119
  
The second part of Nash’s and Daniel’s two-fold program dealt with obtaining “long-
range information” which illuminated “unresolved problems” that Nash and Daniels “deemed 
indicative of increasing racial tension.”  On a regular basis, Nash would meet with Daniels to 
review this information, then call upon agencies and local governments, which was necessary to 
defuse the situation at the local level.
120
   
While not a traditional committee, the “maypole” committee was yet another example in 
which Roosevelt demonstrated his pragmatism in dealing with racial issues.  He only agreed to 
this committee as long as the primary goal was to diminish anti-war sentiment, prevent race riots, 
and above all keep the war effort unimpeded.  Roosevelt’s purpose was to win the war and that 
goal eclipsed all others.  A proposal for a committee whose mission was to anticipate, identify, 
and squash racial tensions that, left unchecked, would undermine the war effort was acceptable 
and approved.  Thus a war that was rooted in anti-racism forced the United States to confront and 
to some extent deal with its own racist policies and practices in federal employment.  This com-
mittee’s work proved successful, for after 1943 there were no further race riots during the war.121   
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After Roosevelt’s death, Daniels would not remain with the Truman administration for 
long.  Niles and Nash would continue to serve under Truman, and they would prove especially 
important in the transition of attitudes about race relations from the perspective of the Oval Of-
fice during the Truman Administration. 
122
   
 
1.11 Transitioning between the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations 
In late 1944, Philleo Nash became a consultant for the American Council on Race Rela-
tions (ACRR).  This organization was founded at a dinner hosted by Eleanor Roosevelt, and its 
members included Will W. Alexander, Marshall Field, and Edwin R. Embree.  Although it was 
hoped that a private organization such as this one would be helpful in dealing with racial tensions 
in the post-war period, Nash predicted early on that it would not be successful in the long run.
123
  
Although Nash was pessimistic about this particular organization, he supported fully the notion 
of a committee to deal with post-war racial tension.  Moreover, he felt it imperative “to get an 
early start” because his research indicated that the country would face racial violence in the wake 
of World War II.  Nash perceived and predicted the post-war race tension issue as a “large na-
tional problem” 124 and not just a southern problem.  Nash’s opinion mirrored that of Gunnar 
Myrdal, whose study declared that America’s race problem was a national one.   
The existence of the ACRR itself is significant because, although Roosevelt was absent 
from the organizing dinner, it occurred at his dining table, was organized by his wife Eleanor, 
and was, as Nash argued, therefore “informally blessed by the White House.”125  As with the 
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SCHW in 1938, Roosevelt consistently avoided overtly entangling the federal government in 
controversial racial matters; yet he silently encouraged private citizens to tackle the racial issue - 
one the federal government dared not touch because of political repercussions.  Roosevelt’s “in-
formal blessing” of this private committee was echoed in his 1944 State of the Union Address in 
which he “proclaimed a ‘second Bill of Rights,’ promising to revive the New Deal and energize 
postwar liberalism.”  These included “[T]he rights to a job, to decent housing, to adequate medi-
cal care, and to a good education” that Roosevelt stated should be inherent “regardless of station, 
race or creed.”  His statements were quite aggressive and a “bold departure” for Roosevelt “at 
the start of a presidential year.”126   Likewise, Roosevelt’s support of the ACRR suggests that the 
post-war era would provide him, for the first time, the opportunity to address the problem of do-
mestic race relations completely separate from the context of a depression or war.  Additionally, 
two of the committee’s founders were northerners so, unlike the earlier CECS or SCHW, this 
committee’s participants would not be limited to southerners.  The creation of this committee, 
with Roosevelt’s silent support, was a proactive rather than a reactive mode for Roosevelt as the 
nation prepared to move into a post-war readjustment period.  
When Daniels summoned Nash back to the White House in January 1945, Nash had al-
ready formed the belief “that only the Federal Government could deal with post-war tensions.” 
He therefore set about the task of preparing the White House for this aspect of the post-war peri-
od.
127
  Under Niles, Nash had already identified three areas for “the possibilities of Federal ac-
tion,” and asked Niles to see where Roosevelt stood on the following topics:  “the FEPC; Veter-
ans, and the post-war Army.” 128  Looking toward the post-war era and their role in dealing with 
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ongoing “race tension,” Nash proposed that Niles speak with the President because “[I]f you can 
get instructions to go to work on strengthening FEPC; seeing that Negro veteran problems are 
properly looked after in the new Veteran’s Administration through the appointment of a Negro at 
the policy level; and on reducing segregation in the post-war armed forces, the tension job will 
be much easier.”129   
Nash perceived his and Niles’ roles in race relations continuing beyond the war and, even 
before the war ended, he was positioning the White House to take a more proactive rather than 
reactive role.  In 1941 Roosevelt had created the FEPC primarily because of the African Ameri-
can-led March on Washington Movement.  After the 1943 race riots, he allowed the “maypole” 
committee to form, but its job was to squelch further race riots - not to necessarily improve the 
lives of minorities.  As the war’s end approached, Nash, with his several years of researching and 
analyzing racial tension and attitudes about minorities, and especially African Americans, under-
stood better than anyone else in the Roosevelt White House the need for a more proactive ap-
proach to solving racial tension in the United States.  Roosevelt died in 1945 before the war end-
ed, and Harry S. Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States.    
Truman was a native of Missouri, a state created in the turmoil that ultimately led to the 
Civil War.  Truman’s heritage was southern - something his mother, who was still living at the 
time he became president, never forgot.
130
  Although Truman did not believe in the social equali-
ty of African Americans and whites, he felt strongly that every man ought to have the right to 
earn a living and enjoy a life free from violence.   Truman had clarified his opinions about this 
issue almost five years earlier, on August 5, 1940 when he addressed the National Colored Dem-
ocratic Convention in Chicago: 
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I wish to make it clear that I am not appealing for the social equality of the Negro. 
The Negro himself knows better than that, and the highest types of Negro leaders 
say quite frankly they prefer the society of their own people.  Negroes want jus-
tice, not social relations.
131
 
 
When Truman succeeded Roosevelt, many southerners, especially those in Congress, expected 
that his policies would respect the continuing tradition of segregation.  Even before Roosevelt’s 
death his race advisors, Nash and Niles, were preparing for an inevitable occurrence of post-war 
racial violence.  When this violence erupted in the first year of the post-war period, it provided 
the opportunity for the Truman White House to foster a new, historic approach to race relations.  
 
1.12 Words, Missiles, and Blows:  Post-War Racial Violence 
Roosevelt’s race relations advisor, Jonathan Daniels, a white southern moderate, believed 
like other southern moderates that the domestic race riots during the war years were “primarily a 
problem of black protest”132 and that the response of the federal government should be only to 
appease blacks to the smallest degree possible, or as Daniels put it, “throw a little meat to the li-
ons.”133  In contrast, Nash believed adamantly that there would be a need for a federal-level 
committee during the readjustment period following World War II.  He correctly predicted racial 
violence even before the troops began returning home.  He recalled his rationale for his position 
in the following: 
In 1919 – one of the first post-war years after the first World War –  
our country had been plagued by a series of violent race riots.  I felt  
there was every reason to expect the same immediately after the second  
World War….  After World War I and up to 1943 in WWII, most riots  
occurred in the summer, especially in August, and most frequently in  
places associated with crowds.  The crowding, the heat, and the competition  
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for space seemed to have bad chemistry.  The 1919 riots were also associated  
with returning servicemen.
134
   
 
Nash and Daniels, during their collaboration in the OWI, had defined different categories 
to describe the intensity of race tension episodes and riots.  The lowest on the scale was “words,” 
the next degree of intensity was “words and blows,” and the third and most dangerous was 
“words, blows, and missiles.”135  Toward the end of the war, Daniels became Roosevelt’s press 
secretary, whereupon Niles replaced Daniels, and thereafter Nash worked for Niles.
136
  This per-
sonnel change was critical in the shaping of race relations from the White House in the post-war 
years, because up until this time Daniels, the white southern moderate, had played the role of 
Roosevelt’s racial advisor but during the war the place for southern moderates narrowed.  Niles 
and Nash were both northerners with far more liberal racial attitudes that would greatly influence 
their work, and they would continue in this capacity as they transitioned from the Roosevelt to 
the Truman administrations.    
Once the war ended, the OWI was dissolved “and its functions were transferred to the” 
State Department.
137
  Nash continued in his role and prepared for what he called “the second crit-
ical phase of the program for the control of racial violence” that he and Daniels had created in 
1943.
138
  Trying to be as proactive as possible and with the War Powers Act due to expire, Nash 
earnestly began to work with Niles “on a program which was designed primarily to end reliance 
on the President’s War Powers as the final basis for action, and secondly, to develop an affirma-
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tive program of minority group advancement and participation in national life, which would ease 
the anticipated post-war tension.”139  According to Nash,  
[T]his was the beginning of the Civil Rights Program, which President  
Truman supported from the beginning, and which led eventually to the  
President’s Civil Rights Committee, the Fair Employment Board of the Civil  
Service Commission, the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and  
Opportunity in the Armed Forces, and the Committee on Government Contract  
Compliance.
140
 
 
Nash’s memos to David Niles at this time described the rising unemployment in the de-
fense industry and warned that “decreasing employment and return of troops raise the same dan-
ger signals which preceded the riots of 1919.”  In this critical juncture Nash held the federal gov-
ernment responsible for mitigating the impending problem when he wrote that the government 
should “be ready to act.”141   
When World War II ended, many African American veterans returned to the South after 
having served with honor in the Armed Forces and having fought for the Double Victory – the 
one abroad, and the one against discrimination and for full citizenship back at home.  In return 
for their sacrifices, they expected life in America to be better than when they left it, and they 
were willing to fight for it, if necessary.  Even before the outbreak of World War II, the rise in 
African American militancy was evidenced in organizations such as the National Negro Con-
gress, the Council on African Affairs, and the Congress for Racial Equality.  This rising militan-
cy was simultaneously forcing the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
which had more of a mass base at this time, “in more radical directions.”142   During the 1940s, 
the NAACP experienced a nine-fold increase in membership, which meant that the organization 
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had more money to fund court cases.  The post-war period witnessed a continuance of this “time 
of rising resentment of black assertiveness.”143  African American veterans viewed the post-war 
period as ripe for making progress, and they expected their situation in the Jim Crow South to be 
improved when they returned as victorious veterans of a war against racism and fascism. 
As war’s end approached, many in liberal circles feared an outbreak of racial violence.   
Members of the SRC recalled the racial violence that surged in the post-World War I era, which 
led to the creation of the CIC.  While men like Robert Tye hoped naively for an immediately im-
proved and morally redeemed America, one envisioned by Myrdal in his American Dilemma, the 
SRC (like Nash) was bracing for the worst and fully expected an increase in white-on-black vio-
lence based on the pattern that ensued following World War I.
144
   As predicted, in 1946, the first 
year of the post-war period, racial violence erupted in cities across the South, and many episodes 
involved African American World War II veterans.  Incidents ranged from race riots in Colum-
bia, Tennessee to a quadruple lynching in Monroe, Georgia that included the murder of a preg-
nant woman.  In some cases, such as in the Columbia, Tennessee event, an attitude of new-found 
confidence gave those African Americans who were attacked the courage to push back against 
Jim Crow – and ultimately they gained a victory.145   However, those situations were rare, and 
others resulted in murders and attacks across the South – most of which went unpunished.146   
Nash recalls that “[T]he riots in 1946 steadily went to the top of the scale” that he and Daniels 
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had devised, meaning that he characterized them as “words, missiles, and blows.”147  African 
American veterans would not easily attain the equality at home for which they had fought in Eu-
rope and Asia.  It seemed as if a hardcore resistance was birthed in order to maintain the southern 
status quo, and in doing so it choked the optimism that veterans like Robert Tye envisioned. 
 
1.13 The Federal Government Takes a Stand: The Formation of the PCCR 
Following the Monroe (aka Moore’s Ford) lynching of four African Americans (two 
women and two men – one of whom was a World War II veteran), protestors from African 
American organizations such as the National Association of Colored Women, the National Ne-
gro Congress, and female members of the NAACP picketed the White House demanding that 
Truman take action to end lynching.
148
  Additionally, the black press urged Truman to act, and 
private citizens – both black and white – wrote letters and sent telegrams to the White House, 
many of them also insisting that Truman take action.
149
   
Although there were several heinous race crimes in 1946, Nash recalls that the beating 
and blinding of returning black veteran Isaac Woodward in February 1946 “moved President 
Truman to action,”  and it was the description of the Woodward case that prompted Nash’s 
“long-dormant Commission – proposed but never actualized in WWII to be “revived.”150  
Woodward, a World War II veteran trying to get to his home in North Carolina, was traveling 
from Camp Gordon in Georgia via Greyhound bus.  After he had the effrontery to take too long 
at a rest stop, the angered bus driver made a stop at the Batesburg, South Carolina police station.  
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There, Woodward was dragged from the bus and beaten brutally by police officers.  The police 
chief, L. I. Shaw, “gouged Woodward’s eyes with a billy club.”151  
In September, 1946, following lynchings that occurred over seven months from February 
to August, Truman met with a coalition comprised of members from the NAACP, Urban League, 
Federal Council of Churches and the American Federation of Labor.  This group called them-
selves the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence (NECAMV).  Four days later, 
Truman met with representatives from the “left wing of the civil rights spectrum,” including 
members “from the National Negro Congress, the SCHW, and the National Council of Negro 
Women.”  It was during these series of meetings that the dormant idea for a national committee 
reemerged.
152
  This time around, with Truman in the White House and feeling intense pressure 
from an assertive black coalition and scrutiny from the eyes of the world upon the United States 
as the Cold War loomed, the president approved the idea.    
In staffing the civil rights committee, Niles sought assistance from Nash and others, and 
he attempted to reach balance by amassing a group that was interracial and represented a cross 
section of “industry, labor, legal professionals, higher education in the South, the American Ne-
gro community, and various religious denominations.”153  Ultimately, Niles selected fifteen peo-
ple to staff the committee.   
Two members represented corporate America.  Heading the committee would be Charles 
E. Wilson, president of the General Electric Company.  Wilson would have a colleague from 
corporate America in Charles Luckman.  Luckman was a Jewish American who was the presi-
dent of Lever Brothers.   
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Labor was represented on the committee by two members:  James Carey, secretary-
treasurer of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) and Boris Shiskin, an economist for 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL).    
John S. Dickey, president of Dartmouth College, was one representative from higher ed-
ucation.  Dickey had previously served as Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 
1934-1936.   He was also a United States delegate to the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization held in San Francisco in 1945, serving as assistant to the legal advisor of the 
United States Department of State.
 154
 
Another member was Morris Ernst, who was a New York City lawyer, author and co-
founder of the American Civil Liberties Union.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who had chaired the 
Housing Committee of the Americans Veterans Committee, also accepted an appointment to the 
committee.
155
 
Various religious denominations were also represented.  Rabbi Roland Gittelsohn, the 
Jewish chaplain of the Fifth Marine Division at Iwo Jima, served along with the Reverend Fran-
cis Haas, the Catholic bishop of Grand Rapids, Michigan and a well-reputed labor mediator, who 
had recently served as the chair of the President’s Committee of Fair Employment Practice.  The 
Reverend Henry Knox Sherrill, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church also served.
156
  Francis 
P. Matthews, who had recently ended his tenure as the Supreme Chairman Knight of the Knights 
of Columbus, was from Omaha, Nebraska where he practiced law.  During the war, he ran the 
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Catholic Church’s “component of the United Services Organization”157 and afterward became 
the vice president of that organization.  After his work on the PCCR, Truman appointed him Sec-
retary of the Navy in 1949, and later Ambassador to Ireland.  On the PCCR, he represented a lay 
religious affiliation.
158
   
Two members were African Americans - Sarah (Sadie) Tanner Mossell Alexander and 
Dr. Channing Tobias.  Alexander, of Philadelphia, was the first female African American to earn 
a Ph.D. in the United States, and the first woman to graduate from the law school at the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania.
159
   She was a partner in her husband’s Philadelphia law firm and a member 
of the Board of Directors of the National Urban League.  Tobias had at one time been the Asso-
ciate Director of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation and was former Senior Secretary to 
the Young Men’s Christian Association.  At this time he directed the Phelps-Stokes Fund.   
Tobias would later serve as the Chair of the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP), and he would be serving in this capacity in 1954 when the NAACP won 
the landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision at the United States Su-
preme Court.
160
 
 Lastly, two members were white southern liberals.  Dr. Frank Porter Graham, the presi-
dent of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was a nationally-known southern liberal 
who had been a founder and president of the SCHW and was heavily involved with the War La-
bor Board, the President’s Commission on Education, and the Council of United Nations on In-
                                                          
157
  Juhnke, “Creating a Charter for Freedom,” p. 55.    
158
  From introduction to Francis P. Matthews Papers at the Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Mis-
souri, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/matthewsfp.htm#admin.   
159
  University of Pennsylvania Archives and Records Center,  “Biographical Sketch,” SADIE TANNER 
MOSSELL ALEXANDER (1898 - 1989) Record Group, 1817, 1858 – 1985,  PENN, University  Archives and Rec-
ords Center, http://www.archives.upenn.edu/faids/upt/upt50/alexander html _stma.html (accessed March 26, 2012). 
160
  Juhnke, “Creating a New Charter of Freedom…,” p. 53; Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:  The 
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York:  Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1944), p. 844;  Telegram of 
Anson Phelps Stokes to Dr. Channing Tobias, May 18, 1954, “With an Even Hand:  Brown v. Board at Fifty,” Civil 
Rights Digital Library, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/images/br0096s.jpg (March 26, 2012). 
59 
donesia.
161
  Dorothy Tilly, Secretary of the Methodist Church Women’s Division, was also at the 
time serving on the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital.  In the 1930s, 
Tilly had built a reputation among southern churchwomen as an ardent anti-lynching activist in 
the ASWPL.  During the war, Tilly had served under Will W. Alexander in the Farm Security 
Administration.
162
   Both Graham and Tilly believed that segregation was morally wrong and 
that eventually and gradually, through education, interracial experiences, and a focus on brother-
hood and understanding between the races, segregation would be eliminated.  They had partici-
pated in activism in the South where they knew social progress had been made, albeit slowly but 
enduring. 
While Niles worked at getting commitments from those invited to join this committee, 
Attorney General Tom Clark and others worked on the executive order that would officially cre-
ate it.
163
  Before Truman created the PCCR, the term “civil rights” was not common in the Amer-
ican lexicon.  Nash recalled that it was “new terminology” in the 1940s and that “the use of the 
word ‘civil rights’… came about in the course of our staff studies.  We thought it advisable to 
find a term that was slightly fresh, and the words civil rights were not used for this function at 
that time.”164  The term “civil rights” allowed the PCCR to redefine the problem of race relations 
in the United States in part because, as Nash recalled, this new term was critical, for “as soon as 
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we created a President’s Committee on Civil Rights, it acquired its own meaning.”165  This use of 
the term “civil rights” to name the committee constituted a departure from the past because these 
words conveyed the concept that all Americans, including African Americans had civil rights 
that deserved and required protection.   
With his issuing of Executive Order 9808 in December 1946, Truman officially created 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights as conceived by Nash and Niles.  The fact that Tru-
man created a committee whose purpose was to investigate civil rights and to recommend, 
among other things, legislation to cure the ills of American society was indeed a political water-
shed in United States history.  No president before him had created a commission solely for the 
purpose of addressing civil rights of the country’s citizens.  Admittedly, Roosevelt had taken a 
dramatic step when he created the FEPC, but he had acted politically in order to prevent poten-
tially damaging mass protests during wartime.   Furthermore, the FEPC was limited to address-
ing employment discrimination in the defense industry, not to the broader issue of civil rights.  
The FEPC was never intended to be an ongoing watchdog agency, and when its charter expired 
and the war ended, it died and attempts to resurrect it at the federal level proved unsuccessful.
166
   
Truman tasked his Committee with the following:   
1. to consider and determine the adequacy of existing federal legislation and to recom-
mend proposed new legislation 
2. to consider the broader social, economic and educational aspects of promoting the 
cause of civil liberty throughout the country; and 
3. to consider the work of private organizations whose activities affect civil rights.167 
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Prior to the Committee beginning its work, its chair Charles E. Wilson named two mem-
bers as vice-chairs, John S. Dickey and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.  Additionally, Wilson orga-
nized the Committee into three subcommittees, named the members of these subcommittees, and 
gave each a charter.  Wilson tasked the first subcommittee with the issue of legislation, specifi-
cally asking the group to decide “if existing legislation is adequate” and if not, then this sub-
committee was tasked with recommending changes to existing legislation or proposing “new leg-
islation.”  Serving on this subcommittee were Sherrill, Graham, Matthews, Dickey, and Alexan-
der.
168
 
The second subcommittee’s charter was “to consider the broader aspects of the problem 
including social, economic, and educational programs that should be recommended and adopted.  
This group was to consider the effective utilization of existing organizations and mass media.  
Included in this group were Luckman, Haas, Carey, Tobias, and Gittelsohn.”169 
The third subcommittee included Tilly, Ernst, Shiskin, and Roosevelt.  Wilson directed 
this group to address and “consider any other related aspects of the Civil Rights question.  For 
example, anti-racial and religious organizations, discrimination, registration statutes, and the 
general problem of anonymity of groups operating in derogation of minority and civil rights.”170 
The members met over a period of nine months from January 15, 1947 to September 13, 
1947, and their work involved both committee and subcommittee meetings.
 171
   They also gath-
ered information from interviews they conducted and from reports and letters received “from for-
ty witnesses, correspondence with nearly 250 private organizations and individuals, as well as 
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information supplied by twenty-five government agencies and numerous state and local public 
agencies.”172  The PCCR’s staff, which actually researched and wrote the PCCR’s report, “were 
strong advocates of federal intervention to expand civil rights.”  The staff included Robert K. 
Carr, who taught in the government department at Dartmouth; Frances Williams, an African 
American woman who was “involved in the YWCA…and had served as a race relations advisor 
in the Office of Price Administration,” a department that employed a lot of liberals; Nancy 
Wechsler, who “was active in the Americans for Democratic Action;” and Milton D. Stewart, “a 
former journalist who had studied economics and social philosophy at New York University.”173  
Of course, Philleo Nash, educated as an anthropologist, was one member of the White House 
staff who “worked extensively with members of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights” and 
assisted the PCCR’s staff, as needed.174   
On October 29, 1947 the PCCR delivered its comprehensive report to Truman, and in 
December 1947 it published its findings as a document entitled, To Secure These Rights, (a 
phrase they borrowed from the Declaration of Independence).
 175
  In it, the PCCR put forth three 
reasons for  re-examining the country’s policies and practices on civil rights:  “1) a moral reason 
– the United States can no longer countenance these burdens on our common conscience, these 
inroads of moral fiber;  2)  an economic reason;” and 3) an international reason, because the 
United States could not  “ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.”176  
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The Committee’s report made headline news in many papers across the United States.177  
It exposed the lies behind segregation:  separate was far from equal.  Its overriding conclusion 
that segregation had no place in America and its recommendation that segregation be abolished 
meant that, for the first time, the federal government met the issue directly, through open and 
frank discussion among committee members about this topic “and its consequences.”178  There-
fore, the PCCR broke through another semantic barrier by making segregation the term with 
which the government and the nation had to contend, dismissing what Nash described as the 
more “genteel” term, “discrimination.”179  The PCCR even debated the use of the two words seg-
regation and discrimination, ultimately settling on segregation because they concluded that seg-
regation inherently implied discrimination.
180
   
 
1.14 Human Rights in the United Nations v. Civil Rights in the United States   
The 1940s was not only a pivotal decade for civil rights, but also for the human rights 
movement which gained dramatic momentum during the Holocaust and its wake and in the years 
before the Cold War began.  It was in the early post-war period that the civil rights and human 
rights movements became inextricably linked.  As the war drew to an end and the war effort di-
minished, the victors created a new world organization called the United Nations (UN).  This 
organization’s charter buttressed the human rights movement that had emerged in the 1930s and 
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made human rights an international goal with the adoption of the United Nations’ Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights in 1948.    
Economic forces in the 1930s, such as the Great Depression, coupled with the labor 
movement and a growth of the Communist Party, had created an atmosphere in the 1930s that 
resulted in a rise in black activism that was unsurpassed in America.
181
  However, with the harsh 
backdrop of the Great Depression causing skyrocketing unemployment and poverty levels, and 
the New Deal that helped mainly white Americans, several black activists recognized that true 
equality as a goal would remain forever out of their reach without also achieving economic liber-
ty.
182
   
  The nascent UN not only strengthened the human rights movement that had emerged in 
the 1930s, but it also advanced “enthusiasm for human rights,” and “the mere acknowledgement 
of the concept by the great powers… was sufficient to unleash a wave of private human rights 
initiatives.”  Furthermore, “government promotion of human rights during the war catalyzed ac-
tivists and scholars to put their ideas forward in an organized fashion and provided an outlet for 
their hopes of a better future than a world at war.”183  
After the war, the UN was a critical vehicle by which African American activists sought 
redress against the egregious violent acts committed against them in this country.  African Amer-
ican activists including Walter White and W.E.B. Du Bois believed in the promise of this nascent 
organization, and both were present at the United Nations’ charter meeting.   The UN gave new 
hope for those seeking justice in the wake of a global war and a Holocaust.  A formal body such 
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as the UN suggested that victims of human rights violations would not be restricted to the local, 
state, and federal governmental laws which historically had given short shrift to the plight of Af-
rican Americans, especially with respect to lynching.  Even Franklin Roosevelt acquiesced to 
Southern Democrats when he would not support a federal anti-lynching law in the 1930s.  Ra-
ther, the United Nations provided a global forum in which crimes against humanity, regardless of 
the perpetrator, would be heard and tried.   In theory this was perceived by many to be one of the 
fundamental purposes of the UN, but it was not necessarily the case in practice.   
With the founding of the United Nations, the NAACP and other African American organ-
izations “made a strategic decision” to redirect their focus “from civil rights to human rights as 
the best means to end the segregationist Jim Crow laws of the south.”  This effort began with ef-
forts by the NNC, whose organizers had argued in their 1936 “founding manifesto” that what 
was necessary was a “strategy that would ‘place human rights above property rights’.”184    Un-
der the leadership of Ralph Bunche, the NNC “submitted an eight-page report to the U.N. in 
1946 outlining government oppression against blacks” in the United States.  The move ran head-
long into what would become the first of many political dead ends due in large part to the grow-
ing Cold War and the intensifying anti-communist climate in the United States.  In response to 
Bunche’s report, the United Nations’ Secretariat practically renounced the UN’s human rights 
focus when he decided that the evidence the NNC provided was insufficient, and moreover, that 
intervention into the “domestic affairs of states” fell outside the jurisdiction of the UN’s Charter.  
In an effort to emasculate the NNC’s attempt at petitioning the United States, which jeopardized 
the country’s reputation as the emerging leader of the free world amidst the growing threat of 
communism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) instigated what would become a success-
ful smear campaign against the NNC, labeling it a communist organization and therefore “un-
                                                          
184
  Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize, p. 21.  
66 
American.”  Consequently, the NNC’s momentum, which had catalyzed in the 1930s, unraveled 
in the 1940s and the NAACP became, by default, the primary organization to take up the cause 
of African Americans who sought redress against their own country.
185
   
W.E.B. Du Bois, reinvigorated by the recent progress that India had made with the UN 
against South Africa, decided to lead the NAACP in petitioning the UN against the United 
States.   This time UN leaders John Humphrey and Eleanor Roosevelt (who was the chair of the 
UN’s Commission on Human Rights and who also sat on the NAACP board) intervened and 
cautioned Du Bois against taking action against the United States.  Despite being warned against 
such action, Du Bois forged ahead in hopes of presenting the petition at a “full hearing before the 
General Assembly session in November 1947.”   Humphrey agreed to accept the petition, but 
only conditionally.  Fearing that United States would be portrayed as a flagrant human rights vio-
lator at a time when the country’s image as a leader in freedom and democracy in the nascent 
Cold War was crucial, Humphrey did not permit Du Bois to present the petition publicly to the 
UN.  Instead he relegated the petition to the lower-ranking Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  To further ensure that the petition received no pub-
licity, Humphrey “insisted that the petition be treated as confidential in accordance with the no-
power doctrine under ECOSOC resolution 75(V).”  In late October 1947, Humphrey received the 
petition, and within a week the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) issued its 
groundbreaking report, To Secure These Rights.  The timing could not have been worse for  
 Du Bois and the NAACP because the United States, in a perverted use of TSTR, focused only on 
those aspects of the PCCR’s report that showcased “U.S. commitments and activities at the high-
est levels to improve the conditions of U.S. blacks,” and thus used the report as propaganda 
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against the NAACP’s petition. 186  Concurrently the State Department, in a blatantly hypocritical 
effort to shift the spotlight away from the United States’ egregious human rights record, “singled 
out the human rights problems in the Soviet Union” in a “study of discriminatory practices by 
other UN member states.”   Further damaging Du Bois’ cause, the Soviets countered by using the 
NAACP’s petition to highlight the United States’ “hypocrisy” as the emerging leader of the free 
world.  This in turn allowed the United States to claim that the NAACP’s petition amounted to 
nothing more than Soviet and communist propaganda.  The UN ultimately “rejected” Du Bois’ 
petition on technical grounds.
187
   
Within a very short time span, the NAACP and other minority organizations around the 
world realized that the UN, which had been created in the wake of the Holocaust and World War 
II to begin a new world order, had failed them miserably.  Some NAACP leaders were complete-
ly disillusioned with the entire charade.  Others such as Walter White recognized that, amidst an 
intensifying climate of anti-communistic fervor at home, the opportunities in the rights spectrum 
were narrowing.  Rather than waste time in the international human rights arena, which was in-
creasingly becoming a vehicle for United States and British interests against the Soviet Union, 
White shifted overtly the NAACP’s goal to a less lofty but nonetheless important and perhaps 
more achievable domestic civil rights agenda.
188
  This action essentially decoupled the human 
rights and civil rights movements within the United States. 
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1.15 Conclusion 
When dealing with the issue of race relations during presidential administrations, histori-
ans have generally tended to focus on the actions and/or inactions and the personal and political 
motivations of the executive himself.  Consequently, the historian becomes more interested in 
the race relations policy under the executive’s administration, focusing on the outcomes of those 
policies versus how the policy originated or changed – taking a teleological perspective, if you 
will, from the outside looking in.  During the ten years spanning 1938 to 1948, the race relations 
policy within the White House under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations changed dramat-
ically.  Rather than looking solely at the executives themselves, this chapter examined the indi-
viduals who were responsible for forging those policies - those who worked from the inside out.   
One individual in particular stands out in this respect, the social scientist named Philleo 
Nash.  Nash’s early tenure in the White House spanned a decade, from 1942 to 1952, thus strad-
dling both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.
189
  Nash began his official work attempt-
ing to squash the impact of racial tension on the United States’ war effort.  Nash’s work in the 
Roosevelt administration helps us understand that Roosevelt’s role in race relations was not ex-
clusively an effort to stave off race riots that would hamper the war effort, as is evidenced by the 
creation of the ACRR.  Nash’s critical contribution, however, was that his unique, in-depth re-
search and comprehensive analysis led him to believe that a national race relations committee 
would be necessary in the post-war era.  His influence in helping to create the PCCR was the key 
element in the transition from the more reactive race relations mode under Roosevelt during war-
time to the more progressive civil rights activism under Truman in the post-war era.   
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Truman’s PCCR was unique in many respects.  First, while it was similar to Roosevelt’s 
FEPC in that both were created via executive order, it differed in important respects.  While the 
PCCR’s role was a finite one, its mission was far broader - to research the matter of civil rights 
in the nation and to make proposals even for federal legislation, if necessary, to remedy any dis-
parities.  The FEPC’s role was limited very specifically to police and adjudicate discrimination 
complaints within the defense industry.   
Additionally, the PCCR’s composition was vastly different from the CIC, the CECS, and 
the SCHW because Niles and Nash staffed the PCCR with mainly northern liberals.  The CIC 
and then, twenty years later, the CECS and SCHW included only southern liberal members.  On 
the PCCR only two committee members, Graham and Tilly, represented the white liberal south.  
In essence, it took northern liberals to force the federal government to step in and assume re-
sponsibility for racial reform in the nation.  In the South, the cautious southern liberal approach 
would not elicit the accelerated change recommended by Gunnar Myrdal’s new modern racial 
liberalism or demanded by the wake of racial violence in the early post-war era.  So the question 
for southern liberals became who would move forward and who would be left behind in this nas-
cent civil rights movement.   Tilly and Graham, whose activism was grounded in the more uni-
versal and fundamental quest for human empathy and understanding between the races, never 
lost sight of that loftier goal, even at the federally-focused civil rights level.   
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CHAPTER 2:  SOUTHERN DISSENT ON THE PCCR 
The interesting thing is that 20 years from now probably Mrs. Tilly and  
Dr. Graham will have led this very fight the way this report reads, and  
20 years from now they will accomplish it.  We have tried to find some  
kind of out now so we don’t stop their progress.1 
       Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. 
       September 13, 1947 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In September 1946, when David K. Niles began to form the President’s Committee on 
Civil Rights (PCCR) to address the racial discord that had exploded in the first year of the post-
war era, he solicited suggestions from others regarding whom to invite to serve on the commit-
tee.  Walter White of the NAACP was one who provided recommendations for committee mem-
bers.
2
  Philleo Nash also provided some input, and both Niles and Nash contacted several “gov-
ernment agencies” for their input and assistance on proposing potential committee members.  
The key to appointing the members was “to get balance,” because without that, any report issued 
by a committee “would lack credibility.”3  Secondly, creators of the committee felt a unanimous-
ly endorsed report was an essential outcome.  If there were “too many advocates with strong po-
sitions publicly taken, it would not be unanimous and would lack force.”4  This goal of a unani-
mously-endorsed report eluded the Committee because, while its members were unanimous in 
their contempt of segregation and stated so in To Secure These Rights (TSTR), they were very 
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much divided with respect to recommendations regarding ending segregation – specifically in 
education.
5
  Of all the recommendations that the Committee debated, considered, and approved, 
the elimination of segregation in education was the single major point on which the Committee 
could not agree.  Seven years before the United States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, this Committee struggled the most with what 
would become the single most controversial topic in the modern civil rights movement.  During 
Committee meetings, lengthy and heated debates ensued.  The ultimate decision the Committee 
made in recommending sanctions against segregated southern schools would sound the death 
knell of the southern liberal interracial movement, would simultaneously thrust the federal gov-
ernment into a modern national civil rights movement, and would sow the seeds of massive re-
sistance to this nascent movement. 
This chapter deconstructs the debate over this monumental issue at committee meetings 
held twice during the summer of 1947 – one at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, 
and the second one in September at the Statler Hotel in Washington, D.C.
 6
  This debate illumi-
nates the rationale for Tilly’s and Graham’s ultimate dissent on this matter.  Moreover, this chap-
ter explores the fundamental difference between the passive yet deliberate and lasting human 
rights type of activism in which Tilly and Graham had participated since the 1930s and the far 
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more accelerated and aggressive - yet narrower - approach which would be the basis for the nas-
cent national civil rights movement that the PCCR would birth. 
 
2.2 The PCCR’s “Enormous Problem” 
After the initial Committee meetings in early 1947, Robert K. Carr, the executive director 
of the PCCR, wrote Graham indicating that he looked forward to the subtle yet significant influ-
ence Graham would have on Committee proceedings.   
It was a great pleasure to make your acquaintance at the sessions  
of the Committee this week, and I am frank to say that I cannot help  
feeling that you are one of the strong members of the Committee who  
can be counted upon to keep the work moving forward intelligently  
and promptly.
7
 
 
Graham, a well-reputed southern liberal, President of the University of North Carolina 
(UNC) at Chapel Hill, and a member of many federal committees, had the reputation of someone 
with a clear head and cool temperament.  He approached sensitive matters of race with a sense of 
fairness calm.
8
  Despite Carr’s desire to have Graham’s contributions on a consistent basis, Gra-
ham did not attend Committee meetings regularly.  As if his duties at UNC were not demanding 
enough, Graham kept a hectic schedule with variety of other commitments, all of which eventu-
ally caused him some serious health issues.  By late 1946 or early 1947, Graham’s doctors diag-
nosed him with an eye disorder and advised him not to read anything other than what Graham 
described as “pressing University matters.”9 Graham’s eye disorder had been a recurring issue 
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for him ever since he had suffered an attack of the measles, which “settled in his eyes” during his 
high school senior year.
10
   Despite the seriousness of his eye malady and his doctor’s orders to 
rest his eyes, Graham continued working on various committees. 
In April 1947, Carr began organizing a meeting that would include all PCCR members – 
not only certain subcommittees.  The original deadline of October 1, 1947 to deliver a report to 
Truman was less than six months away, and he was anxious for his staff to begin drafting the re-
port, sensing that it would need several iterations prior to its finalization.  Carr, in his role as ex-
ecutive director of the PCCR, had spent the last four months carefully guiding the Committee, 
arranging interviews, and ensuring that news clippings of germane items reached the Committee 
members in a timely manner.  Carr had intimate knowledge about each subcommittee’s work and 
what recommendations would be forthcoming from each, and he was also by this time familiar 
with the attitudes and demeanors of the various committee members.  At this stage of the Com-
mittee’s process, he was particularly concerned about some of the forthcoming recommendations 
and how they would be received by other members, particularly how the Committee would tack-
le the issue of ending segregation in schools.  A recommendation to withhold federal grants in 
aid from segregated schools would be one of the topics discussed at the forthcoming meeting.  
Carr knew that Graham, an educator and president of the University of North Carolina (UNC) at 
Chapel Hill, had an abiding interest in public education.  Graham also had the benefit of direct 
experience in this area and had been involved in the Pauli Murray case at UNC at Chapel Hill in 
which Murray, an African American, applied to the graduate school shortly after the Missouri v. 
Gaines Supreme Court decision.  Graham had also long been an advocate for federal aid to edu-
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cation and had served on the Advisory Committee on Education in the late 1930s.
11
   Carr had 
previously relied upon Graham’s calm and thoughtful manner, so again he wrote Graham and 
urged him to attend this critical meeting: 
I am slightly apprehensive about some of the recommendations  
which may be made to the full Committee by the other two  
subcommittees and I am extremely anxious for you to be present,  
if it is at all possible, for I have learned to depend upon you as  
one of the wise members of the Committee.”12   
 
Carr’s prescient, though understated, words of concern accurately predicted the difficulty 
the committee would have with respect to the segregation in education issue.  Carr, in conjunc-
tion with James S. Dickey, arranged to have a meeting of the full Committee at Dartmouth Col-
lege, their employer, in Hanover, New Hampshire.  The meeting’s purpose was to provide a set-
ting in which all PCCR members could review, discuss, and decide on final recommendations 
within a timely manner.  This would then enable the staff to move forward in drafting the report. 
Once Carr had scheduled the meeting for June 30
th
 and July 1
st
, he contacted Graham 
again to persuade him to attend: 
I am wondering whether you have been able to adjust your schedule  
so as to permit attendance at the Hanover meeting of the Committee.   
I recall that you were somewhat skeptical of your ability to get out of  
your other engagement.  Yet I cannot help hoping that that has proved 
  possible, for from my point of view, your presence in Hanover would  
be a valuable asset.  I don’t know what we would do without the wise,  
calm approach which you bring to the work of the Committee, and I am  
certainly counting on your presence. At the moment there are no clouds  
on the horizon, but this is a very important session and, as you know,  
things sometimes tend to get out of hand.  You are always a great help  
when erratic or emotional notes are introduced into the Committee’s  
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discussion.
13
 
 
Carr knew that the suggestion to withhold federal aid from segregated schools would 
pose a problem for Graham.  Graham, a southerner, educator, and member of Roosevelt’s Advi-
sory Committee on Education, would have had definite opinions on this topic, but despite Carr’s 
pleas to Graham to attend the Dartmouth meeting, Graham declined Carr’s invitation due to 
scheduling conflicts.  As predicted the major question at this meeting, which could not be re-
solved, became whether to recommend withholding federal grants from segregated school sys-
tems.   
The session was held in the Paul Room of the Baker Library on the Dartmouth campus 
and began the morning of June 30
th
 with twelve of the fifteen PCCR members in attendance:  
Wilson, Dickey, Roosevelt, Alexander, Ernst, Gittelsohn, Luckman, Matthews, Sherrill, Shish-
kin, Tilly, and Tobias.
14
  After a productive morning session, the group broke for lunch, and 
when it reconvened Carr opened the discussion with the topic of withholding federal assistance 
from segregated schools.  He began by explaining that the Committee would “not recommend a 
specific program of federal grants-in-aid, but in a more general way say that we have got to have 
education as a means of –.”  He never got to complete his sentence, because he was interrupted 
by Rabbi Gittelsohn who explained, “the idea is to get ‘adequate school facilities for all.’”  Carr, 
probably sensing that he had started off the discussion rather clumsily, gathered his thoughts be-
fore responding, and when he did he spoke to the entire Committee, laying before them the criti-
cal issue on which they had to decide:  
You have got to decide whether you want to recommend that 
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 federal grants-in-aid be spent in such a way as to guarantee 
 equality to racial groups, the benefits they receive, or whether  
 you want to go a step further and absolutely oppose any 
 segregation.
15
 
 
With this statement, Carr succinctly clarified the either/or decision confronting them.  Not only 
was this the sticking point in the Hanover meeting but also became the most important topic the 
Committee tackled --and they came to understand that while deliberating. 
With Carr’s challenge put forth to the Committee, a vigorous debate ensued.   Morris 
Ernst was the first to speak, stating unequivocally, “I am for the latter… I wouldn’t want to sign 
a report that didn’t come out for that.”16  Then, after an input from another Committee member 
supporting opposition to any segregation , Tilly advised caution: 
 I wish all these problems were more clear cut.  I am for this, of  
 course.  Yet at the same time if we get this it will delay the day 
 longer when we will reach a place in the South where we won’t 
 have the things happening that are happening now.
17
 
 
Tilly was referring to the mentality of the white South.  She was a white southern liberal 
who had made strides in human relations since the 1930s.  Her vehicle for positive change was 
through interracial meetings of southern churchwomen whom she brought together so that they 
could develop an understanding and respect for one another.  While Tilly did not agree with seg-
regation, in this quiet statement she informed her colleagues that if the white South were forced 
to end segregation, it would resist and would undo the social progress she and other southern lib-
erals had attained through their interracial methods. 
Referring back to Carr’s statement, Channing Tobias replied that “you can” continue seg-
regated schools with equitable distribution of funds with southern support; “but you can’t get” 
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that and also withhold funds to force desegregation of schools with southern support – Tilly 
agreed.  Gittelsohn then asked a crucial question, “Do you have a ghost of a chance of getting 
equality as long as you have segregation?”  Tobias conceded that, “It wouldn’t be absolute equal-
ity;” however, “you will get something.”  And Tilly, who was opposed to the proposed sanctions, 
concluded by explaining, if we can achieve segregation with equality, then “it will be a step to-
ward” desegregation.18  Tilly’s comments suggested a strategy of gradual change with the even-
tual goal of ending segregation in education.    
After this initial back and forth among several Committee members, John Dickey offered 
this insightful comment, highlighting the importance of the Committee’s stance on this subject:  
 I think this is a really tough proposition for this committee.  I  
Have a hunch that it is at the heart of the educational problem  
that this Committee faces.  The other things are not likely to be  
greatly changed by the Committee’s position, and I may be in the  
very distinct minority on that.  But I think that the position this  
 Committee takes on this issue is of real consequence in the 
 foreseeable future.
19
  
 
His words also portended the school desegregation crisis that erupted seven years later in the 
mid-1950s, after the United States Supreme Court issued its Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka, Kansas decision, which declared segregation to be unconstitutional.   
Dickey next addressed the manner in which he believed segregation might be ended, and 
that was with better educated teachers in the South.   
I think you have got to get started at this thing where prejudice  
apparently takes its hold, with the youngster in the elementary  
schools and coming out of the control of the family into the control  
of the school.    
 
I don’t see how there is ever a chance that we will get at this problem  
in the South until, to put it bluntly, Northern money is made available to  
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help them, or money from the rest of the country, to raise the quality and 
the quantity of the teaching of the whites in their schools.  I believe that  
as you raise the salary of your teachers you will get a more sophisticated  
person….   
 
…until you begin and find and attract that type of person into the public 
school systems of the South, I have very little hope that we will breed 
a community which will do very much down there about things like  
lynching.
20
   
 
Like Tilly, Dickey favored federal grants-in-aid being used to equalize education within 
the segregated schools as a first step toward desegregation.  The NAACP initially employed this 
strategy, seeking to equalize the schools, as it believed that the southern states could not afford 
two genuinely equal but separate school systems.
21
 Dickey, obviously troubled by this issue, ad-
mitted to the members present that he initially disagreed with continuing federal grants-in-aid, 
but after much reflection on the subject felt strongly that his position was ultimately “very short-
sighted” and “would be a setback to the federal aid to education” which Dickey supported.22   
Seeing that there were two opinions forming over this issue, Morris Ernst offered some-
what of a compromise in the form of a “time lag,” suggesting that the Committee recommend 
that after 1951 no more federal funds be utilized in segregated schools.  At this point, Tilly, who 
must have been grateful for the support voiced by Dickey,  jumped in again, admitting that she 
was “terribly troubled” about her stance and expanded on Dickey’s position stating, “Unless we 
get federal aid to education we cannot raise the teacher’s salaries…. And when we do get to 
where we can raise the salary we get a better teacher and then you raise the whole attitude of the 
                                                          
20
  Ibid. 
21
  For more on the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas case and decision, see Richard Kluger, 
Simple Justice:  The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality, (New 
York:  Knopf, 1975; reprint, New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2004). 
22
  Ibid. 
79 
community.”23  What Tilly was saying implicitly was that raising the whole attitude of the com-
munity would result in a voluntary and sustained end to segregation, rather than a forced end 
which she believed would fail and also backfire.  Ernst, troubled by Tilly’s position, countered 
with, “What happens to our report if our sights are low enough to indirectly condone segrega-
tion.”   As a southern white liberal who had worked in human relations in the South for over 
twenty years, Tilly understood better than anyone in the meeting that there was no easy answer 
when it came to education and segregation and the South, and rather than continue a seemingly 
endless argument, all she could offer back at that time was, “I am terribly disturbed about this.”24  
Tilly found herself in a predicament because she knew fundamentally that segregation was mor-
ally wrong and she was absolutely opposed to it, yet she had to support federal grants-in-aid for 
all southern schools.  Her motivations stemmed from her years of work in southern race relations 
and human rights and her own experiences in dealing with whites and their attitudes toward mi-
norities, specifically African Americans.  Tilly understood that most people’s thoughts about 
race would not change until and unless the people themselves changed from within.  She and 
some other southern liberals believed optimistically that these transitions in attitudes could be 
achieved over time by education and communication across the racial barriers.  This method 
would lead to acceptance of others and the elimination of prejudices, which would eventually 
allow for a voluntary and therefore lasting integrated society.   Tilly believed that punishing the 
South by withholding federal money from southern schools would certainly anger white suprem-
acists.  It would, more importantly, also retard the progress that had been made in the South thus 
far, by lowering educational standards for the children and continuing school segregation with no 
hope for educational advances to ultimately choke out Jim Crow school systems.  Tilly’s advo-
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cacy for using education to gradually eradicate prejudice was espoused by other southern liberal 
groups working in human relations during the 1940s.
25
  Those who wanted to force the change 
were emblematic of a shift that emerged in the 1940s about other ways in which to counteract 
racism.
26
   Tilly then explained how the white supremacist South would refuse federal funds for 
education if they came with a price:   
  In the South when you face this they will say ‘This affects states’ 
  Rights,’ and also it would affect their attitude towards federal aid 
  to education and they would say ‘We prefer to be ignorant than 
  to have the government tell us how to live.’27 
 
While many southern states refused federal intervention in the case of education because 
they favored states’ rights, this argument overlapped with the issue of race.  Tilly’s and Dickey’s 
answer was that by keeping the federal grants-in-aid, the quality of education overall would be 
better, which should lead toward the goal of lasting integration.   
Gittelsohn re-entered the discussion, attempting to breach the divide between Tilly and 
Ernst by asking, “Would the South feel any better about it if we said to them ‘You must appor-
tion the funds on an equal basis?’” Then, deferring to Tilly he asked, “Will they do what we say 
they must do?”28  His words reflect optimism and also naïveté, for Tilly knew the South would 
not voluntarily do what the Committee ultimately recommended and would not make any chang-
es with respect to civil rights until forced to do so.    
Seemingly at an impasse, Carr interjected the following summary in the hopes of making 
some progress: 
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  It seems to me, as I listen to the two points of view, that  
everyone is against segregation and that can be said in a  
straightforward fashion in the report.  The argument is really  
about the method by which you are going to overcome segregation  
in the end, whether by immediate sanction that would withhold  
funds from the state, or whether you are going to put your hope in  
the educational effect of better facilities over a longer period of time.
29
 
 
Gittelsohn admitted immediately that, as a private citizen he would be satisfied with a gradual 
elimination of segregation, but not in his role as a PCCR committee member, stating “…I cannot 
conceive of signing my name to a report which by any stretch of the imagination condones seg-
regation.” He furthermore believed that by applying sanctions toward desegregation, the PCCR 
is basically saying to the American public, “we don’t care about segregation for the moment.”30 
Everyone at the meeting realized the importance of this decision.  Moreover, the debate 
illuminated the fundamental difference in the human relations activism of Tilly, who believed 
that education would lead to lasting change versus the emerging civil rights approach to force 
change first and then educate those who are unwilling to accept the change.   Tilly’s experiences 
focused on working to change the hearts of racist individuals so that eventually they would ac-
cept the differences of others and voluntarily discard segregation.  The new and forthright civil 
rights approach represented a more radical liberalism, and in these committee meetings, it be-
came apparent that the survival of the southern liberal approach, which had been the white-led, 
progressive agent of change in the South for almost three decades, was in jeopardy.   
This argument illustrated that Nash and Niles had successfully formed a Committee with 
diverse and thoughtful viewpoints.  It also indicated that, for this issue, a unanimous concurrence 
was not likely to be achieved.  Ernst was the first to articulate that realization: 
It seems to me that this is one of those fundamental things, and you  
                                                          
29
  Ibid. 
30
  Ibid. 
82 
may find it in other aspects like the Armed Forces and elsewhere, where  
there isn’t unanimity and I am frank to say that unanimity procured at the  
sacrifice of getting at the lowest common denominator isn’t worth much  
for the American public, not from the Committee.  The Congress or the  
President may have to do it, but the Committee in reporting ought to have  
higher sights.
31
 
 
At this time, Charles Luckman chimed in by paraphrasing Dickey’s lengthy comments 
from several minutes earlier and proposed a solution for the segregation in education issue.  “The 
solution to it lies rather solely in the field of education of our young people as well as our 
adults….”  Therefore, he argued that federal funds were necessary to bolster youth education 
“with a view toward using that education for the complete elimination of discrimination and seg-
regation.”32  Gittelsohn countered that no amount of money will work, because the whites and 
blacks would still be segregated in schools, and that experience alone led white children to be-
lieve that black children were not good enough to be in school with them.
33
  Tilly did not agree 
with Gittelsohn because, she explained, many southern liberals were educated in segregated 
schools.  Several minutes later, after realizing that her statement might be misinterpreted, Tilly 
qualified her statement by claiming that she was simply stating fact that most southern liberals 
were educated in segregated schools, and yet they became liberal-minded adults.  Tilly, in an un-
popular and isolated position, felt the need to ensure the more radical team members understood 
her position when she declared 
I would dislike very much to put my name to something 
that didn’t go all the way against discrimination and 
segregation, but I am merely bringing in this other side.
34
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Tilly believed in her tried-and-true tactics in human relations, thus she felt torn between 
her proposed methods and the far more demanding civil rights approach.  Tilly was used to being 
involved in a movement that had a much slower pace to it, with lofty and meaningful goals, yet 
no hard deadlines.  Personally, Tilly disavowed segregation but her goal for the South was ulti-
mate integration and, with the exception of her anti-lynching activism, which was at times har-
ried and dangerous, the work she performed with church groups and organizations involved in 
the interracial movement provided an optimistic, if sometimes unsteady and always plodding, 
course of social change.
35
  However, as a member of the PCCR, Tilly was having a very difficult 
time managing the aggressive nature of this proposed change to abruptly withhold federal money 
from southern schools to force their desegregation.  It was not just the segregated South that was 
under attack;  it was the methods by which she and other southern churchwomen and southern 
liberals had used to breach the racial divide: with interracial meetings, education, and coming to 
understand members of the other race as human beings.  This is why Tilly feared that forcing de-
segregation upon an unwilling white South would fail and foil the progress already being made 
toward the ultimate goal.     
At this apparent standoff, Committee Chair Charles Wilson suggested that the Committee 
take a vote, either for a strong statement about discrimination and segregation or for withholding 
federal grants-in-aid to force school desegregation.  Wilson’s suggestion went unanswered as 
more discussion ensued with other members commenting about the importance of this one deci-
sion.  Luckman described it as an “enormous problem” and Carr concurred, offering again that 
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this issue was the most difficult point for the Committee to decide.
36
  This lengthy debate about 
schools revealed an underlying disagreement about how to successfully promote change in racial 
attitudes.   
When the Committee discussed the issue of segregation within the context of other areas, 
such as the Armed Forces and Housing and Health, Ernst questioned whether the PCCR should 
take one stance regarding federal funding and segregation for one area, such as Housing and 
Health, versus another stance when it came to education.  Carr, realizing that the argument on 
education had already utilized a lot of meeting time while several more agenda items waited, 
suggested that his staff write two versions of this issue within the report’s draft.  This approach 
would provide PCCR members a way to see both options in writing before making a final deci-
sion.  At this point, Dickey, who also understood that there might not a unanimous vote on this 
issue, suggested a statement be inserted noting that the majority of members felt that sanctions 
were indicated but saying nothing regarding a minority opinion.
37
  
After spending the entire afternoon discussing this topic, the committee members present 
took a straw vote, which resulted in a slim majority of six to five in favor of federal sanctions.  
During this tense meeting, Carr ably filled the calm and deliberative role for which he had called 
upon Graham.  At the meeting’s conclusion, Carr restated his recommendation about writing two 
drafts and before the group took a recess, he suggested the following:  the group did not want to 
recommend a positive grant-in-aid for education, but it was not ruling it out and perhaps would 
be able to even offer a modified recommendation.  At this point in the meeting discussion on this 
topic was completed, and the group adjourned for a recess. 
38
  However, discussion on this topic 
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was far from over.  Within six weeks, PCCR’s staff would issue a draft of the report, and the 
Committee would meet again.  This time Frank Graham would be in attendance, and the debate 
would again quickly escalate. 
2.3 Tilly’s Predictions  
About a week after the conclusion of the PCCR’s meetings at Dartmouth College, Robert  
Carr wrote to Frank Graham.  Carr updated Graham on the events of the meeting and the plans 
going forward:   
This is a just a brief note to let you know that the Committee came  
through its Hanover meeting with all flags flying and no casualties!   
The sessions went extremely well – more so, I think, than anyone had  
dared hope. 
 
The Committee voted to authorize the Staff to write a draft report under  
the supervision of a subcommittee to be appointed by Mr. Wilson.  It is  
hoped that this draft report will be ready by the middle of August or shortly  
thereafter.  The plan is to send out this draft report to the Committee members, 
giving them a preliminary opportunity to read it and to submit suggestions  
and criticisms by mail.  Then it is planned to hold a two or three day session  
of the Committee in Washington during the first week in September to give  
the report a final going over.  The report would then be put in final shape for 
submission to President Truman about October 1.
39
 
 
From Carr’s letter, one might infer that the Hanover meeting went so smoothly that the 
report was ready to be drafted.  What Carr failed to mention was that all but two items had been 
agreed to by the other Committee members:  “[E]ducational sanctions and fair educational prac-
tices.”40  Nevertheless, after the Hanover meeting Carr felt that he had enough information for 
him and his staff to draft a report for review, so he and the staff set about writing the first draft.  
In late August, Carr’s staff distributed the first report draft of To Secure These Rights to all 
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PCCR members for their comment and scheduled the Committee’s final review meeting for Sep-
tember 12
th
-13
th
 in Washington, D.C. at the Statler Hotel. 
Despite the Committee’s agreeing to have the staff draw up two versions of the recom-
mendation regarding federal sanctions in education, this draft contained only the recommenda-
tion to withhold federal funds from school systems that were racially segregated.
41
  Tilly, who 
had been in the minority on this issue at the Dartmouth meeting, wrote a lengthy dissent to Carr 
and Wilson, which they received prior to the September meeting.   
Admitting that she was “deeply troubled about the report,” Tilly’s letter suggested several 
changes.  There were specific issues at which she directed most of her comments.  In reading 
through the draft, Tilly believed that the Committee was “putting too much hope on legislation as 
a cure all.”  She reminded Wilson and Carr that in the South, things did not work “by the normal 
processes of democratic, constitutional government,” and then asked rhetorically with a refer-
ence to prohibition, “did the Volstead Act work?”42 
It was the recommendation to withhold federal funds from segregated schools as an at-
tempt to force an end to segregated education that most worried Tilly, and she reminded the two 
gentlemen of the Dartmouth meeting during which this topic became the subject of heated de-
bate.   
I told you of my reaction to the segregation approach at  
Dartmouth. I have been in summer schools and conferences  
week after week since then.  We have had discussion on the  
“separate but equal” statutes of our southern states.  The question  
of one school system makes the groups always ‘see red’.  As I said  
before, the South will stay ignorant before it will be forced to having  
non-segregated schools.  I believe every Southern newspaper will  
attack the report editorially on this score. 
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I am afraid, too, this will definitely kill the Federal Aid to Education  
Bill in Congress….  
 
I think the section on segregation will definitely kill any chance we  
might have of getting any legislation on any part of the report through  
Congress and will keep us from having a permanent Civil Rights  
Committee, the anger is going to be so great against the present committee.
43
 
   
Despite Tilly’s personal repudiation of segregation, which had occurred during the 1930s, 
she knew that the majority of white southerners would reject unconditionally any push, especial-
ly by the federal government, to end segregation.  Moreover, Tilly believed the sanctions ap-
proach suggested in the draft simply would not work.  Tilly knew she had come gradually to her 
decision against segregation and, over time, with education and understanding, she had come to 
accept African Americans as equals.  She knew others could not be forced to change.
44
  Tilly tru-
ly believed that progress was being made in the South… albeit slowly, but deliberately.  She had 
to convince the other Committee members that forcing change would elicit a resistance to that 
change, and would either impede or prevent the achievement of a lasting social change.     
When Tilly read the report draft, she also saw all too clearly that the South stuck out like 
a sore thumb as the nation’s most egregious section with respect to treatment of minorities.  The 
report’s tone must have been reminiscent of Roosevelt’s NEC Report on the Economic Condi-
tions of the South, which less than ten years earlier had focused on the South’s economy, and 
Roosevelt himself had labeled the region “the nation’s No. 1 economic problem.”  Many white 
southerners had reacted negatively and defensively to that insult yet that report had been written 
by southern liberals.
45
   The draft of the PCCR’s report was written mainly by northern liberals, 
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under the aegis of the federal government.  Tilly knew that the white South would react negative-
ly against it.  Angered, she accused the report and the Committee of being “too intolerant.”  She 
chided them, “[A]ren’t we attempting to teach tolerance in it (i.e., the report), then surely we 
have just got to watch ourselves.  The most intolerant people are those who are intolerant of in-
tolerance and this is what we are showing in the report.”46   
More important, though, this approach in Tilly’s eyes would kill any chance of education 
improving the situation in southern segregated schools – and as a result, the South’s children, 
black and white, would continue to suffer.  As such, she implored Carr and Wilson to allow a 
rewrite of certain sections of the report:   
  Now about my South and the report. 
The report is too beligerant [sic].  It is rather vicious as it raises  
a ‘whip-hand’ against the South…. I admit the accusations are  
just but we will have to use another method or else we undo the  
social progress the South has made in the last twenty-five years…. 
We cannot avoid facing the segregation – but make it with a different  
approach.  The report sounds like we are mad at someone or some section  
of our nation…. 
 
After all, do we not want to strengthen the civil rights of our people?  Isn’t 
 this the real purpose of our committee?  As the report is, it will be rejected 
 by the South and the South knows how to REBEL.”47 
 
Tilly’s argument had not wavered; she once again made the argument of how hard it was to 
change attitudes about race.  She knew that, despite the progress that had been made in race rela-
tions, a backlash was mounting across many southern communities, especially with the return of 
black veterans from World War II and court rulings on the white primary.  She predicted that an 
anti-South report would help solidify and grow the network of the backlash across the South.  
With respect to politics, Tilly foreshadowed the split in the Democratic Party and the creation of 
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the States Rights Party reactionary force when she warned in her letter, “I doubt if President 
Truman will feel it wise to sign it as it is. If he does and the report is really taken seriously (as we 
hope it will be), the South might speak at the National Convention.”48 
 
2.4 An Anti-South and Unbalanced Report   
Tilly was not the only Committee member who perceived the report as negative.  During 
the two-day meeting held September 12-13, 1947 in Washington, D.C., the Committee reviewed 
the draft together, and several other Committee members also voiced their concern about the 
overall negative tone permeating the report.  Charles Luckman in particular was concerned about 
how the American people would react to this report, in which it seemed everything was wrong in 
America.  He described the report as “one-sided” “and not sufficiently constructive”.  He warned 
“that you don’t make progress in America if you say to the American people,  ‘Everything is 
bad.’”49  Luckman, a Jewish American, was also concerned with the lopsided attention given to 
African Americans in the report versus all the other minorities.  He explained,  
I am not sure that we seem to be as interested in all minorities as we  
are in the one.  If you total up the mentions – which I happened to do  
yesterday afternoon while I was pretending to be Baruch sitting out on  
a park bench here, having nothing else to do for a little while – there are  
362 mentions of one minority, and the next highest is 16.  Now that is a  
tremendous gap to the people who read the report, and I am afraid that there  
may appear to be an emphasis.
50
 
 
Though there was an emphasis on African Americans, Luckman did not suggest deletions 
from the report but sought ways in which other minorities could also be highlighted within it.  
Sadie Alexander and Channing Tobias, the two African Americans on the Committee both 
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quickly interjected comments, justifying the tone and focus of the report.  Alexander explained, 
“The staff pointed out the fact that it would appear at times that there was one minority, but it 
was because there were so many more transgressions on their rights.”  Tobias chimed in, “I think 
Mr. Luckman will just have to recognize the fact – as we all do, of course – that the proportion is 
just true to the facts, just true to the experiences of the minorities themselves.  There are just cer-
tain things that the Negro minority suffers that other minorities don’t suffer.”  Luckman acqui-
esced and Tobias explained: 
Because of their high visibility, it makes it easy to discriminate.  It is  
a different type of thing, in a way; so little progress has been made on it  
as compared to the progress that has been made with other groups. You  
have state laws directed against the group.  You just can’t help but call  
attention to the facts.   
 
It would be a very much finer thing if we could just have a balance thing,  
to speak of Mexicans, Jews, Negroes, in a way that wouldn’t call positive  
attention to one group more than the other; but that isn’t the fact in American  
life today.  We are just reflecting the situation as it is.
51
 
 
Tobias did not interpret the report to be negative, as did Luckman, but rather a “factual” 
report.  Carr reiterated the committee’s desire to not produce “a balance sheet but rather a careful 
examination of the places where change is needed or further progress is called for.”52  Alexander, 
agreeing with Carr and Tobias, reminded the others of their task, as she perceived it to be:  
We were not told to go out and find out what good has been done.   
Our assignment was to find out what had to be done to correct any  
evils.  That is our assignment; and if, incidentally, we can say ‘There  
are good things,’ it is allright, but we can’t have a lengthy report in  
which we go around the United States and say as to everything good  
that has been done, because that is not our assignment.
53
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Later in the discussion, when the focus shifted to police brutality against minorities, the 
South once again was singled out.  This time Frank Graham objected, asking that more balance 
be introduced into the draft.  Alexander spoke up against removing some language to soften the 
message: “Mr. Wilson, I am not anxious to put any burden on the South, but… the fact is that the 
incidence of police brutality against Negroes in the South is disturbingly high.  That is the fact, 
isn’t it, Mr. Carr?”  To which Carr replied, “Certainly, it is.”  She then read the next sentence 
from the draft, “‘In no other section of the country do comparable outrages occur so frequent-
ly’***[sic],”  and she then asked Graham,  “Is that a fact, Mr. Graham?”  Graham responded, “I 
think the total number is largely in the South.  When you say ‘comparable,’ then I think the Jap-
anese in California would have much to say in this period.”  The group agreed to soften the lan-
guage in this section.  Tilly, who had been away from the room for a period of time, re-entered it 
during this exchange and, at the first chance interjected, “I think all the way through we have 
brought out the South too much.”  Wilson, attempting to keep the discussion on task, reassured 
Tilly that the group had agreed and some of the harsher language would be modified.
54
   
As the Committee members went through the report page by page, various members 
raised other topics.  Following those discussions and resolutions, Graham directed Carr’s atten-
tion to what he described as a “quite inaccurate” passage regarding voting by African Americans 
in the South.  He explained, “it starts, ‘The denial of the suffrage on account of race.’  It says 
most Southern States completely disenfranchised the Negro.”  Tilly interrupted, “And the last 
sentence is too strong.”  Graham continued,  
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It says, ‘In the past 2 years, the situation has changed to the point  
where it can be said that some Negroes in the deep South have begun  
tentatively, insecurely, and hesitantly to exercise the political rights of  
free Americans.’  You start out with ‘most Southern states,’   you give  
the instance of progress limited by 2 years, and say the ‘deep South.’  
If people didn’t know, you wouldn’t realize from this paragraph that  
Negroes in the upper South have been voting for 20 years, to my  
knowledge, in considerable numbers.  Sometimes they are the decisive  
factor in the vote in Raleigh, North Carolina.
55
   
 
Graham’s criticism was valid since many northerners inaccurately perceived the South to 
be monolithic.  He then asked Channing Tobias for confirmation, “It says, ‘tentative, insecurely, 
and hesitantly.’  Even in the deep South, Mr. Tobias, aren’t Negroes voting openly at the polls?”  
To which Tobias replied, “Especially now.  That is true in Georgia.  It is true even in Mississippi, 
where two white men recently fought each other over the issue.
56
  Graham understood that the 
South, even as a distinct region within the United States, was not homogenous.  Moreover, Gra-
ham cautioned Carr about making reckless statements such as the one he caught, claiming they 
would “undermine the value of the report.”57  Graham explained “When you read this paragraph, 
if you didn’t know the facts you would get a very inaccurate picture of the situation.  That fur-
nishes material to the enemies who don’t want this progress, and then it infuriates the people 
who have been fighting for the progress and have made some achievement.”58  Like Tilly, Gra-
ham had worked in southern human relations for decades, and as a southern liberal, he worried 
that this report, if not tempered, would become an incendiary for those who only wanted to 
squash any form of racial progress and, if inaccurate, would be ignored by those whites who de-
sired change.   
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The debate continued on about whether to amend the statement or remove it altogether 
until Tilly found another troubling sentence. “It says, ‘But resistance to political rights of Ne-
groes in most of the South today is so intense and the gains of the past few years so limited that 
the future seems very uncertain.’  I don’t think the future seems uncertain at all.”  Carr chided 
her, “Now, Mrs. Tilly, I don’t quite believe you mean that.  You have been telling me about all 
sorts of uncertainties in the future.”  To that she retorted, “I don’t mean in the next day or two, 
but we are making progress all the time in the Negro vote.”59  Frustrated, Carr argued, “I think 
some of these generalizations should be changed, but we can’t make it out that all the Negroes 
are voting in the South.”  Graham shot back, “And you can’t make it out that only in the last two 
years a few have started to vote.”60  While Graham’s statement was true, it was not until Smith v. 
Allright and other similar cases that more African Americans started to vote.  Until then, very 
few did.
61
 
Tilly’s and Graham’s sensitivity to statements that seemed to completely invalidate the 
progress that activists like Tilly and Graham had spent decades implementing is understandable.  
Tilly and Graham represented southern liberalism to the PCCR and, during these meetings, 
southern liberalism was increasingly put on the defensive.  Graham explained, however, that 
when he and/or Tilly reference a “mistake like this, we don’t mean for you to go to the other ex-
treme.”62  Their motivation was to ensure that the report would be as accurate as possible, in all 
areas.  They understood that while minorities might be reading the report, the ones they were 
most concerned with were white reactionaries and southern moderates and liberals reading the 
report – who would be looking for something that they could use to refute the report. Tilly had 
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commented about the report earlier that day when discussion centered on an example of police 
brutality and murder of black inmates.  She requested, “I want it [the report] fixed so that they 
[i.e., the South] can hang their hats; I don’t want to find something they cannot hang their hats 
on….the South will pick on something that they can attack.”63    
A lengthy argument then ensued regarding higher education institutions and mandating 
anti-discrimination policies.  At the conclusion of that debate, the Committee adjourned for din-
ner.  Before they left, Charles Wilson set a serious tone for the post-dinner agenda: “As soon as 
we convene at eight o’clock we are going to take up this grant-in-aid question and I hope every-
body will be here, because it is a controversial one and I want you all to know, in case anyone is 
planning not to be here, that that is going to be before us and we will probably reach a settlement 
on it.  I hope we shall.”64    
 
2.5 Desegregation in Education – The Sticking Point 
Tilly was armed and ready for debate at the evening session of  the September meeting.  
Earlier that day on September 12, 1947, she reprised her concerns over the federal grants-in-aid 
issue, before the Committee actually tackled that point.  Making mention of the recommendation 
in the report draft, Tilly warned: 
There is a sentence there that is going to upset the Confederacy  
again – ‘But this impending development raises the fair question  
whether the country as a whole should be asked to help bear the  
added costs of maintaining a pattern of segregation’.  That is a true  
statement, but can’t we soften it a little.  I am afraid that is going to  
be one of the things that is going to make us awfully mad.”65   
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Charles Wilson poked a little fun here and, playing off her reference to the Confederacy, 
asked:  “And fight the war all over again?”  To which Tilly retorted:  “Yes.  Just don’t make it 
too hard on us; try to understand us a little bit and don’t rub it in so much.”  In defending her po-
sition, Tilly explained, “It was stated a while ago that each section of the country would highlight 
something (i.e., from the report).  This is what will be highlighted in the South, this whole ques-
tion of segregation in education.  It is going to overshadow everything else in the report, in my 
opinion.”66  A full seven years prior to the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decision, Tilly understood that this issue of education and segregation 
in the South was the critical issue, and depending on which way the committee decided, Tilly 
knew it could be a deal killer for the white South, although in all likelihood the South would 
have resisted anyway.   Moreover, Tilly believed that by withholding federal funds from segre-
gated schools the children would suffer in the end, and the tactic would further delay integration.   
When the Committee reconvened at 8:00PM, chair Charles Wilson called the group to 
order and immediately focused the Committee on the federal grants-in-aid recommendation by 
asking the group, “Are you ready to accept the proposition set forth in [pages] 19 and 20 con-
cerning [withholding federal grants-in-aid from segregated schools]?”67  Immediately, Tilly re-
ferred back to that sentence from above about “the added costs of maintaining a pattern of segre-
gation,” stating “There is a taunt in that sentence that will irritate, and I know what the answer of 
the South will be – ‘We won’t accept it.  We would rather be ignorant.’”68  She continued,  
I know folks in the South who have been working so hard to get the South  
to accept this [federal grants-in-aid] and have had this thrown at us so long.  
It will mean the Government will take charge of our students and we will  
have Negroes and whites together in schools…. In the past two years we  
have got our Southern congressmen almost 100 percent back of this.  That  
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is the thing they have been afraid of all the time.  If this comes out as it is  
[not], I do not believe it will be possible for us to get that Federal Aid to  
Education Bill through next year because there is something very irritating  
about that sentence.
69
   
Again, Tilly raised the issue of the Federal Aid to Education bill.  Sadie Alexander, seem-
ingly running out of patience with Tilly, suggested curtly, “Very well.  We will take out “fair.”  
Morris Ernst subsequently offered, “Bob, in answer to Mrs. Tilly, you could certainly cut out the 
words ‘raises the fair question,’ and say ‘raises the question’ or even tone it down.”  To which 
Tilly responded, zeroing in on education as the critical issue for the white South:  
I don’t believe we are going to get the South to accept any funds on a  
non-segregated basis, and I think this report is going to have to temper  
itself so it can understand that and lead up to it.  Dr. Graham knows more  
than I do about this problem, but this is the one sore spot.  I think you could  
get something through for the elimination of segregation in any other area  
more easily than you could in education.
70
   
 
To which Alexander retorted, “Which is the basis of all segregation.”71   Alexander was 
the one PCCR member who was, during the tenure of the Committee, flagrantly discriminated 
against because of her race, due to Washington D.C.’s segregation laws.   She was almost re-
fused service in a restaurant when lunching with other Committee members, including Charles E. 
Wilson.  She was also refused service at a Milk Bar in the Washington, D.C. airport due to her 
race, for which she later sued the concession company.
72
  Robert Carr, who had to arrange lodg-
ing for all Committee members when they convened in the nation’s capital, had to use “tactful 
diplomatic negotiations” so that all PCCR members, including the two African Americans, could 
stay at the Statler Hotel.
73
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As she had attempted in Hanover, Tilly once again tried to convince her fellow Commit-
tee members that with federal aid, the quality of education across the South would be elevated 
and segregation would be eliminated far more quickly over time than without the aid.
74
   After a 
few more recommendations from other Committee members who offered to appease Tilly, Jim 
Carey interjected an argument against Tilly’s and in opposition to those who wanted to appease 
her : 
 We are setting up the standards in democracy, as I see it.  I don’t 
 believe this will answer the problem, nor do I have any ideas that 
 people who believe in segregation are going in any way to be  
 appeased by the striking of a word in a report of this nature.  I think 
 there is a struggle going on, not only in this country but throughout 
 the world, and we are not just going to join sides.  We are going to  
 decide whether or not we will take issue with the abuses, the use of  
 Democratic institutions to deny people freedom of access to opportunity. 
 
 We are not asking for an awful lot.  I don’t know why we should monkey 
 with the words.  We ought to justify it as best we can in our words, but 
 I don’t see any reason to struggle over the appeasement of a situation 
 or to in any way get into the field of that if we word this a certain way, 
 people will stop believing in segregation and go ahead and adopt some 
 different course.
75
   
 
Tilly’s response to Carey echoed that of so many southern liberals and human relations activists 
who endorsed slower yet lasting change while trying to avoid reprisal from a potentially violent 
opposition.  Those who debated Tilly on this point perceived her slower approach as one that ca-
tered to those against change versus those who would have benefited from the change.  She 
therefore once again attempted to explain and defend her position:
76
   
I think you are missing the point.  The South is making progress  
rather fast, but we are going to highlight some things here that  
will bring that progress it is making out in the open more than the  
foes of the progress have seen before, and I believe it is going to  
retard it.  I believe you will be more conscious of the strides we  
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have made and the forces that are pulling it back will where it is  
highlighted and shown up in this way – I believe we will have  
trouble.
77
   
 
Carey then, defending his position, offered: 
 
 I might say that is the accusation that is directed against anyone 
 that agitates the question, and definitely we are in a field of 
 agitation on this issue.   
 
 However, as to whether or not it retards it, I don’t think it would  
help in meeting the problem that we are confronted with if we join  
forces with the opposition.
78
   
 
Tilly retorted, harkening back to her own activist roots in the Women’s Division of the Method-
ist Church: 
 I am not asking that we join forces on it.  I think we have to be 
 careful of the way it is approached.  There has to be an under- 
 standing.  The South has the largest minority group and has the 
 biggest problem, and it is hard for anyone who doesn’t live in the 
 South to really understand the heart throbs and heartaches on both 
 sides.
79
 
 
To which Roosevelt added compassionately, “And those in the middle like yourself.” 
At this point, Frank Graham joined the discussion to explain his position,  
I have talked continuously in schools for about twenty years,  
and in my talks I have taken the position over twenty years –  
in answer to direct questions – that there was not to be Federal  
control of education in the States.  I said in the bill we were  
proposing – in that bill it was expressly provided that there  
was not to be Federal control.  That is the position I have taken,  
beginning twenty years ago.
80
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Graham had also delivered a lengthy radio address in 1939 about federal aid in education, 
advocating that the federal government distribute funds equitably to both races and democratical-
ly among the states.
81
   
Both Tilly and Graham understood the need for improved education in the South.   Edu-
cation had been a major concern not only for them and other southern liberals, but also became 
an important issue for the federal government during the Depression.  This was because the 
South was already lagging behind the rest of the nation in education and the RECS very adeptly 
made that point in 1938.
 82
   Federal aid was the key to improving the South’s overall education 
and, thus its prospects for future prosperity, and putting conditions on the funding meant that the 
South would refuse it.  Graham, who served on Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee on Education 
in the 1930s, had spent several years trying to convince fellow southerners to accept federal 
grants in aid yet, this “long, tormented legislative history” labored on because the white South 
wanted the funding with no restrictions.  It had already killed a version of the bill four years ear-
lier after Republicans and northern senators “attached a rider” to the 1943 version of the bill 
which provided for no aid to segregated schools.
83
  
After Graham explained his position, Roosevelt then asked him directly if he believed 
that the South would end segregation in the schools more quickly if there were no restrictions 
placed on federal grants-in-aid.  Graham responded without hesitation, “I think the South will 
work it out more quickly, yes.”  However, when Roosevelt deferred to them, describing Graham 
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and Tilly as the Committee’s “experts” in this topic, Graham conceded “I can’t give you any as-
surance.”84    
After additional exchanges, Alexander again offered her opinion, this time questioning 
the logic behind Graham’s and Tilly’s stance on the matter. “How can a Committee representing 
America, sent out to find how we can improve civil rights, recommend that we shall have segre-
gation in education?”85  Roosevelt extended Alexander’s argument:  “Or not take a position on 
it?  If you carry Mrs. Tilly’s argument logically to its conclusion, we should not aggravate the 
southern congressmen and just overlook the question.”86 Tilly quickly defended herself by stat-
ing that she was not asking anyone to “overlook the question….  I wish I knew the answer….  I 
am trying to find a way to get the South submissive to it.  You might not be willing to spend the 
tax money, but that is not the answer.  The South would rather be ignorant.”87  Tilly then looked 
to fellow committee member Channing Tobias for support by asking, “Don’t you think that 
would be the answer, Doctor Tobias?”88  Although Tobias began with an affirmative response to 
Tilly, he then launched into a lengthy diatribe recalling a meeting he had recently had with a 
friend of his, a white college professor in the South who questioned, “‘how we are ever going to 
find our way out of this thing [segregation] as long as our section, which is the poorest section of 
the country, adheres to this principle of two sets of institutions [divided] along racial lines when 
we are unable to support one.’”89  In Tobias’ mind, perhaps the issue boiled down to a matter of 
pragmatism, and he offered the following thoughts:   
  …I mean it is a question not only of the ethics of it under the 
principles that we are discussing now, but it is a very practical 
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  question of how much progress can be made under those 
  conditions. 
 
  Now, I want to say this:  that I realize, and I think I said it once 
  before in one of our meetings, just the attitude that will be 
  taken by Congressmen, the possible advantage that will be taken 
  of this in order to repudiate all the work of the Committee, but 
  I feel we have come to a time in the history of our nation and in  
  the history of the world when we have got to say what is really in 
  our hearts on this question of segregation and be willing to take 
  what comes. 
 
  I think it ought to be worded as carefully as it can be worded, but 
  I think we ought to say it.  Segregation is injurious, as Lillian Smith 
  brought out, possibly more injurious to the white child than it is 
  to the Negro child because it brings that child up with a feeling 
  of arrogance and group pride as he realizes that he occupies 
  a different and preferred position.   
 
  I think if there is any way to approach it from the point of view  
of the best interests of the South and the best interests of the  
nation, than that is the way to approach it; but I do not feel that in  
a report of this kind we can evade that issue.  I think it has got to be  
faced.
 90
  
    
 
Although Tobias agreed initially with Tilly, he perceived the PCCR’s job as something different 
than anything that had come before.  Therefore, he believed the PCCR had an obligation and a 
unique opportunity to act as no other group which had preceded it to solve similar issues.   
The debate continued and Tilly stuck by her original opinion when she stated, “If we had 
better education, even on a segregated basis as now, we would come nearer getting to the point 
of non-segregated schools,” to which Graham agreed immediately.91  But Carey perceived the 
argument as being about education, whereas he interpreted Tilly and Graham arguing over seg-
regation versus non-segregation.  Tilly confirmed Carey’s point of view by explaining that for 
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white southerners, the issue was segregation versus non-segregation.
92
   Tilly and Graham were 
not alone in their views of this issue.  When Guy B. Johnson, director of the Southern Regional 
Council (SRC), had addressed the PCCR at an earlier hearing, he predicted erroneously, that  
“[T]he ultimate disposition of the segregation issue will not take place in our generation.”93  This 
leader of the SRC, an organization whose membership included the ranks of southern liberals 
that led the slow yet deliberate interracial movement in the South, could not foresee and did not 
advise an abrupt ending of segregation in the foreseeable future.   
As the debate continued, most members of this Committee, the majority of whom were not 
southerners and two of whom were African Americans, believed that the position Tilly and Gra-
ham took was indefensible and counter to the PCCR’s mission.  Morris Ernst’s verbalized his 
frustration with sarcasm: 
 
The position seems to have simplified itself in my mind. We can say  
what we say here or we can say we deplore segregation – period, and  
say we are bankrupt as to any idea of any sanction and the quickest way  
to abolish segregation is for the Government to do nothing about it and  
that life will take care of it.  I am not ready to say that.
94
   
 
Jim Carey was more direct: 
…I think this is not just a question of asking the people of the South to  
continue their patterns until they decide to change them, but it is asking  
other people to pay in part the price for the prejudices of the people in the 
South…. 
 
I don’t think we can ignore the issue of segregation, so it [the Report] has  
to say something; but, certainly, I would prefer to strike it out or destroy  
the report rather than say we are going to assist in justifying on the basis  
of expediency any program of segregation in the field of education.
95
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With respect to federal grants-in-aid, Tilly stated flatly to Carey and the Committee that 
the South would “not accept it on a non-segregated basis….  It is one of the most serious things 
connected with this report.”  An exasperated Carey shot back, “I think it is time to set up the 
challenge with those people.”96  This exchange escalated emotions between Carey and Tilly be-
cause Carey referred to white southerners as “those people.”  Tilly accused Carey of characteriz-
ing southerners as people separate from the rest of the nation.  Carey, trying to understand where 
Tilly was coming from, conceded that he did not accept that the entire South was represented by 
the white supremacist South.  He asked Tilly if she was referring to “the Rankins,” meaning 
those who shared the same bigoted and prejudiced views as Congressman John E. Rankin from 
Mississippi, who was infamous for the race-baiting and anti-Semitic viewpoints that he made on 
the House floor.   Tilly stated that the Rankins were “opposed to Federal aid to education,” to 
which Carey replied, “They are opposed to education.”  At that point Graham defended Tilly, 
stating, “Don’t identify Mrs. Tilly with the Rankins.”    Carey explained that he was merely try-
ing to point out that those who believed and acted like John Rankin “were not proper representa-
tives of the people of the South.”97  Roosevelt reminded Carey that even southerners who were 
not so rabidly racist as Rankin would still not support “non-segregated Federal aid to educa-
tion….”  And he then offered that even if the majority of southern Congressmen do not support 
it, they still don’t represent the majority of people in the South.”98  What Carey and others like 
him on the Committee were arguing was that the southern liberal approach may have worked by 
slowly chipping away at the bedrock of white supremacy, but it still accepted discrimination and 
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segregation.  To allow the slow pace of change to continue in the South as it had for the past sev-
eral decades would, to these impatient Committee members, render the PCCR as ineffectual, 
thereby squandering the unique opportunity presented to them.  Therefore, to them, these options 
were unacceptable.   
Despite these objections, Tilly remained firm in her conviction that the matter of segrega-
tion in schools would galvanize a larger resistance to social change and she stated flatly, “I am 
afraid they do [represent the majority] when it comes to this segregation in schools, don’t you, 
Dr. Graham?”  Before Graham could respond, Ernst suggested that the group take a vote on the 
matter to see where the votes would lie at that point, so he made a motion to approve sanctions in 
federal grants-in-aid.  Roosevelt seconded the motion.  Graham, however, needed more clarifica-
tion on the topic before he was ready to cast his vote and voiced the following concern: 
There is a question I don’t believe you have taken account of, Jim.   
I get the full force of everything you say, but I was on the President’s  
Committee to draw up the bill [Federal Aid to Education], and we  
faced this question of Federal control of the schools in the states, and  
it was written in the preamble of the bill that there should be no Federal  
control of the States with regard to education.
99
   
 
Charles Luckman agreed that this point should be discussed because he believed it could 
“change[s] the import of this considerably.”  Further debate ensued after Graham confirmed that 
in “ever[y] bill that has ever been presented” there would be no federal control of education, and 
further that he “would interpret withholding of federal funds from a state in order to compel non-
segregation as a federal control.”  Therefore, even though the sanctions would be a “negative 
control,” they would still imply federal control.  Again, Ernst asked for a show of hands on the 
matter but, before anyone voted, John Dickey stated that he still would not vote for the recom-
mendation because he, like Tilly, believed the best and surest way to end segregation was 
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through better education.  Dickey firmly believed that imposing sanctions would only make mat-
ters worse.   Jim Carey then offered that, at the very least, the Committee had to take a forthright 
position to set a higher standard for all Americans, and leave any compromising over this issue 
to the  lawmakers.  Nevertheless, Carey considered Tilly and Graham to be “the two most im-
portant people on this particular issue.”100 
Sadie Alexander again took up the issue with a pointed question to Tilly, asking Tilly 
how the world would react to “a report in which we recommended that the South maintain segre-
gated schools …?”  Graham responded defensively, “You are not suggesting we recommend seg-
regated schools?”101  To which Alexander replied that she was not but that supporting the segre-
gated system would essentially be the same thing.  Graham further explained that the South was 
against federal aid if it came with conditions, because then it violated the concept of states’ 
rights.  Graham also corrected those who intimated that the South was against education by stat-
ing that “it might surprise you to know that the southern people pay more in proportion [for edu-
cation] than any people in the world…. They go deeper into their pockets for public schools than 
any other people in the world; so it isn’t a question of being against education.”102 
  
2.6 A Gracious Out   
After further debate, it became absolutely clear that the Committee could not agree on 
this matter, and Carr concurring with Carey, declared “the Committee has to take a stand on the 
level of principle and let the compromising occur at the political level, if need be.”  However, 
Carr also expressed concern about Tilly and Graham, acknowledging that “this matter becomes 
                                                          
100
  Ibid., pp. 901-903.      
101
  Ibid., p. 904.      
102
  Ibid., p. 904-905.      
106 
personal” for them.  Then, addressing directly Tilly and Graham, he admitted “I am a little wor-
ried about what you are going to do.  We don’t want to destroy your effectiveness as workers in 
the South.  If you sign it [the report], what will it mean?”  Graham assured the group that he had 
“signed a good many statements against federal control of education, which I interpret this to 
be.”  To which Carr asked pointedly, “You mean you could dissent” on that ground?  Graham 
agreed.
103
  
The PCCR members continued the debate.  For Graham, the argument was clear - he was 
against any federal control when it came to education.  For Tilly, the matter became a struggle 
over the tactical approach - forced desegregation versus a strategic goal of eventual, voluntary, 
and sustained desegregation.  In order to convince her colleagues, she offered another example in 
which African American and white students were visiting each other and having speakers of the 
opposite race in the classroom.  Admittedly, this was all being done quietly, allowing the stu-
dents and speakers to get to know each other in a school setting, interacting as students rather 
than as blacks and whites.  Tilly claimed that progress was being made in this organic and subtle 
effort.  Carey then concurred with Carr, restating that “we have a difficult situation on the matter 
of principle.”  He also agreed with Tilly that if the report came out against segregation and for 
sanctions, then the report would not “make your task or Dr. Graham’s task any easier in the 
South….”  Graham interrupted Carey insisting that he “wouldn’t ask anybody here to stultify 
himself or compromise his conscience in order to make our problem easier….  I think everybody 
here ought to vote according to his conscience.”104   
Those Committee members who attempted to salvage a compromise from this tangled 
debate - Carr, Luckman, Ernst, and Roosevelt - agreed that it was important to find a way to get 
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the point across in the report without impeding Tilly’s and Graham’s progress in the South. The 
discussion at this point turned to drafting some sort of statement in the report that repudiated dis-
crimination and segregation and did not suggest sanctions immediately, but rather recommended 
an interval to ending federal grants-in-aid over time.   Ernst requested that the Committee take a 
straw vote on the motion that he had made much earlier in the evening.  A majority of seven 
members voted for the motion and it carried.  Not all members voted, so it is not clear who offi-
cially disagreed with the motion.  Tilly attempted to speak for those who did not vote, stating 
that “We are not against it; yet couldn’t vote for it,”105 thus reaffirming the delicate position that 
she and Graham found themselves in with respect to this issue.  Ernst suggested that the report 
include some sort of statement for those such as Graham and Tilly who did not vote for it, in or-
der to save them from trouble in the South and to be clear that the decision was not unanimous.  
Graham suggested that those who were in the minority “append a statement of our position.”  
Roosevelt went a step further, suggesting that they issue a statement with their names on it.  Tilly 
disagreed, stating that she would not be in favor of issuing such a statement and declaring, “If 
my name goes on the report, I will stand by it.”106   
Several members agreed that a statement of dissent should be included, and they, (Ernst, 
Luckman, Shiskin, and Graham), coached by executive director Carr, discussed what that state-
ment should include.   The group concluded that the best thing to do would be to “note there was 
a dissent” and allow Tilly and Graham to decide what the actual language of the dissent would 
be.   Still, the argument was not over.  Tilly warned that the dissent “saves us, but it doesn’t save 
the report.”  To which Ernst retorted, “I don’t want to save the report at the cost of not being able 
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to live with myself.”  Carey joined in, claiming that if the Committee were not unanimous on this 
critical issue, it would undermine the report and “destroys the purpose of it.”107    
Despite Truman’s desire and the hope of several Committee members that the PCCR’s 
recommendations would be unanimous, on this matter the Committee could not agree.
108
  After 
the heated and lengthy debates on this topic, it was clear that, once again, a slim majority of the 
members wanted to go forth with a strong anti-segregation position that included sanctioning 
federal grants-in-aid to segregated schools, and Tilly and Graham, along with a few others, did 
not.  Seeing no way around this impasse, Tilly and Graham finally agreed to a suggestion in 
which they would be able to write a minority dissent about this recommendation but still sign 
their names to the Committee’s report.  Charles Luckman described this dissent as “a gracious 
out.” 109   
The two factions within the Committee that argued at length over this topic held very dif-
ferent viewpoints on how to approach change.  By the end of the 1940s, a new theory about the 
causes and cures of racism had emerged from the work of Theodor Adorno and his colleagues, 
sociologists who argued that racism was completely irrational, and those who were racist could 
not shed their racism through educational means.
110
  If there was no hope for changing the hearts 
of people, then there was no reason to wait for people to change, and therefore the government 
should force legal change.  Despite the fact that Adorno and his colleagues would not publish 
their findings until 1950, many liberals had already been influenced by Myrdal and were already 
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moving in the direction of having civil rights advances forced, without stopping to consider the 
possible fallout, and this was demonstrated in the attitudes of the several PCCR members.  Tilly 
and Graham were not committed to legal changes to force desegregation or other changes in 
southern society, but most of the northerners on the PCCR were in favor of utilizing those 
measures.   
Graham wrote the dissent language that was included in the report but did not identify ei-
ther himself or Tilly as dissenters.
 111
  Having their names associated with the dissent would un-
doubtedly weaken the report in the eyes of white southern reactionaries and also white southern 
liberals.  If it were known that the two white southerners on the Committee were the ones who 
did not agree with the proposal regarding federal aid to education, then their actions might lend 
support to those groups who would not support it either and give them another reason to dismiss 
the report altogether.   Graham wrote: 
A minority of the Committee favors the elimination of segregation  
as an ultimate goal but opposes the imposition of a federal sanction.   
It believes that federal aid to the states for education, health, research  
and other public benefits should be granted, provided that the states  
do not discriminate in the distribution of the funds.  It dissents,  
however, from the majority’s recommendation that the abolition of  
segregation be made a requirement, until the people of the states involved  
have themselves abolished the provisions in their state constitution and laws 
which now require segregation.  Some members are against the non-segregation  
requirement in grants on the ground that it represents federal control over  
education.  They feel, moreover, that the best way to ultimately end segregation  
is to raise the educational level of the people in the states affected; and to  
inculcate both the teachings of religion regarding human brotherhood and the  
ideals of our democracy regarding freedom and equality as a more solid basis  
for genuine and lasting acceptance by the people of the states.
112
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The language in the dissent only addresses the differences in the methods raised by committee 
members about how to end segregated education; it did not convey the emotions of the objec-
tions voiced in the meetings.  Graham phrased the dissent carefully, to inform the audience of the 
facts and also so as not to harm the report itself. 
Two weeks after the meeting in Washington, D.C., Sadie Alexander wrote Charles Wil-
son complimenting the Committee’s handling of the anti-segregation and federal grants in aid 
issue.  She compared their difficult task with that of the founding fathers, who had to reach com-
promise when writing the contents of the Constitution.   
In reading the current issue of the Benjamin Franklin Institute News,  
I came across a letter written by that distinguished world citizen…on  
June 9, 1788.   
 
Please note paragraph three of Franklin’s letter.  Does this not prophetically  
express the cause for any differences of opinion of members of our Committee?   
If men with the wisdom of our Constitution fathers were confronted with  
the necessity of compromise how could we weaker mortals hope for complete 
unanimity of expression  in a study so complicated as Civil Rights in the  
confused and chaotic world of the year 1947?  
 
I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to all members of the  
Committee and to Mr. Carr, that each of us may find strength in having  
agreed to ‘some unreasonable things, that  reasonable ones of more  
consequence may be obtained.’113 
 
2.7 Southern Traitors and Dupes  
Within days of the report’s publication, newspapers across the South criticized the report 
and bashed Tilly and Graham. On November 1, 1947, two days after publication, Jackson Mis-
sissippi’s Clarion Ledger, an ultra-conservative paper, ran an article whose headline conveyed a 
sense of urgency because Mississippi’s vacationing governor, Fielding Wright, had cut short his 
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vacation because of the PCCR’s report:  “Wright Takes Issue With ‘Racial’ Report:  Returns to 
Capitol From Vacation Trip.”  The article described the PCCR as “the so-called Truman commit-
tee on civil rights, which has recommended, among other things, the end of segregation of rac-
es.”  In this piece, Wright’s ire was evident when he was quoted that his opinion on ending seg-
regation “if fully expressed might be so fiery as to be unprintable.”114  Wright was agreeing with 
Mississippi’s acting governor, Oscar Wolfe, who had been filling in for him while Wright was 
on vacation.  Wolfe had issued an earlier statement against the PCCR’s report – singling out Til-
ly and Graham without naming them: 
 This so-called Civil Rights Committee is supposed to have two  
Southern members, but their approval of this recommendation 
 discloses that they are not nurtured in Southern ideals or in true 
 American ideals.  Rather, it reveals them either as traitors or as 
 dupes to the destruction of the South and to the United States. 
 
All forms of human relationships and contacts cannot be  
regulated by law.  History allows that where any nation has not 
practiced segregation of races, but allowed miscegenation and 
amalgamation of races, this custom has always resulted in the 
destruction of the nation that permitted this crime against nature. 
 
We of the South know this, and ask the aid of all decent white people 
of this country to help stem this concerted effort on the part of  
misguided people to foster a scheme advocated by outside 
interferers and meddlers to destroy this nation. 
 
The South stands for segregation and will continue to practice it 
regardless.
115
 
 
 “Aimed At the South” was the title of Savannah Morning News’ editorial.  Despite the 
broad scope of TSTR, this particular southern newspaper editor read the report as a castigation of 
the Jim Crow South and therefore blasted the Committee and its report on several counts, accus-
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ing them of being “brain-trusters of the Roosevelt-Truman camp.”116 The PCCR’s recommenda-
tions were so egregious, according to this author, that it prompted him to compare it to another 
painful episode of southern history, Radical Reconstruction and the legislation Congress enacted 
during that time.  This evocation of Reconstruction might have been construed as a threat of 
pending violence: 
  
The report, almost from beginning to end, would disrupt 
 the established economic and social traditions and customs  
 of the South, especially in connection with race relationships, 
 to an extent as great if not greater than the famed proposed force  
 bills aimed at the South during Reconstruction Days!
 117
 
 
The editor also expressed displeasure with the two white southern Committee members, Graham 
and Tilly, when he wrote, “ 
 
[I]t is no credit to this region, moreover that among the fifteen  
members of the committee are Dr. Frank P. Graham, president of the  
University of North Carolina and Mrs. M.E. Tilly of Atlanta, an  
official of the Women’s Society of Christian Service of the Methodist  
Church.
118
 
 
 
In Alabama, The Huntsville Times also reported on Truman’s Committee and its recom-
mendations at great length.  Part of this article singled out the Committee’s two southern mem-
bers; no other Committee members were named.
 119
  As if almost blaming Graham and Tilly, the 
article, directly after their mention, stated that “Much of the report deals with the South, and with 
                                                          
116
  “Aimed At The South,” Savannah Morning News, October 31, 1947, p. 6.  
117
   Ibid.  For more information about the use of Reconstruction rhetoric see for example, Pete Daniels, 
Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 36.  Daniels 
argues that the use of Reconstruction references was an “implied threat of violence.” 
118
   “Aimed At The South”   
119
  “Wipe Out Race Barriers Now Group Advises:  Civil Rights Committee Makes 35 Suggestions on Ex-
plosive Subjects,”  The Huntsville Times, Huntsville, Alabama, October 29, 1947, p. 1. Microfilm Reel 000075, Al-
abama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama (hereinafter, ADAH). 
113 
the Negroes of America.  But the Committee said the other regions also have their ‘interferences’ 
with the rights of individuals.”120    
Within two weeks of the PCCR’s report publication, an article written by Thurman Sens-
ing, Director of Research of the Southern States Industrial Council in Nashville, Tennessee also 
bashed the report and its Committee members.  He dismissed Tilly and Graham as disingenuous 
southerners and claimed that African Americans would suffer if desegregation were forced: 
Of one thing, however, we can be quite certain—and that is, that the  
report is aimed rather directly at the South….Why should a committee  
of fifteen members take it upon themselves to lay down certain rules and  
regulations that would revise the customs and practices and traditions of  
a region containing 40 million people?  It should be noted, too, that this  
committee, which apparently takes it upon itself to represent one-third of  
the nation, contains only two members from the South – a region comprising  
one-third of the nation’s population.  Moreover, the most charitable thing  
that can be said about these two members is that they are not too highly  
regarded by the people they are supposed to represent. 
 
Since thirteen members of the committee are from without the South, since  
the two members from the South do not represent Southern thought, and since  
the recommendations of the committee are unquestionably directed at the South, 
 it is not too difficult to answer the question as to why this is so…. 
They therefore attempt to stir up strife and tension in the region they can not  
control…they are perhaps most dangerous in their effort to violate all the tradi-
tions and principles of the South with reference to racial segregation…. 
This committee does not understand – and neither do a great many people  
outside the South seem to understand – that segregation is not discrimination…. 
Segregation is best for both races – and thinking people of both races realize it.   
It has worked in the South, which region still contains three-fourths of the  
nation’s Negro population – and we are only being realistic when we realize  
that it would work no other way in the South.  Those who actually understand 
 the relationship between the races know that nothing would be worse for the  
Negro race than enforced abolishment of segregation.
121
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Despite Tilly’s pleas to make the report less harsh on the South, and the minor, mostly 
cosmetic changes that the PCCR’s staff made in concession, the southern press discarded these 
lame attempts and called it as they saw it – an unmitigated attack on the traditions upheld by the 
white South.   Up until the time of her service on the PCCR, Tilly’s work in southern race rela-
tions was largely within the progressive circles of the Women’s Division of the Methodist 
Church and the anti-lynching movement, but her service on the PCCR now illuminated her as a 
civil rights agitator to those who wanted the social status quo unchanged.  This newfound celeb-
rity status was not always a positive experience for Tilly.  One letter to the editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution targeted Tilly and suggested that she mind her own business and start civil rights 
improvements within her own neighborhood.
122
  Franklin Acker of the South Carolina paper The 
Independent, described Tilly as one of two southerners on the PCCR who was nothing more than 
a “parasite who, while living upon the funds furnished by the Methodist church, has rendered 
much of her service to the cause of Socialism and Communism.”123  Disparaging race relations 
activists by labeling them socialists or communists was not a new phenomenon, but one that 
would increase as the civil rights movement accelerated.
124
   
B.B. Chandler, publisher of the Mobile Press Register, personally sent Tilly an article 
from that paper entitled, “Southern Leaders Point out Fallacies in Committee Report on Civil 
Rights.”  The article criticized the PCCR’s work, arguing that “a study of the report of the Presi-
dent’s Committee on Civil Rights shows that the Committee is ignorant of the South and preju-
diced against it.  The Committee’s lack of common sense and utter ignorance of the difficult 
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problems faced by the South is evident in its silly recommendation that all racial segregation be 
abolished immediately.”125 
Graham was a public figure known nationally as a southern liberal.  The letters he re-
ceived from southerners were mainly critical of his role or, at best, questioned his role.  In sever-
al of the letters, the matter of the dissent arose from those who were curious if Graham had dis-
sented on the issue of withholding federal funds from segregated schools.
126
  Furthermore, be-
cause no one signed the dissent registered in TSTR, some questioned Graham’s stance on segre-
gation: 
As a native southerner and Ex-President of the Oklahoma Division United  
Daughters of the Confederacy I would like to know where you were born and 
reared and how you voted on the race segregation question, as a member of  
Pres. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights.  Of course, I believe negroes and 
whites were created separate races and should so remain.  I believe we should 
give the races equal opportunity but never social equality.  Neither do I believe 
that the Federal Gov’t should interfere with States’ Rights.  I am a Democrat  
and firmly believe in the sovereign rights of our States.  I would appreciate  
your views on segregation and States’ Rights.  Thanking you for an early re-
sponse.
127
 
 
Graham also received several letters from angry North Carolinians.  One from D. A. Hut-
to asked him to issue a minority report to counter TSTR:     
 
My observation for some years has been that this good STATE  
of N.C., - - - THE BEST PEOPLE THAT I KNOW ANYTHING  
ABOUT, has bestowed upon you many of its honors time and time  
again - - - - but I do not believe any of these HONORS were given  
with the thought that you would STAND OUT against even any, much 
less ALL of the TRUE AND SACRED things that these same people  
have held so faithfully to.   
 
AND IT NEARLY KILLS ME TO SEE that YOU HAVE SIGNED A  
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YANKEE report against all of us.  IT WOULD SEEM THEREFORE  
TO ME (Just one of the masses,) but I find many agreeing with me.,  
that this would be a very good time for the people to get wise and wake  
up and CANCEL THE HONORS, they have so VAINLY BESTOWED  
UPON YOU.  Unless, of course, you should come to your senses and  
at least make some “MINORITY REPORT,” with some sense to it.128 
 
Another letter illustrated the fear that desegregation in education would lead to social in-
timacy:  
I am surprised at a man in your place, living in the south having anything  
to do with this petition.  Just such a thing as this causes a lot of trouble  
with the Negroes in this country.  I have nothing personally against the  
negroes, and am ready to protest for the negroes, but I am opposed to a  
negro coming in my house and sitting down at my table with my family.   
I am also opposed to my children sitting at a desk with a negro in the school 
room.
129
 
 
This author then mentioned what he or she believed to be the inevitable and ultimate con-
clusion, that those who favored the end of segregation were trying to create a mixed race of 
blacks and whites.  This illogical and unfounded argument was intended to strike fear in order to 
ensure segregation would not be attempted … “I am opposed to one of my children marrying a 
negro.”130   Mr. O. L. Bonne also wrote Graham, predicting violent consequences and holding 
Graham accountable for them, “The position you have on this race question if pursued will sure-
ly result in discord and blood shed [sic].”131 
By the late 1940s, Tilly and Graham were seasoned southern race relations experts and 
the attacks on them by southern white supremacists were not enough to deter them from continu-
ing in their life’s work.  Tilly would remain truthful to her tried-and-true tactics in working with 
churchwomen of both races in subtle, yet meaningful, areas and would support the nascent Civil 
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Rights movement as it gained momentum over the next two decades.  Graham, on the other 
hand, moved his activism further into the political realm, when he assumed one of North Caroli-
na’s United States Senate seats after Senator James Broughton unexpectedly died in 1949.  
White racists ensured, however, that Graham would never be elected in his own right.  After this 
brief stint in politics, Graham delved heavily into human rights work with the United Nations for 
the remainder of his career.
132
   
Truman’s Civil Rights Message to Congress in February, 1948, fueled the fire against 
TSTR and stirred up animosity against Tilly and Graham all over again.  Less than a week after 
the president delivered his message, in which he mentioned the PCCR and tasked Congress with 
moving ahead on ten of the PCCR’s recommendations, Tilly and Graham received an anony-
mous letter postmarked in Tilly’s hometown of Atlanta.  The salutation across the top of the let-
ter read, “The Two Southern Residents of the Civil Rights(?) Committee,” indicating that it was 
intended for both Tilly and Graham.  The letter threatened a violent future for the South and held 
Tilly and Graham directly responsible for their complicity as members of the PCCR.    
 Your recommendations are naught, but by your actions you  
have precipitated and agitated more assault, more rape and more  
bloodshed than the South has ever seen.  You have prepared more  
hangmen’s nooses than have ever been prepared – or would have  
been prepared in the history of the whole Southland.  The tremendous 
increase of rape cases in the South - the wholesale electrocutions  
and putting to death by the Gas Chamber, are the direct result of the  
wide publicity of your actions…. 
 
You cheap publicity seekers and nigger lovers such as Eleanor Roosevelt,  
President (?) Truman, and others are the direct cause, or will be the direct  
cause, of more lynchings than have ever, or would have ever occurred.   
You are ignorant of conditions in the South, and the understanding of the  
colored race.  You are agitating the negro.  Their feeble minds and yours,  
cannot grasp the resulting chaos your recommendations will bring.  You  
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are bringing about insolence, bigotry, as well as assault, rape, murder and  
a number of outrages.
133
 
 
The anonymous letter also references the 1946 Monroe, Georgia mass lynchings of four African 
Americans – one of the heinous post-war race crimes that led Truman to establish the PCCR: 
We admit that the murder of 4 negroes in Georgia was a dreadful 
affair, but the state of affairs was so desperate, something had to 
be done.  By this action, possibly 4 thousand lives were saved.
134
  
  
The author then denied Tilly and Graham their southern heritage by writing “Leave the 
South to the Southerners.  We have handled the situation for a century and we will continue to do 
so.”135  Earlier in the letter, the author essentially excommunicated Tilly and Graham from being 
southern because of their association with the PCCR and TSTR, pronouncing  “You are not wor-
thy to live in the South.  The Southern public knows that you are not Southerners.  The damage 
that has been done is irreparable.”136  In the mind of this writer, Tilly and Graham could no long-
er be considered southern because being a southerner meant that one must be white and must al-
so uphold the social custom of segregation.  The letter’s author warned Tilly and Graham that 
there were plenty of others who shared the author’s attitudes.   
Who am I?  I am the average Southerner.  I was born and reared in  
the South.  My Father and grandfather, my mother and my grandmother  
were Southerners.  There are millions just like me.   
 
Ask any Southerner, man or woman, how they feel about this question.   
We think it is high time that the Southern people assert themselves in  
words and in deeds.  We should and we will have something to say about  
conditions in the South.
137
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Seven years before segregation came under attack after the 1954 and 1955 Brown deci-
sions, the threats made by this anonymous author are emblematic of some white southerners’ in-
tense desire not only to maintain the status quo, but they also threatened a violent, mass-based 
backlash in order to do so.
138
 
Less than a week after Truman’s February, 1948 speech to Congress, Senator James 
Eastland criticized Tilly and Graham on the Senate floor, implying that the Committee was 
stacked against the segregationists, when he said “the southern people who were to be so vitally 
effected by the President’s so-called Civil Rights Committee were denied representation on the 
Committee, except for two persons who had already by former action committed themselves to 
the course which they were expected to pursue.”139   
Later that month, on February 19
th
, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia made the introductory 
speech at the Virginia Jefferson Day Dinner, honoring Senator Clyde Hoey, of North Carolina.  
In this speech he, too, criticized Truman and the PCCR and its recommendations, especially with 
respect to the recommendation to withhold federal aid from segregated schools.  Byrd’s threat 
confirmed Tilly predictions… that the South would rather be ignorant than be forced into ending 
segregation by the federal government. 
If such coercion becomes a reality, by passage of the legislation  
as proposed, I pray god that Virginia will lead the southern states  
as renouncing for all time, every dollar of Federal aid.  We must  
not sell our right of self-government for a mess of Federal pottage…. 
But let me interject, independent of this outrageous proposal, the 
sooner Federal grants are abolished, the better.”140 
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  Although she had worked for many years against hate groups, Tilly had never been 
overtly targeted by them.  This changed after her service on the PCCR.  In 1948 she made an ap-
pearance at an anti-mask hearing in which she and other southern churchwomen had petitioned 
southern state legislators to pass legislation outlawing the wearing of masks in public.  After this 
hearing, she was tripped and thrown to the floor by Ku Klux Klan members as she was exiting 
the meeting.
141
  She received at least one bomb threat and several harassing phone calls to her 
home in Atlanta.  Undaunted, Tilly’s response was to play a recording of “The Lord’s Prayer” 
into the telephone.
142
   
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Graham and Tilly did not agree with segregation, in fact they were morally opposed to it.  
They dissented because they were concerned about the southern reaction from reactionaries, 
moderates and liberals alike, to the Committee’s recommendation to withhold federal money 
from segregated school systems in order to force desegregation.  All members of the Committee 
realized that the report would be read by white southern segregationists.  Committee members in 
favor of the recommendation to sanction federal grants-in-aid essentially redefined the race issue 
as a white problem because they demanded immediate change regardless of what southern white 
supremacists thought about it.  Tilly and Graham – the two white southerners on the Committee 
feared such unyielding recommendations would unravel social progress and instigate violence.   
They also were concerned about being able to continue their work in the South in the wake of the 
report’s publication.  For Tilly it was about being able to work quietly, making gains that would 
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endure - converting white racist attitudes individually, organically, which would overtime lead to 
voluntary acceptance of integration.  Tilly admitted, later in her life, that the experience on the 
PCCR was her “most difficult task.”143  For Graham, it was about his ability to continue his work 
in public education in ensuring that the South got its fair share of funding because it desperately 
needed it.  He believed accurately that, faced with an ultimatum, the South would sacrifice edu-
cation for racial segregation.   
TSTR generated much interest – both positive and negative.  Tilly and Graham were seen 
by other members of the Committee as experts in southern race relations, and even those who 
disagreed with Tilly’s and Graham’s dissent with respect to federally funding segregated schools 
still sought their advice.  In December 1947, Sadie Alexander wrote Graham asking for his help 
with ongoing activities related to the Committee’s work. 
It would appear, however that our work on the committee was but  
the beginning of a long road each one of us will have to trod if we  
expect to see the recommendations become a reality rather than an  
addition to governmental archives. 
 
I have had a request from many groups asking me to speak.  I am  
particularly anxious to accept one in Richmond, Virginia, under the  
auspices of my college sorority, Delta Sigma Theta.  These young  
ladies will write you, giving the names of the other organizations in  
the City of Richmond which are joining with them in planning a  
public meeting at which they have asked me to attend and asked me  
to request you to attend.  I would not want to come South to discuss  
the report unless you or Mrs. Tilley (sic) accompany me.
144
 
 
Both Tilly and Graham knew that the PCCR’s report with its strong anti-segregation 
stance and recommendation to withhold federal funds from segregated schools, despite the dis-
sent they appended to the report, would be scrutinized and criticized by segregationists and white 
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supremacists in the South and also within some southern liberal circles.   In meetings, Tilly con-
tinuously warned the Committee about this and foreshadowed that the South would not be silent 
about its unhappiness with the report.  During the September 1947 meetings, Tilly admitted that 
in her conversation earlier that summer with George C. Biggers, editor of the conservative news-
paper Atlanta Journal, he told her flatly that on the recommendation to withhold funds from seg-
regated schools, “‘the Atlanta Journal would itself have to attack the report.’”145  Graham also 
knew that this report, and whether he dissented on the matter of segregation and education, 
would be scrutinized by many white southerners.  He admitted during the September meeting, “I 
am going to be asked in meetings, heckled, and so on, ‘How did you vote one way in President 
Roosevelt’s Committee and another way in President Truman’s Committee?’”  Graham was not 
concerned about it though, and with his dissent on the matter, he could truly say “I voted the 
same way both times.”146  While many liberal organizations and individuals praised Tilly and 
Graham, newspapers, organizations, politicians and individuals across the South denounced them 
as traitors and their actions as treasonous.   
The anti-segregation recommendation in the report illuminated the ineffectiveness of the 
interracial movement and foreshadowed the end of one phase of southern liberalism.  Moreover, 
it represented a narrowing of the type of work already being done in the South by those such as 
Tilly and Graham.  Tilly and Graham would emerge from their experience on the PCCR into a 
race relations miasma.  During this period of flux the interracial movement was becoming obso-
lete, but the United States government was slow to act on the PCCR’s recommendations, and the 
African American-led civil rights movement had yet to crystallize.   These two activists would 
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return to the South and continue their work in human relations, with a focus on this new subset 
of the human rights movement known as civil rights that they helped to birth.  
Tilly would return to the South and for the remainder of her career would continue work-
ing in the realm of human rights, hosting interracial meetings with southern churchwomen to 
help to shift white, racist attitudes in communities across the South, as the civil rights movement 
both gained momentum and weathered several setbacks in the 1950s and 1960s.  Graham re-
turned to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill but by 1949 moved on to fill a Senate 
seat, where, his role on the PCCR would help cost him an election in his own right, essentially 
ending Graham’s long tenure of public and political work in southern race relations.  He would 
then move to the larger issue of global human rights in a role with the United Nations.  
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CHAPTER 3:  MRS. TILLY’S MOVEMENT1 
Laws mean nothing unless the people want to abide by them.  The people  
must have in their hearts the will to treat their fellow man right.  Then, and  
then only, will America really become a free nation for all of its citizens.
2
 
 
Dorothy Tilly, January 1948 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Dorothy Tilly admitted many years after her service on the PCCR, that the work on this 
Committee was her life’s most difficult task.  Tilly objected to some of the more radical recom-
mendations put forth in TSTR, and at times her arguments seem to favor no change to the racial 
status quo, versus endorsing a change that would be resisted and that would likely elicit violence 
and undo progress made by southern liberals.  In some sense, it may have appeared to her PCCR 
colleagues that she was mollycoddling the southern white supremacists, but she was not.  Tilly’s 
views were not at all supportive of the white supremacist desires to maintain Jim Crow.  Fur-
thermore, she was very different from others on the PCCR because her experiences as a white 
female human relations activist in the South gave her a unique perspective about the South.   
While her more radical colleagues probably perceived Tilly as dragging her feet on the segrega-
tion and education issue because of the fear of a backlash, they themselves could not imagine 
what massive resistance might be like.   Because of her experiences as an anti-lynching activist 
and, as one who would have been old enough to remember the 1906 Atlanta Race Riot and re-
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surgence of the Ku Klux Klan following World War I, Tilly understood that racism was violent 
and irrational, and she was genuinely fearful of what could happen if segregation suddenly end-
ed.
3
  Despite her knowledge of these incidents Tilly herself could not even imagine what massive 
resistance could be.   Additionally, to Tilly some of the recommendations put forth by the PCCR 
represented a narrowing of the work Tilly was already doing within the field termed by Tilly and 
her colleagues as “human relations.”   
In December 1947, approximately six weeks after the PCCR published its report, Tilly 
was asked to speak to the Women’s National Press Club about her role on this Committee and 
about civil rights.
4
  In the speech, Tilly covered several issues that included civil rights, the Cold 
War, the problems of segregation, and what some southern churchwomen were doing to combat 
racism. She stated unequivocally that "the hope lies in the women" to correct the ills of our so-
ciety and rid the nation of hate, because "they are freer to work, and their living doesn't depend 
so much on what they say and what they do."
5
  Although Tilly dissented from the recommenda-
tion to sanction federal grants-in-aid to segregated schools in To Secure These Rights, she signed 
the report and supported it.  As a former member of Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, Tilly 
helped to set a national agenda for civil rights reform.  In the post-PCCR world, Tilly and her 
southern churchwomen continued to be positive catalysts for human rights in the South.    
This chapter will briefly examine Tilly’s childhood and young adulthood to reveal the in-
spirations for her activism.   It will then examine the direction that Tilly’s human rights career 
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took in the post-PCCR world, focusing first on three conferences that Tilly held in the late 1940s.  
The first was on human rights and the second on civil rights.  Then, two years into the post-
PCCR world, Tilly reverted back to her interracial movement human relations tactics of quietly 
bringing churchwomen of both races together, which she did in a third conference, which was 
not well publicized and innocuously called, “A Workshop of Southern Churchwomen.”  Tilly’s 
goal was to convene women of both races so that they could quietly devise strategies to eradicate 
prejudice and hate within their communities across the South without provoking opposition.  
This ecumenical conference, which Tilly named “The Fellowship of the Concerned (FOC)”, be-
came an annual interracial event for many southern churchwomen from 1949 until 1968, when 
illness forced Tilly’s retirement.  The chapter will also compare and contrast the Fellowship of 
the Concerned with its predecessor, the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching, to demonstrate the evolution of churchwomen’s interracial and civil rights activism in 
the post-war period.  The chapter then reveals how Tilly demonstrated support for the landmark 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision, despite the position she took in PCCR 
meetings against abruptly ending segregation in the schools, and how many of her churchwomen 
followed suit not only in supporting the decision but in keeping their own children in schools 
during the desegregation crisis that erupted in many southern cities.  Lastly, the chapter reveals 
how churchwomen’s activism, deftly guided by Tilly, tackled the immediate needs of the civil 
rights movement without ever losing sight of the loftier goal of human rights for all.    
 
3.2 Early Inspirations 
Tilly was reared in a devout Methodist household and fortified her faith throughout her 
adult life, often quoting from scripture to inspire her and other white churchwomen to move for-
127 
ward in the quest for humanity despite great odds in the harsh and racist climate of the South.  
Her earliest influences came from her family, especially her father who was a Methodist minis-
ter, and her mother, who was a schoolteacher.
6
  In the late summer of 1894, when Tilly was elev-
en years old, she traveled alone by train from her hometown of Hampton, Georgia, through At-
lanta and then farther up the Southern Railway to Duluth, Georgia to visit her aunt and other 
members of her extended family.  After her visit had ended and young Dorothy had returned 
home, her aunt wrote to her: 
Dollie, darling, everyone in Duluth misses you.  By your sweet friendly  
courtesy you gained the hearts of every one white and black here…. 
 
Now, my dear child this is great encouragement, for you to continue to  
be kind to all, even to the poor and needy, and your Heavenly Father  
will bless you in this life, and in the hereafter.
7
 
 
Even at this young age, Tilly exhibited traits that would eventually guide her life’s work 
as a humanitarian in the troubled South, for which her aunt recognized and complimented Tilly’s 
behavior.  This type of nurturing foreshadowed the training and encouragement Tilly would re-
ceive from other Methodist women in the 1920s and 1930s as Tilly transitioned from an activist 
to a leader of Christian southern women in the struggle for humanity and justice.  In fact, Tilly’s 
most influential teachers were the female mentors she found in the Woman’s Missionary Society 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and the Commission on Interracial Cooperation.  By 
the 1940s, Tilly herself was recognized as a leader of southern churchwomen and, like those be-
fore her, utilized the teachings of Christ, prayer, and interracial meetings to build sustained em-
pathy between members of both races.   
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Tilly did not need a law passed or a court case argued to decide that segregation was 
wrong.  She came to understand it as morally wrong and disavowed it sometime in the 1930s.
8
   
Taking her cue from Methodist women who became her mentors during the critical decade of the 
1930s, Tilly, in time, became a mentor for other southern churchwomen.  Tilly helped shift white 
racist attitudes in the South through her conferences and throughout the country via her writings 
in Methodist church circles.  Tilly did not quit organizations that continued to practice segrega-
tion.  For example, she did not leave her church – even though it did not accept African Ameri-
cans as members until well into the 1960s.  Tilly knew from experience that people’s hearts 
could change, not through force but over time, through trust, faith, love and understanding.    
Tilly’s membership in the PCCR in the 1940s crystallized her role as a catalyst for social 
and political change in the South over the next twenty years.  The radical recommendations made 
by the Committee, coupled with the insistent inputs from Committee members who refused to 
accept Tilly’s more deliberate tactics to instigate social change in the South, proved to her that 
the change imposed on the South from the outside, which had started slowly a few decades be-
fore, was increasing its pace and would hereafter be relentless.  Tilly realized that her role going 
forward would be to prepare the white South for the ongoing onslaught of change, because she 
predicted accurately that white racist southerners would defy and retaliate against any effort by 
the federal government to inflict social change in the South.   
 
3.3 From Human Rights to Civil Rights and Back Again 
Tilly’s involvement in the PCCR did not prevent her from organizing and participating in 
other events in 1947.  Inspired by her work on the PCCR, and undoubtedly supportive of the 
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Christian ecumenical movement’s duty to help form a new global order in the days following 
World War II, Tilly organized a regional Conference on Human Rights and World Order in At-
lanta.  This conference was held on May 8 and 9, 1947 at the Lutheran Church of the Redeemer 
in Atlanta, Georgia.  Tilly chaired the conference under the sponsorship of three organizations, 
the Georgia Council of Church Women, the Women’s Society of Christian Service – Southeast-
ern Jurisdiction, and the Southern Regional Council.  The conference’s purpose was twofold: 
to bring together ‘representative’ individuals of various racial, cultural,  
and economic groups for the purpose of interpreting ‘Human Rights’ in  
the world scene today, and adapting them to local, regional and national  
practices.
9
 
 
A secondary but nonetheless important purpose was  
to undergird the forthcoming report of President Truman’s Civil Rights  
Committee and to prepare the leaders of women’s organizations of the  
South to face clearly and understandingly that the denial of human rights  
to any group anywhere affects the peace and safety of all people everywhere.
10
 
 
Here, Tilly directly associated her work on the PCCR within the larger context of the 
human rights movement.  The interracial conference was deemed a success, with over 200 con-
ference attendees representing 13 states – including Washington, D.C., Oklahoma, and New 
York.  It was an ecumenical conference as well, with various religious organizations represent-
ed.
11
   Representing the post-World War II progressive coalition at the conference were repre-
sentatives from Emory University, Scarritt College, Spelman College, Atlanta University, Agnes 
Scott College, the Teamsters, the American Federation of Labor, Atlanta Urban League, Ameri-
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can Red Cross, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Georgia School of Technology, 
League of Women Voters, and the Woman’s Bureau of the Department of Labor.12   
For the conference’s first day Tilly organized workshops addressing the following topics:  
“Human Rights and World Order,” “Human Rights Under the Law,”  and “Human Rights in 
Earning a Living.” 13  These topics echoed the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights, 
which extended beyond civil rights alone.  To further bring a realistic, if not harsh, perspective to 
attendees about the state of the world in the early post-war era, Tilly organized the luncheon for 
the first day to “be the cereal served to children of war devastated countries.”  She solicited do-
nations for it, instructing attendees, “Persons will be privileged to pay any amount they wish for 
the lunch and it will be sent to overseas relief.”14  That evening, three keynote speakers ad-
dressed the conference attendees.  Lillian Schearer of the Women’s Bureau of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor’s Social Security Administration spoke about “Women’s Right to Make a Liv-
ing.”  Turner Smith, Chief of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ad-
dressed the audience speaking of “Our Civil Rights.”  While the conference was ostensibly about 
Human Rights, Tilly included this important session about civil rights, thus demonstrating the 
inextricable link between the two  movements. The final speaker, Richard Fagley of the Federal 
Council of Churches and a representative from the United Nations, spoke about “Human Rights 
and World Order.”15   
Tilly reserved the second day for attendees to conclude workshop discussions and then 
allotted time for them to discuss their findings and develop a program of action.
16
  A critical goal 
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of this conference, like so many other initiatives at this time, was to educate Americans “to sup-
port the United Nations and its human rights system.”  The optimism created by the conference 
dovetailed with the general optimistic outlook held by many in the postwar period who supported 
and expected a new world order in which human rights would be a priority. 
17
 Human rights was 
not a new initiative for Tilly; however with the United Nations human rights movement well un-
derway, she likely believed the timing was optimal for a conference that highlighted human 
rights.   
Some southern women’s church groups also believed that they held a vested interest in 
influencing the creation of a new global order, and they asserted themselves in that effort while 
simultaneously working against lynching and disenfranchisement.  Two months prior to Tilly’s 
Human Rights conference, the Woman’s Society of Christian Service of the North Georgia Con-
ference of The Methodist Church held its annual session in March 1947.  During this meeting, 
the members adopted a resolution in which they denounced lynching and the white primary, call-
ing for “full justice to be given in all our courts to all citizens, regardless of station in life, creed 
or color….”  The women declared their support for the United Nations and the “concept of ‘One 
World,’” and they endorsed the “strengthening of the U.N.O. by the early organization of a 
world police force and by working toward the formation of a world government with limited 
powers adequate to prevent war.”  On the national and global levels the women, conscious of the 
United States’ role in shaping international affairs, called upon the United States “to accept its 
full share of responsibility in providing homes for displaced and homeless victims of totalitarian 
brutality and religious persecution.”  But they also disapproved of any “peacetime universal mili-
tary training by the U.S,” suggesting that such action “would undermine” the United Nations’ 
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disarmament proposal and therefore they claimed it “both unadvisable and useless in this atomic 
age.”18  This resolution provided insight into some of the opportunities and tensions that charac-
terized the 1940s as a critical decade in the growing civil rights movement, the nascent Cold 
War, and the larger effort for human rights.  Moreover, the resolution, coupled with Tilly’s Hu-
man Rights Conference, demonstrate that many white southern churchwomen expected to con-
tinue their human rights activism and exert their influence in shaping local, national, and global 
communities in the post-war era.   
In February 1948, President Truman presented his Civil Rights message to Congress, 
which consisted of about one-third of the PCCR recommendations.  Truman’s speech again drew 
the ire of many southern senators and congressmen, and once again the PCCR and To Secure 
These Rights came under attack.  Tilly traveled across the United States during 1948, speaking to 
groups about To Secure These Rights.  She also organized another conference placing the focus 
on civil rights.
19
  However, by this time, a concerted and growing reaction against To Secure 
These Rights and Truman’s Civil Rights program had formed in the South, and some of her 
speaking engagements about To Secure These Rights drew negative and, in some cases, hostile 
responses.
 20
   
Concurrent with Tilly’s organizing efforts of southern churchwomen to push a human 
rights, and later a civil rights, agenda in the late 1940s, there arose a southern white women’s 
counter effort led by Mississippi newspaper columnist and avowed segregationist Frances Sillers 
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Ogden.
21
   Ogden, who cultivated her activist training roots in the 1920s with the Daughters of 
the American Revolution, shifted her activism to be even more conservative in the mid-1940s, 
when a confluence of events including World War II, Roosevelt’s FEPC, a threatened anti-poll 
tax law, and the Smith v. Allright decision, which knocked down the Texas white primary, 
spurred Ogden to action.  During the war, she began her campaign against the attacks on Jim 
Crow by encouraging white southern women to use their influence as mothers to strengthen and 
uphold the custom of segregation.  After the PCCR released its report, Ogden specifically at-
tacked TSTR because of its recommendations to immediately abolish segregation and to sanction 
federal grants-in-aid to force desegregated schools.  Ogden utilized scare tactics when speaking 
to white women, warning that integration would “‘affect you and your children and your chil-
dren’s children.’”  Ogden called for “‘Race segregation,’” claiming that it was “’self-
preservation.’”  School integration, she warned, would lead to “‘mongrelization.’”  In the 1948 
presidential election, she supported the States Rights candidates, Strom Thurmond of South Car-
olina and Fielding Wright of Mississippi.  By the early 1950s, Ogden had become so disgusted 
with the Democratic Party that she organized southern white women in favor of keeping the seg-
regated status quo, and they campaigned for the Republican presidential candidate, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.
22
   
While the Human Rights Conference in 1947 and the Civil Rights Conference in 1948 
were well attended and well organized, both lacked the momentum to catalyze sustained progress 
in either the human rights or civil rights movements in the South.
23
  Tilly recognized the inherent 
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pitfalls in drawing attention to these movements.  In the post-war years, the number of southern-
ers willing to publicly partake in civil rights activity shrank due to the emergence of the Cold 
War, the rising anti-communist sentiment, the post-war racial violence, and the more forthright 
goal of integration put forth by the PCCR in the nascent national civil rights movement.  Ever the 
optimist, the undaunted Tilly searched for ways in which she and southern churchwomen could 
continue improving the South for all southerners – African Americans and whites - without 
drawing attention to themselves, since Tilly’s early attempts to promote civil rights had been met 
with strong opposition.  In 1949 she drew upon the methods she learned through her mentors in 
the 1930s - Methodist women - and created an interracial conference which she innocuously 
named “The Fellowship of the Concerned.”  Learning from her conferences in 1947 and 1948,  
Tilly did not attach a theme to the 1949 conference such as human rights or civil rights and, simi-
lar to the Christian Leadership Schools of the 1930s, Tilly invited white and African American 
churchwomen to this conference.
24
  
Tilly’s work on the Farm Security Administration brought her to Washington, D.C. sev-
eral times during the war and during one of her visits, Tilly was introduced to Eleanor Roosevelt 
and the two became friends.  Tilly had arranged for the First Lady to attend an interracial confer-
ence at Lake Junaluska, North Carolina in 1944.  Tilly again called on Roosevelt to help with 
this 1949 conference.  Roosevelt had been a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly 
and had led the committee that wrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 25
   Roosevelt 
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agreed and became the keynote speaker at the Conference.  About a month before the scheduled 
date, Tilly, ruminating about the growing anti-civil rights sentiment in the South, wrote to Roo-
sevelt admitting  "I think I told you that our South seems to be more or less willing to accept the 
Universal Bill of Rights but has a closed mind about our civil rights in the South."
26
   
Despite Tilly’s worries, two thousand people came to hear the former First Lady speak 
about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the Wesley Memorial Church in Atlanta.
27
  
Although there were many supporters of Roosevelt in attendance, she had many enemies in the 
South, and outside the church many of her detractors also showed up and “jeered” at the First 
Lady as she came through the crowd to enter the church.
28
   
During the conference itself, Tilly reconstituted existing networks of activist church-
women (many of whom were former members of the defunct ASWPL) into a new organization 
that she called the Fellowship of the Concerned (FOC).   The FOC, an umbrella coalition, was 
loosely composed of southern churchwomen who were leaders in their various religious organi-
zations, including United Church Women, the Women's Christian Missionary Service of the 
Methodist Church, and other groups who wanted to improve race relations in the South.
29
   
With commitment from attendees, Tilly parlayed this one conference into an annual inter-
racial meeting that mushroomed into a true movement of southern churchwomen over the next 
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twenty years.  The FOC helped foster a spirit of sisterhood between African American and white 
churchwomen across the South so that they together could forge a new and improved South for 
all southerners.    
 
3.4 The Fellowship of the Concerned 
In some respects, the FOC resembled the ASWPL.  Both organizations held that white 
middle-class Christian southern women had a moral obligation to improve southern society and 
therefore were uniquely situated to carry out this mission.
30
 An FOC pamphlet claimed,  
Church women of all faiths and denominations have long furnished  
valuable moral leadership in the South. Now as never before their active  
leadership is needed--to help bring our practices in closer accord with the  
ideals of Christianity and Judaism, to strengthen and broaden democracy,  
to build a society in which every person can be confident of security and  
justice. By their determination to see these aims achieved, thousands of  
Southern church women are joined together in a fellowship that knows no  
boundaries of race or creed--the Fellowship of the Concerned.
31
 
 
Nowhere in this document was the controversial topic “civil rights” mentioned.  The 
FOC’s goal was far broader than civil rights, and Tilly, fresh from hostile and negative feedback 
from her service on the PCCR, did not wish to draw attention to this newly-formed group, so that 
it could pursue its mission quietly yet effectively. 
As did members of the ASWPL, FOC members signed a pledge accepting the organiza-
tion's goals and their responsibilities within the organization. As with the ASWPL, there were no 
FOC membership dues; rather, members became part of the larger regional network and could be 
called upon to assist with a meeting or to resolve a crisis whenever necessary.
32
 These similari-
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ties between the two groups are not surprising, since both Dorothy Tilly and her mentor in the 
CIC and ASWPL, Jessie Daniel Ames, had risen through the ranks of southern Methodist wom-
en’s organizations such as the WMS.  In these organizations, they learned the techniques of  in-
terracial meetings, such as having meeting attendees return home armed with information to host 
local gatherings and evangelize what they had learned.  
The FOC was also quite different from its predecessor.  Unlike the ASWPL, the FOC had 
no formal structure (except for Tilly's role as its leader), no letterhead stationery, and no field 
secretaries.
33
 Additionally, although the ASWPL was by design an all-white organization, Tilly 
from the outset invited both white and black women to attend annual FOC conferences, so that 
the "membership" at the conference level was interracial.
34
  This practice echoed the Christian 
Leadership Schools of the 1930s, in which Methodist women of both races met for a week and 
then took their knowledge home to educate others of their experiences.  The FOC conferences 
were significant for they brought together black and white women of varying faiths in a social 
setting, many for the first time, where they could join together in fellowship and prayer, interact 
as equals, share common issues as mothers and wives, and develop tactics to improve the 
South.
35
  Although the ASWPL was forced to confront the volatile issues of race and sexuality 
commonly associated with lynching, it largely acquiesced to the status quo of segregation. The 
FOC, on the other hand, defied segregation from the start because Tilly included African Ameri-
can and white women at the annual conferences, and organizers of state conferences did the 
same. The sexual politics of its activism were far more threatening than the sexual politics of an-
ti-lynching activism, volatile as that had been. Supporting integration meant advocating that 
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white and black children and white and black adults be in the same places, which had had much 
more direct sexual implications for its opponents. As a result, the FOC, had far fewer "members" 
than did the ASWPL.
36
  Many southern liberals dropped out of racial reform in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s because they disagreed with the push for desegregation and social equality.
37
  By 
then southern liberalism had shifted from thinking about ways to create parity between distinct 
black and white societies to thinking about ways to integrate blacks into white society.  Addi-
tionally, the early 1950s also witnessed a decrease in membership rolls of the SRC, due to more 
conservative forces such as the House Un-American Activity Committee becoming more influ-
ential and fearsome.
38
    
The FOC conferences were similar to its predecessors, the Christian Leadership Schools 
and interracial Bible studies, in that they were designed to enlighten, educate, and inspire at-
tendees to take their newfound knowledge back to their communities and act upon the ideas that 
had emerged during the meeting.  After each conference, Tilly would mail “Gleanings” or high-
lights from the conference along with any other literature that might help the attendees go forth 
and put into action things they learned at the two-day meeting.
 39
  Potential attendees were rec-
ommended to Tilly by their national or regional church organizations.  Once a woman attended a 
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conference, she might be called upon by Tilly to assist with the statewide workshop for the fol-
lowing year.
40
   
 
3.5 From Interracial Conferences to Interracial Activism 
A fundamental difference between the Christian Leadership Schools of the 1930s and the 
FOC of the 1950s and 1960s was that several white women who attended FOC conferences, ex-
panded the interracial experience at the conference to include interracial activism at home, as 
instructed by Tilly.  Naturally, some white churchwomen were freer than others from racist atti-
tudes, and these women even engaged in integrated prayer groups and activism with African 
American women as early as the 1940s.
41
  
Olive Andrews, a white woman from Montgomery, Alabama had created the first inte-
grated prayer group in Montgomery in the 1940s.
42
  She was a member of the all-white Trinity 
Presbyterian church in Montgomery, in which she taught Bible school.  One day the church had 
an African American guest speaker from Tuscaloosa named Myrtle Williamson, who was in 
charge of the Bible department at Stillman College.  Williamson and Andrews connected later 
that day, and Williamson told Andrews of a “conference of Negro women” held each summer at 
Stillman.  Williamson invited Andrews to speak at the conference that summer, which she did.  
This became the first time in her life that Andrews had eaten with African Americans in a social 
setting.  Andrews at first admitted having a “sort of scary feeling” when she presented her talk – 
because it was the first time in her life that she “had ever been the minority.” Although teaching 
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blacks in a Bible study was, as she described, “paternalistic,” after a time Andrews was asked to 
coordinate the conference.  During this experience she realized that “all people are just people,” 
and she found it very difficult to make the transition between the integrated experiences in Tus-
caloosa and the racial tension back home in Montgomery.  She felt that “[Y]ou just had to 
change your personality altogether almost to get back into Montgomery.”  Because these women 
did not want to wait a whole year to meet, Andrews organized an integrated Bible study group in 
Montgomery.  News of her work reached Dorothy Tilly, and at some point in the 1950s, Tilly 
invited Andrews to the annual FOC meeting in Atlanta.  Andrews recalled her first FOC meeting 
as “remarkable” because at the conference “Mrs. Tilley [sic] had every color under the sun...” 
and “we all went together, black and white.”  From that time on, Andrews’s interracial group in 
Montgomery was considered part of the FOC.
43
    
Jane Schutt of Jackson, Mississippi was a younger FOC member whose activism was 
rooted in the civil rights movement and who embraced integrated activism in the early 1960s.  
Schutt, a white, middle-class mother and housewife, was a member of Tilly's Fellowship of the 
Concerned and the president of Mississippi's Church Women United during the mid-1960s.  She 
was involved in the "Jackson Movement," and served as a member of Mississippi's biracial Civil 
Rights Committee. Schutt experienced antagonism from whites who opposed her civil rights ac-
tivism. One winter night in 1962 a cross was planted and set afire in her front yard. Undaunted, 
Schutt used it as an outdoor Christmas decoration.
44
  Schutt also led an integrated Girl Scout 
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troop.
45
  In a letter Schutt wrote to Tilly following the 1964 annual FOC meeting, she exclaimed 
that “The inspiration and information I have received in each meeting of the Fellowship of the 
Concerned have spurred me on to new effort when all seemed pretty hopeless.”46 Schutt went on 
to report that as a result of the 1961 FOC meeting, she had been able to form an interracial and 
interfaith meeting group in her community. This led to an association with African American 
women such as Clarie Collins Harvey, founder of Womanpower Unlimited, an organization cre-
ated to assist the Freedom Riders whose goals evolved into voter registration activism.
47
 Schutt 
enclosed a copy of Womanpower Unlimited’s brochure on their “First Workshop on Race,” and 
in the letter she enthusiastically explained that “Mrs. Clarie Harvey and Womanpower Unlimited 
have been our strong allies in each endeavor.  Our progress has been very slow, but we feel it has 
been sure and solid.”48  In 1966, Tilly asked Harvey to lead a discussion group at the Jackson, 
Mississippi Fellowship of the Concerned meeting and five years later, in 1971, Harvey became 
the first African American woman and first southern woman elected as President of United 
Church Women.
 49
 
  In 1960, Genevieve Lexow of Florida participated in the annual Fellowship of the Con-
cerned meeting in Atlanta, acting as a "Chairman" who reported on the Church and Human Rela-
tions workshop.  One of the recommendations that came from this workshop was that women of 
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both races should better "understand each other."
50
   Tilly had suggested that the attendees reach 
out to women of other races and faiths using common points of interest to begin a dialogue.
51
 Six 
years later, in June 1966, Lexow wrote Tilly describing how Tilly's encouragement at the 1960 
FOC meeting had led Lexow to contact an African American woman named Susie Holley. At 
first these two women discussed their respective children’s weddings, but eventually the conver-
sation turned to how Holley could get assistance to expand a daycare and preschool facility for 
underprivileged children in South Broward County, Florida. Thus began Lexow's journey of in-
terracial activism with Holley and other African American women.  
  It is not often one sees the far reaching extent of ripples that spread  
  out from a pebble thrown into the sea—or a word spoken into a large  
  crowd.  It may please you to hear about the ever-widening influence   
  of a simple statement you made one day in a meeting of the Fellowship 
   of the Concerned in Atlanta in 1960. 
 
You asked each of us to make a gesture of friendship such as a telephone  
call about a mutual item of interest to an acquaintance of another race or faith. 
‘Ah!  this is an assignment I can do easily, with no great danger of extensive  
involvement,’ I thought. 
 
And so the telephone call was made and Susie Holley and I discussed the  
weddings of our children which had taken place earlier that year.  Before  
hanging up she said, ‘I have wanted to talk with you about establishing an  
extension of our Cradle Nursery in the southern part of the County.  Do you  
know whether or not there is a need and who I could contact?’ It was not  
difficult to refer her to Mrs. Wright, a fellow UCW who had  dreamed of a  
day nursery for children of her neighborhood; nor could I refuse to accompany 
her on the first interview.  From then on the story of the South Broward Cradle 
Nursery is one of ever deeper involvement in a project which has been one  
of the most harrowing and most rewarding I have ever experienced. 
 
I am enclosing a report and statement of goals which was compiled one  
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year ago.  Today I have been notified that the Office of Economic Opportunity 
has approved our nursery for development in their day care program in the  
county.  Far sooner than we dreamed possible our goals are being reached! 
 
The real milestones on this journey are difficult to put into words.  Having  
participated in the venture from its first appearance as a wistful dream, at  
first reluctantly, through periods of chagrin and despair; hope, humility and  
joy, I am deeply grateful that it has become a recognized channel of service  
that is soon to be enlarged in many directions. 
 
I am sure you will understand the quality of the blessing which has come to  
one who timidly took a faltering first step.  Thank you, Mrs. Tilly for planting the 
“mustard seed” and for the inspiration of your deep commitment to the Way of 
Love.
52
 
 
Lexow's letter reveals her growth as she overcame her fear, reached across the racial di-
vide, and discovered what could be accomplished when black and white women worked togeth-
er.  It also reveals the transition of her attitudes and activism over time and the pride she felt in 
her accomplishments.  Moreover, her efforts run true to the mission of the FOC in that they were 
more along the lines of human rights initiatives and not confined to civil rights.  Tilly’s directive 
to the women of the 1960 FOC meeting seemed innocent enough: “make a gesture of friendship 
such as a telephone call about a mutual item of interest.”  Tilly did not make her suggestions na-
ively, for she knew through experience the power of interracial communication along common 
issues, and that such experiences across the racial divide could make the impossible suddenly 
possible.   
Schutt's letter and Lexow’s letter to Tilly are significant for many reasons.  First, they 
demonstrate how white and black churchwomen were working together in interracial prayer 
meetings and workshops.
53
  They also reveal that the commitments churchwomen made at Tilly's 
interracial two-day conferences were successfully implemented at the local level in many in-
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stances.  Although FOC conferences were not limited to civil rights, attendees such as Schutt 
found ways to apply tactics learned at FOC conferences to local civil rights activism.  Lastly, 
both are examples of the gradual yet enduring success of the interracial experiences that FOC 
meetings provided. 
In other cases women who attended the FOC meetings also experienced epiphanies about 
their own power in creating and allowing change.  It was during the 1956 FOC meeting that Wil-
la Lindsay of rural Cairo, Georgia realized her role in effecting social change.  After returning 
home, she wrote Tilly:  “The problems of the rural church and community are many, broad, and 
deep in regards to their race relations, but I was made aware at the meeting that ‘I’ am a key per-
son to answer the challenge it presents.”54  Lindsay’s realization and those experienced by others 
across the South were, essentially, the lynchpins of Tilly’s strategy – having churchwomen un-
derstand that they held a very powerful role in society, and in turn using their role as church-
women to improve society.   
African American women's experiences were also important to FOC efforts.  Tilly 
brought together women of both races so that they could meet as equals in an integrated setting 
and understand each other as southern mothers and wives. She knew from her experiences in 
similar meetings in the 1930s that this tactic would work to eliminate stereotypes whites held 
about African Americans.
55
 It would also help African American women reverse prejudiced atti-
tudes they held about whites.  Following the 1964 FOC conference, Constance Wyatt, an African 
American woman from Norfolk, Virginia, wrote Tilly: 
  I trust that this letter will find you and the other members of the  
Council well, and continuing your efforts to help create in the south,  
a wholesome atmosphere for men to live in, changing the hearts of men.   
I pray continually that this may one day become a reality. 
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  Mrs. Tilly I must tell you that mere words can not express the effect  
  attending The Fellowship of the Concerned had upon me.  This was my 
  first trip into the deep south and quite frankly I had no previous desire  
  to go there, because I have often said, “Lord, deliver me from anyplace 
  worse than Virginia,” the land where I was born.  My family and many 
  of my friends expressed their concern when I told them I was about to 
  embark on a trip to Atlanta, Georgia, to attend an integrated [sic] meeting. 
  I must confess that I had grave doubts and many reservations about  
Attending the meeting. 
 
  Now as I think about the trip I can not recall any other experience in my life 
  that has helped me to reshape my opinions and ideas concerning the white 
  man in the south.  Living the life of a Negro in the South does not give one 
  the opportunity often to see Christian brotherhood in Action.  Therefore 
  we often have deep rooted hostilities and doubts about the Christian faith 
  in America.   
 
  I had never heard about the Southern Regional Council before and did not 
  believe and probably would never have believed , had I not been present, 
  that such a meeting was possible in the South during these times.  I doubted 
  that people could come together and sit down and discuss sanely and  
  intelligently the problems which really exist in the South.  The meeting 
  did much to renew my belief that with God all things are possible. 
 
Mrs. Ann Fullman from New Port News [sic], Virginia was my roommate  
and traveling companion, we enlightened each other through many frank  
conversations during the trip. 
 
Mrs. Tilly, I am now telling my friends that as bad as race relations are in  
Virginia and other parts of the South, there are some people here with a  
genuine concern for the problems with exist here.  The concerned who are 
willing to witness of their concerns not merely with words but with deeds also. 
Good and bad deeds have a way of speaking so loud that I can’t hear what you  
are saying.   
 
We now pray, ‘Lord help us so that all we speak with our lips, we will believe 
in our hearts and all we believe in our hearts we will practice with our lives.’ 
It is my fondest wish that will have the privilege to meet you again in another
 mountain top experience of ‘The Fellowship of the Concerned.’56 
  
 Tilly also engaged African Americans as speakers for FOC conferences to arm attendees 
with facts about African Americans and their organizations.  Attendees could use this infor-
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mation to  dispel myths and stereotypes in their own communities and learn firsthand about the 
African American experience in the segregated South.
 57
  Ruby Hurley, an active member of the 
Methodist Church and a regional director for the NAACP, participated in annual and local FOC 
meeting educating attendees about the important role held by the NAACP.
58
  In 1961, Tilly was 
able to secure Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his wife, Coretta Scott King, as participants.  Mrs. 
King led the women in song and Dr. King addressed the attendees.
59
 The couple’s participation 
demonstrates that the leader of the civil rights movement and his wife, who was becoming more 
involved with the Peace movement and who had joined the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom during the early 1960s, believed the FOC's work to be significant.
60
  
In February, 1965, following the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Mrs. Ella Mae 
Brayboy, an African American, married mother of three from Atlanta, and a driving force for 
African Americans in local voter registration, gave a speech at an Interfaith Conference orga-
nized by Dorothy Tilly.
61
  Brayboy shared her experience of growing up in the segregated South, 
the lack of educational opportunities available to her, the discrimination she faced in the job 
market, and her realistic assessment of how much would change in the post–Civil Rights Act pe-
riod: 
The Civil Rights Bill has opened a new world of public accommodations  
to us because before in order to see a first run picture we would have to  
climb to the top of the house at the Fox or save our money for years to go  
to New York or Chicago to have some freedom.  But this bill has not erased  
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some unpleasant memories that are connected with some public places.   
As I go in some places I cannot help but wonder how I will be accepted.   
Older people do not adjust as fast as young people. A bill cannot wipe out  
350 years of discrimination and injustice in a few years—the scars will  
linger on along with mixed feelings. 
 
I am wondering just how long it will take for Negroes to really integrate.  
How long will it take for us to really be accepted economically?  We have  
got to be accepted and get jobs with decent salary [sic] or else we cannot  
share or become part of this ‘Great Society.’62 
 
Brayboy’s words harkened back to the human rights goals enumerated by the National Negro 
Congress in 1936.
63
  Brayboy not only shared her first-hand account of her life experiences as an 
African American living in the South, but she also provided an historic perspective of the long 
civil rights struggle in this country.   
 In 1967, Coretta Scott King returned to the FOC annual meeting, acknowledging the or-
ganization’s good work and the friendship she shared with Tilly.  King closed the conference 
with a brief and prescient speech in which she spoke frankly about the fact that her husband's 
work exposed her family to great danger, and that if it brought “death to her or to her family, she 
would have to accept it, that there was no turning back.”64 
 
3.6 The Southern School Desegregation Crisis and the South’s Shock Absorbers 
By 1953 the landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court 
case was winding its way through the courts.  As such, Tilly shifted the FOC’s strategy that year 
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to overtly meet this controversial issue head-on.
65
  While Tilly disagreed with segregation, she 
understood the gravity of this 1954 Supreme Court decision to the South.
66
   
The FOC represented more than an annual conference; it also was a strong and extensive 
network.  Tilly had learned during her days as an anti-lynching activist that, during times of cri-
sis, she could reach out to her network for assistance in almost any southern community. There-
fore, anticipating the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on school desegregation in 1953, Tilly wrote 
to her constituents to ask them to become the "interpreters and shock absorbers of this deci-
sion.”67  Only two months after the annual FOC conference, Tilly sent attendees a letter asking 
for reports on any action taken by churchwomen in their communities in preparation for the up-
coming Supreme Court decision and alerting them to the volatility of the pending decision: 
We appreciated your presence at the meeting of the Fellowship of the  
Concerned in October. 
 
 We were wondering if you have been able to have any Discussion  
Groups on the possible Supreme Court decision.  If so, we would like to  
hear from you about them.   We would also appreciate a story about anything  
else you have done in this line, such as the distribution of literature, etc.   
Many things have already come as a result of that day’s planning, but we feel  
we are just beginning the facing of a difficult situation.   
 
 As you know, South Carolina passed an amendment last year to its Constitution  
to cease to operate public schools under the direction of the state.  Georgia  
has just passed a similar bill to ‘give away’ the schools, thus endangering the  
system of public schools that it has taken over 100 years to perfect. 
 
 The ‘give away’ plan, as you may know, is that the funds of the State will be  
given to local parties.  They in turn will set up a board or Commission which  
will give funds to each child and designate to which school he shall go. 
 
 Of course, this evasion of any Supreme Court decision will not hold, but in 
the meantime the public schools will be destroyed.  Teachers’ pensions and  
the accreditation of schools will be lost.  The two groups who will suffer the most 
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will be the children and the teachers.  Both in this case are unable to speak for 
themselves, but church groups can do so. 
  
We are enclosing a statement passed by the Executive Committee  
of The Women’s Society of Christian Service of the Methodist  
Church, North Georgia Conference. 
 
 We believe it is going to be most necessary that the women know  
 their law enforcement officers, so we urge that they call on their 
 sheriffs and chief-of-police.  It might stand in good stead if the 
 Supreme Court outlaws segregation and racial hatred flares up.
68
 
  
 For the next several years Tilly and the FOC shifted their focus to “preparing white 
southern society for segregation's inevitable end."  Tilly understood that most southern whites 
would resist forced desegregation because laws did not change people’s hearts.  So she proac-
tively refocused her network of southern churchwomen to change the attitudes of white women - 
specifically mothers, wives, and teachers - so that they in turn could set examples in their homes, 
churches, and communities by teaching tolerance and acceptance.
69
    
Almost a year after the 1954 Brown decision, Brown II was handed down by the courts in 
May 1955 urging that states desegregate their schools using “all deliberate speed.”70  Three 
months prior, in February 1955, Tilly called a special FOC meeting to address the rising tide of 
massive resistance against the Brown decision and what was certain to be defiance against the 
upcoming Brown II Supreme Court decision.  During this meeting, Tilly reinforced and supplied 
her network with new information and tactics because as Tilly explained, “the disturbed and per-
turbed South presents a challenge to the faith and courage of church women….”71   
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Noreen Tatum, Alabama FOC member and director of Children's Work for the North Al-
abama Conference Board of Education of the Methodist Church, spoke about desegregation at 
this special FOC meeting.  Tatum implored churchwomen to make a thoughtful decision on de-
segregation by examining their souls and considering the unique opportunity given to them – as 
white women - to change the South for the better.
72
   
 We women of America are therefore trustees of a precious gift,  
 because we are among a minority group privileged to enjoy the 
 fruits of freedom in our own day and age.  To us is entrusted not  
only the right use of the freedom which is ours, but also the extension  
of its precious privileges to all mankind.  Can it be that God had this  
in mind when he created YOU and ME?  Can it be that he is trusting  
in US to help work his purposes out for our own crisis-laden generation?   
Are we willing to be used of him in this way? 
 
   
If so – we can be, here and now, in our own communities, in our own  
churches, in our own homes.  For our generation – and particularly our  
Southland – is faced with an unprecedented opportunity, an opportunity  
which has never before been given in like measure or in like form to any  
other generation or group of Christian women:  the opportunity of extending  
the privileges which we so cherish and enjoy to a group within our midst  
who have been set apart and limited in their pursuit of life liberty and happiness.
73
 
 
In her speech, Tatum also tried to get the women to broaden their interactions with Afri-
can Americans in order to eliminate stereotypes.  To this end, she asked “How wide are your 
friendships?  Do you really know…A Negro school teacher?... Any Negro woman who does not 
have to depend on domestic service for a livelihood?  Would you be willing to widen your 
friendships so as to include one or more of these?”74  Tatum used her words to try to get the 
women to understand what it must be like to be an African American in the Jim Crow South.  
She appealed to the women as mothers, “How Christ-like is your imagination?  Have you ever 
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stopped to listen…” to a Negro mother explain to her little boy why he could never sit on the 
fascinating front seat of a bus where he could watch the driver shift gears and punch buttons to 
open the doors and steer the big bus safely through city traffic?”75 
About three months after the special FOC meeting in 1955, the Alabama FOC convened, 
and one of the issues they tackled in this meeting was what they could do about the attacks on 
the NAACP.  The NAACP had argued the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas be-
fore the United States Supreme Court and, since the court rendered its decision that segregation 
was unconstitutional, the organization had been under increasing attack in the South.  The state 
of Alabama attempted to make NAACP dealings illegal in that state.
76
  Ruby Hurley of the 
NAACP addressed the Alabama Fellowship of the Concerned about the mission and work of the 
NAACP.
77
  Hurley spoke candidly about life as an African American in a white supremacist so-
ciety and discussed why organizations like the NAACP were so important.
78
  Alabama FOC 
members could then use the facts Hurley provided to counter slanderous attacks on the 
NAACP.
79
 
At the close of 1955 Tilly wrote to former fellow PCCR member Sadie Alexander.  Dur-
ing the 1947 PCCR deliberations, Alexander had opposed Tilly’s position and argued with her 
on what wording should be in the PCCR’s final report regarding segregation and education.  Re-
calling that experience against the 1954 and 1955 Brown decisions Tilly wrote, “Things are com-
ing to pass, aren’t they?  Our report on Civil Rights is really archaic now, isn’t it?  In our wildest 
dreams we never thought things would happen so quickly – but they really are not happening in 
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many spots in our sections.  I do want you to know though, we are trying.”80  Tilly’s letter re-
flects both the optimism of the groundbreaking decisions and also the reality of a reluctant and 
resistant South, which Tilly not only predicted in 1947 but also had to help move forward. 
In the years that followed the 1954 and 1955 Brown decisions, the school desegregation 
crisis spread across the South from Little Rock, Arkansas to Atlanta, Georgia, and beyond.  On 
May 22, 1959, Tilly spoke before the Congressional Subcommittee Civil Rights Hearings in 
Washington, D.C. about the school desegregation situation in Georgia.  In giving her credentials, 
Tilly indicated that she had held many offices within the Methodist Church, both within Georgia 
and also regionally in the South.  She stressed that her work with women’s organizations of the 
Methodist church had been in the realm of human rights.  She also reminded her audience of her 
participation in labor hearings of the AFL-CIO, and claimed, “I have worked in all the fields of 
human rights.”  Here, at a civil rights hearing, Tilly overtly labeled herself as a human rights ac-
tivist, which grounded her activism in a movement that transcended the civil rights movement 
and therefore lent more credibility to her testimony.  Even at the start of her speech, Tilly said 
that she wished to “change the trend of today’s session,” so rather than discussing a litany of civ-
il rights infractions as her predecessors had done, she focused her time in front of this subcom-
mittee on the “climate” in her native state of Georgia with respect to the segregation issue.81  
In her introduction, Tilly applauded the recent court decisions “that are helping us along 
to a more democratic way of life, which we will reach fully some day.”  Tilly’s comment about 
the court decisions was, on one hand, intended for those segregationists who absolutely abhorred 
any federal government intervention in southern affairs.   Tilly also remarked that the goal of the 
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democratic way of life had still not been achieved, despite the federal involvement.
82
  This com-
ment harkened directly back to the debate in the PCCR meetings in Hanover, New Hampshire 
and in Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1947, in which Tilly’s plea to her PCCR colleagues to 
not force desegregation because it would only lead to resentment, defiance, and violence.  Her 
comments were prescient; practically everything she cautioned about during those PCCR delib-
erations came to be.   
In her speech, Tilly also apologized to the Committee for her South, but then shared her 
optimistic vision of a brighter future by invoking her deep faith and providing a vision of the 
South that she believed Jesus Christ had intended:   
Social changes come slowly, always, and perhaps a little more  
slowly within the five Southern States than anywhere else in our  
Nation. But we will finally get there sometime -- because we are in  
the Bible half, and I believe some day we will reach the place where  
we will translate what we read in the Holy Writ into action. 
 
We talk a lot about our way of life. And I think when that time comes  
when we can translate that which we read into daily action, we will find  
the way of life is the way of the Master.
83
 
 
Tilly then described for her audience the lengths to which the current governor (Ernest Vandiver) 
and two former Georgia governors (Herman Talmadge and Marvin Griffin) had worked since 
1953 to defy the court decision that outlawed school desegregation.  Each executive declared that 
during their respective terms, there would be no race-mixing in Georgia’s schools.   In 1953, an-
ticipating the Supreme Court’s decision on school segregation, Georgia’s legislature in the 
Talmadge administration “ordered a referendum on a constitutional amendment to end the public 
school system and substitute private schools to keep segregation in effect in Georgia.”84 
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In 1956, during Griffin’s administration, Georgia’s legislature submitted six more bills 
that defied the school desegregation decision.  Five of these bills were passed, including one that 
mandated the closing of public schools if ordered to desegregate by the federal government.   
Tilly claimed that a full one-third of Ernest Vandiver’s gubernatorial inauguration speech in Jan-
uary 1959 was devoted to anti-school integration rhetoric and was full of anti-federal govern-
ment sentiment.
 85
  Vandiver accused the federal government of “punishing the South with a se-
cond Reconstruction.”86  Furthermore, he declared that during his administration, he would not 
allow the federal government to take over Georgia’s schools or universities.  Another one of 
Vandiver’s bills was to allow the collection of taxes for segregated schools, but it forbade tax 
collection for integrated schools.  Vandiver also pushed for six more bills regarding schools and 
segregation to be made law under his administration.  One of these bills was to prevent African 
Americans from entering Georgia’s universities.   According to Tilly, this bill caused a lot of 
controversy but, despite the publicity against it, Vandiver signed it into law.  Tilly completed 
Georgia’s bleak picture by adding that the head of the States Rights Council, in response to an-
ticipated forced school desegregation, declared that Georgians would vote to close their public 
schools rather than have them integrated.
87
   
Tilly proffered all of these examples to prove to her audience that the situation in Georgia 
was dire and quickly reaching a climax, because many expected all of the Georgia schools to 
close by 1960 or 1961.    Undaunted and optimistic, Tilly also told of the positive and hopeful 
inroads that many organizations, such as the Fellowship of the Concerned and other interracial 
groups and activists, were making in this very volatile environment, especially within the City of 
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Atlanta.  In this part of her speech, Tilly held Atlanta up as an example not only for the rest of 
the State but also for the rest of the South.  She offered examples of interracial groups and city 
and local minority leadership coming together and working together to solve social issues such 
as bus integration and golf course integration, and in doing so in the most peaceful methods pos-
sible in order to sustain enduring positive social change.  In 1959, school closure was averted in 
Atlanta due in large part to a women’s group entitled Help Our Public Education (HOPE).88  
School systems in other southern states such as Arkansas, Virginia, Alabama, and others did not 
fare as well.  The Virginia schools in several cities closed rather than be desegregated, depriving 
students of both races of public education until most of the schools reopened a year later.
89
   
Although school integration was by far the most controversial and volatile issue faced by 
the South since the federal government’s first involvement in civil rights in the late 1940s, Tilly 
remained optimistic for her South because of the work of southern churchwomen.  Toward the 
end of her speech, she stated that “[T]he hope of the South is in the women. They have to be the 
interpreters and the shock absorbers of the social change.”90   
Tilly knew that the white South would never voluntarily accept federal intervention in its 
affairs, especially if it meant affording blacks the same opportunities as whites and having chil-
dren of both races attend the same schools.  Her opinions had been confirmed in 1947 and 1948 
by the furor that erupted after the PCCR recommended sanctioning federal grants-in-aid to 
school systems that remained segregated.  The reaction to that recommendation foreshadowed a 
long battle over southern school desegregation.  The South would be dealing with school deseg-
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regation until the late 1960s until, one by one, southern school systems which had defied the 
court’s ruling in 1954 had to eventually abide by the Supreme Court ruling.  
In September 1963, nine years after the U.S. Supreme Court declared school segregation 
unconstitutional and after several lawsuits, African American students in Birmingham, Alabama, 
began to desegregate all-white schools in that city.  Birmingham was the hometown of Noreen 
Tatum, who had spoken to her white churchwomen constituents in the special-called meeting in 
February 1955.  Despite attempts by Alabama governor George Wallace to close the schools ra-
ther than desegregate, two young children, Dwight and Floyd Armstrong, desegregated Birming-
ham’s Graymont Elementary School, and Richard Walker desegregated the City’s Ramsay High 
School in early September 1963.
91
  The reaction from the white racist community was hostile 
and violent. On September 15 a bomb exploded at the 16th Street Baptist Church, killing four 
young girls: Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, Addie Mae Collins, and Denise McNair.
92
  
About one week before the bombing, Tatum wrote to Tilly offering her first-hand experience as a 
mother and a white supporter of school desegregation as her daughter's school, Ramsay High 
School, was desegregated when Richard Walker enrolled there. Tatum recounted the first few 
days of desegregation at the school. Tatum's faith convinced her that God had given her the op-
portunity to make positive changes in southern society, even by reaching out to African Ameri-
can students.  
Marielon is a student (junior) at Ramsay High School.  Yesterday was a  
day without incident.  Only one student has to be sent home because he  
couldn’t behave himself in class.  Richard Walker, the Negro boy is in  
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Marielon’s English class.  She said he was not mistreated at all in class  
though none of the students spoke to him.  He sat at the back of the room,  
and the teacher called on him to answer a question which he did, rather  
timidly, but correctly. Marielon said if he were a girl she would be friendly.   
But for his sake as well as hers she hesitates. 
 
I do not know what today will bring.  There was a meeting last night which  
I understand had as its purpose stirring up Ramsay students to walk out like 
Woodlawn students did.  As I took Marielon to school I saw only one group  
walking away from school, and a motorcycle policeman stopped them and was 
very evidently trying to talk them into going back. 
 
 
Marielon did not want me to go to school with her but I did wait at the foot  
of the ramp until I saw her get inside the building.  One of my good friends  
teaches at the Woodrow W. Elementary School, which is in the general  
vicinity of the Graymont school, and she says they are being flooded with  
requests for transfers – people selling their homes (Putting them up for sale)  
and renting rooms or apartments in their Woodrow Wilson school district so  
they can get their children in there and out of Graymont.  Isn’t it all but  
unbelievable that the  presence of two little children could cause so much  
consternation and turmoil? I’ll tell you more when I see you. 
         Love always, 
         Noreen (Tatum) 
P.S.  I had what was veritably a God-given chance to speak to the Negro  
boy at Ramsay the day he was turned away.  I don’t know that in his harassed 
[sic] state of mind he realized I had tried to say a kind word of encouragement  
to him – but it eased my heart just a little.   
       N.
93
 
Tatum’s letter also allows us to see the influence that Tatum's work had on her daughter, who 
wanted to befriend the new "Negro" boy in her English class. Her daughter’s sensitivity to the 
sexual politics of integration made her aware that in her white supremacist society a white girl's 
friendship with a black boy would expose him to danger. Opponents of school desegregation 
regularly objected to such friendships because they believed that they would lead to "race-
mixing." Although civil rights activists repeatedly denied that this had anything to do with their 
goals of equity and fairness, they often had to face those kinds of charges. 
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Forced desegregation did not change people’s hearts for the better.  In many instances, 
the federal government’s intervention hardened the hearts of many whites who, at first, defiantly 
and violently opposed desegregation.  In some cases, state and local governments attempted to 
avert the court’s ruling by establishing equalization schools.94  As time went by and school de-
segregation spread all over the South, the whites’ defiance assumed a different approach during 
the late 1960s and 1970s in a phenomenon called white flight.  White families who could afford 
to move out of cities facing integrated public schools did so to mostly white suburbs with very 
low if any minority population.
95
   All reactions against forced school desegregation were fueled 
by either hatred, ignorance, fear, or some combination of one or more of those crucial ingredients 
to preventing positive social change.    
The approach Tilly and Graham opted for in their dissent in the PCCR’s report admitted-
ly would have taken a much longer time, but it would have, in their minds, resulted in a truly 
voluntarily integrated society, where people of all colors would have abandoned their hatred, 
fear, and ignorance for love, acceptance, and understanding.  Tilly admitted that the approach 
taken by the PCCR in TSTR, which heavily influenced the federal government’s involvement in 
civil rights, did make some people shift their white, racist attitudes.  However, as she predicted, 
for so many in the South it did not, and massive resistance against school desegregation proved 
to be violent, pernicious and tenacious, as school desegregation did not complete until the end of 
the 1960s.     
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3.7 FOC Human Rights Activism and Civil Rights Activism 
The FOC was founded because southern churchwomen were concerned for the future of 
their South and did not confine activism to the civil rights movement.  FOC human rights initia-
tives included the FOC’s first official campaign which tackled injustice in the southern court sys-
tem.  The “Know Your Courts as You Know Your Schools” program had southern churchwom-
en visit courthouses and jails to ensure justice was meted out for all, regardless of race.
96
  Addi-
tionally, the themes of annual and statewide FOC conferences were not necessarily about civil 
rights.  For example, the 1958 Alabama FOC meeting’s theme, “Woman’s Role in the Affairs of 
the World,”  was far broader than civil rights and included keynote speakers such as South Afri-
can Violaine Junod, Mrs. John L. Sanders, a native of Japan, and Vera Chandler Foster, wife of 
Luther H. Foster, Tuskegee Institute’s president and an active member of the Women’s Interna-
tional League for Peace and Freedom.
97
   
During the 1965 annual FOC conference, FOC members suggested that churchwomen 
focus on ending police brutality.  This initiative came about because of the highly controversial 
and well publicized tragedy witnessed by millions, as television cameras broadcast unthinkable 
acts of police brutality against non-violent protestors who attempted to cross the Edmund Pettus 
bridge in Selma, Alabama while demonstrating for voting rights.
98
  In response to this egregious-
ly violent attack, Tilly called for a national interracial conference of women to address this 
cause.
99
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Tilly’s FOC also tackled subjects such as studying the status of domestic workers with 
the possibility of helping them organize.
100
  This effort was reminiscent of the activism of some 
progressive-minded Methodist women who, during the 1930s, examined the plight of domestic 
workers within their own households.
101
 
In accord with the United Nations’ designation of 1968 as International Human Rights 
Year, Tilly named the FOC meeting that year "International Human Rights Year--the Twentieth 
Anniversary of the Adoption of 'The Declaration of Human Rights.'"
102
  In organizing the 1968 
conference using human rights as the main theme, Tilly acknowledged the significant work of 
the United Nations and reinforced the FOC’s ongoing support of human rights as a goal that was 
inextricably linked with the group’s civil rights activism.  The 1968 meeting’s theme was remi-
niscent of Tilly’s 1947 “Conference on Human Rights and World Order” – held at a time of op-
timism and promise in the early post-war era, while the PCCR was still meeting and before it 
birthed TSTR.   
For this 1968 meeting, Tilly engaged Leticia Romas Shahini of the United Nations’ Divi-
sion of Human Rights to give the opening address.
103
 Tilly’s choice for keynote speaker recalled 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s keynote speech at what became the first official FOC meeting in 1949, in 
which she discussed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
104
  Clearly, the women of the 
FOC did not limit their efforts to the civil rights movement, but they also perceived themselves 
as human rights advocates who were responsible for influencing and instigating positive change 
globally.      
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While FOC conferences were not ostensibly about civil rights, Tilly carefully chose the 
civil rights causes that would be supported in annual FOC conferences.  Certainly federal civil 
rights legislation was something that Tilly wanted to succeed.  Ten years after the PCCR called 
for civil rights legislation, the country still lacked any strong civil rights laws and there seemed 
to be an unlimited supply of massive resistance to counter the movement.  The Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 was met with so much resistance that Tilly convened another special conference so that 
her churchwomen could focus on investigating voting registration patterns throughout the South 
in order to expose inequities and ensure compliance with the federal law.
105
   
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tilly sought ways to revamp the format 
of the FOC annual meetings.
106
  In preparation for the 1965 FOC meeting, Tilly asked several 
members of her network to survey and report on the degree to which southern cities were com-
plying with the Civil Rights Act.  The results of this survey were disturbing, for in some cases 
such as in Montgomery, Alabama, resistance to civil rights forced her FOC members to exclude 
African American women from participating, for fear of reprisal.
 107
  Clearly the ongoing re-
sistance in Montgomery and in other southern cities resulted in some whites withdrawing from 
the interracial tactics that Tilly and her churchwomen espoused.  
As the civil rights movement continued into the 1960s, Tilly and the FOC supported its 
peaceful efforts such as the student sit-in movement and the Freedom Rider movement.
108
  How-
ever, when Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) activists became more mili-
tant and destroyed property at Leb’s restaurant in Atlanta during a protest in January 1964, FOC 
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member Mrs. C. M. Weston wrote a letter to John Lewis, President of SNCC, voicing her disap-
proval.
109
  Weston's letter reflects her disappointment with the protesters' lack of respect for safe-
ty, property, and authority, but more importantly, it juxtaposes the generational and tactical dif-
ferences between the churchwomen and their brand of activism and the increasingly militant tac-
tics of SNCC.
110
   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
Dorothy Tilly was indeed a civil rights activist and, in fact, her participation in Truman’s 
Committee on Civil Rights places her as one of the critical figures of the post-war civil rights 
era, one who forged a course for the federal government to follow in securing civil rights for all 
Americans.  Tilly thought of herself first and foremost as a human rights activist, and she was 
remembered as such in a posthumous tribute to her by Paul Anthony, who was, at the time of Til-
ly’s death, the executive director of the SRC.111      
Tilly was the only PCCR member to live continuously in the South in the wake of the 
publication of To Secure These Rights, and some white supremacists never forgot or forgave her 
for her service on that committee.  In 1958, a full ten years after her service on the PCCR, she 
was discredited in a newspaper article written by an ardent segregationist from Montgomery, Al-
abama, who referred to her disparagingly as “Aunt Tilly.” The use of the term “Aunt” or “Uncle” 
by a white person toward an adult African American was intentionally meant to demean and dis-
respect adult blacks.  This salutation was intended as an insult, as the author also focused on Til-
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ly’s PCCR membership and discredited the work of others on the PCCR, intimating that those 
members had Communist ties. 
112
 
We are also in receipt of a letter from Mrs. M. E. Tilly which is entirely 
 too long to take up this week.  We will present this note from the nation’s  
own ‘Aunt Tilly’ whose record goes back to Harry Truman’s infamous Civil 
Rights Committee of 1946 which was a dilly which included such people  
as Dr. Channing Tobias (the Negro front man), and others, which will be  
discussed in length as soon as we can get the Congressional Records.  The  
Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, can furnish  
additional information on these.
113
 
 
This article reveals that more than ten years after the PCCR issued its report, white supremacists 
in the deep South still considered the PCCR and its recommendations as a critical rupture and 
threat to the South’s social order.   
In the post-PCCR era, Tilly looked for ways in which southern churchwomen could ex-
tend their influence in shaping the recalcitrant South.  Her experience in the Christian Leadership 
Schools of the 1930s and her role on the PCCR led her to hold annual interracial conferences in 
Atlanta from 1949 to 1968.  During these conferences, churchwomen leaders of both races lived 
together, prayed together, ate together, and met to discuss social problems and devise plans of 
action to make their vision of a better South for all a reality.   
  From the late 1940s on, Tilly’s influence extended to the national and even international 
spheres.  Over the course of her career, Tilly was recognized as a human rights leader and as 
such was called on domestically to moderate the labor hearings of the AFL-CIO in Detroit and, 
internationally, when she accompanied the United Nations’ American Committee for Palestine to 
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Palestine in 1949 to observe the proceedings in determining the new Jewish state.
114
  Over the 
course of her career Tilly was sought by four United States presidents as an advisor and expert in 
the field of race relations and civil rights.
115
    
As late as the mid-1960s, when Tilly was in her eighties, she was still sought after by 
other younger women activists, such as African American Dorothy Height of the National Coun-
cil of Negro Women, for her organizational skills that brought women of both races together.  
Height invited Tilly to the organizing meetings of a new interracial and inter-regional group she 
was founding called “Wednesdays in Mississippi,” which brought together black and white 
women from the northern states and Mississippi in order to find common ground on which to 
build bridges of understanding – something Tilly had been doing for almost forty years. 116  Tilly 
was a bridge across movements, generations, religions, and racial divides.  Tilly’s mission, 
across these diverse yet intertwined connections, was optimistic and unwavering, demonstrating 
universal themes such as justice, peace, the ability to earn a living, education, housing, and oth-
ers that fall under the larger encompassing rubric of human rights activism. 
Unlike politicians, who had to delicately balance their actions against an increasingly 
massive resistance to the civil rights movement, Tilly quietly yet skillfully continued her life’s 
work in human rights using methods she learned from her Methodist sisters in the 1930s to navi-
gate the storm-ridden waters of a violent civil rights movement, which she perceived to be a sub-
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set of the larger human rights movement.  Through the tumultuous years of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Tilly carefully intertwined movements, skillfully weaving in various and selected threads of the 
civil rights movement as she continued furthering the absolute goal of human rights for all.  Al-
so, unlike politicians who ultimately sacrificed the United Nations human rights movement for 
the more narrowly defined civil rights movement in the late 1940s, Tilly never short-circuited 
one movement in favor of the other.  Tilly’s reliable methods, utilizing interracial meetings in 
which churchwomen studied problems before deciding a plan of action, was always strategic.  
Her work with churchwomen to raise more tolerant children was recognized in 1955 by Marion 
A. Wright of the Southern Regional Council in 1955, as the “most strategic” work being done in 
southern race relations.
117
  In fact, in the post-PCCR decades of the 1950s and 1960s, Tilly creat-
ed her own movement, an amalgam of the human rights and civil rights movements that influ-
enced and inspired a new and interracial generation of churchwomen activists.  Tilly understood 
that racism was volatile and violent and that any sudden or forced change with respect to civil 
rights in the South would arouse the ire of white supremacists.  Tilly’s work in the years follow-
ing the PCCR did not provoke massive resistance and, in some cases, it had far-reaching effects 
as it helped to change the racial attitudes of some whites in the next generations.   
  
                                                          
117
 Marion A. Wright to George S. Mitchell, 24 August 1955, Box 1, Folder 5, Tilly Papers, Emory Univer-
sity.   
  
166 
CHAPTER 4:  DROPPING A MATCH INTO THE DRY AND PRICKLY UNDER-
BRUSH OF SOUTHERN PRIDE AND FEAR:  POLITICAL FALLOUT INSTI-
GATED BY THE PCCR   
There was some talk sometime [sic] ago about you running for  
governor of  North Carolina.  I’d like to see you run now, to see  
how far you would get.
1
  
J. S. Davis to Frank Graham, November 2, 1947   
 
4.1 Introduction 
When Robert K. Carr convened a meeting of the PCCR on September 12-13, 1947 in 
Washington D.C. to finalize its report, Frank Graham was present. He, along with Dorothy Tilly, 
voiced disagreement with the approach the report had put forth to end segregation in schools, 
because it amounted essentially to blackmailing the South into choosing between education and 
segregation.  During his career, Frank Graham had fought long and hard trying to convince the 
South to accept federal aid to public schools, and he feared that the tactic recommended in To 
Secure These Rights (TSTR) would kill public education in the South. 
Graham came from a background similar to Tilly’s, in that he was a white southerner 
reared in a religious home.  The Grahams were staunch Presbyterians.  As an adult, Graham was 
an elder in his Presbyterian church in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  Graham was also a highly 
educated man who ran the first state university in North Carolina, and who believed strongly in 
the value of a public education.  His interest in public education was directly attributable to his 
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father’s influence.  Alexander Graham had been superintendent of the Charlotte Public Schools 
and believed that all children, regardless of class or race, deserved a sound public education.
2
    
Frank Graham believed in the “education of the whole person characterized by the devel-
opment of social responsibility.”3    During the 1930s, Graham’s reputation as a southern liberal 
grew and he became an ardent New Dealer who became increasingly involved in national issues 
that dealt primarily with the struggling economy and the plight of the downtrodden.  In 1933, 
President Roosevelt appointed Graham as vice chair of the Consumers Advisory Board. 
4
   
In 1934, Graham was appointed to another federal committee, this time as chair of the Advisory 
Council on Economic Security.  His work on this committee led to the Social Security Act, 
which he believed would be a step in the direction for the “renewal of democracy.”5  Two years 
later, Roosevelt summoned Graham to serve again, this time on a committee “to study the rela-
tionship between the federal government and state and local education.”6   
In 1938, Graham chaired the Committee on Economic Conditions in the South (CECS) 
that wrote the Report on Economic Conditions of the South, a document that illuminated the 
gross disparities between the North and South, especially in economy and education.  Almost 
directly following that experience, Graham joined the nascent Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare (SCHW) and became its first president.   
By the end of the 1930s, Graham was becoming more ensconced in the Washington polit-
ical scene through his various appointments to federal committees.  During the war, he would 
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continue to serve under Roosevelt, and as the 1940s unfolded, would enter the national discourse 
on race relations. 
  Although he returned to Chapel Hill after World War II, another presidential appoint-
ment was waiting soon thereafter - to Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights.  This Committee and 
its report proved to be pivotal in the field of civil rights, and even though Graham represented a 
well-respected liberal who served on national committees prior to serving on the PCCR, he be-
came one of the first casualties in the political fallout over the PCCR’s recommendations regard-
ing segregation and education four years prior to the Brown decision.     
Graham understood his native South and human nature, and he was therefore convinced 
that the surest way to win enduring acceptance of desegregation would be over time, through ed-
ucation and religious programs.  After much heated debate during the two late summer days in 
September 1947, Dorothy Tilly and Graham and the remaining PCCR members ultimately 
agreed to disagree on the matter of federal withholding of funds to segregated schools.  Even af-
ter agreeing to dissent, Tilly, the more emotional of the two, was still concerned about the re-
port’s tone and claimed that, while the dissent would absolve her and Graham, it would not save 
the Committee’s report.7   While the dissent may have saved Tilly so that she could continue her 
work in race relations in the South, Tilly could not have been more wrong with respect to Frank 
Graham because three years later this report would help kill Graham’s brief political career as a 
United States Senator from North Carolina.  
This chapter will explore how a white southern liberal, Frank Graham, expanded his ac-
tivism in the 1940s through political appointments to some controversial committees, and there-
by became enmeshed in the increasingly complicated national discourse on race relations, even 
                                                          
7
  Transcription from PCCR Meeting, September 12-13, 1947, p. 911, Box 195, Papers of Philleo Nash, 
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, (hereinafter, Nash Papers).     
169 
before his PCCR appointment.  It will then demonstrate how the PCCR’s recommendations in-
stigated a conservative backlash in southern politics, beginning with House and Senate southern 
Democrats who criticized the report and decried the committee (especially Graham).  The re-
sistance escalated after Truman’s message to Congress in February, 1948 and culminated in the 
creation of a separate political party – in essence a split in the solid Democratic South.  The 
chapter will then examine how, three years after TSTR was published, the PCCR’s recommenda-
tions would come back to haunt Graham in North Carolina’s Democratic primary for United 
States Senator.  His role in the PCCR would be ultimately responsible for his defeat in the prima-
ry race.  Graham’s political career was the second casualty, after Claude Pepper, of the conserva-
tive political backlash that was instigated by the PCCR’s recommendations and continued until 
the defection of Southern Democrats to the Republican Party in the 1960s.  Lastly, the chapter 
will look briefly at Graham’s career beyond politics as he moved away from the South and en-
joyed a long career with the United Nations. 
 
4.2 Graham Enters the National Discourse on Race Relations 
By the 1940s, Frank Graham was well established as a leading southern liberal as well as 
leading proponent of public education.  In the late 1930s, he had been instrumental in coordinat-
ing the completion of the Report on Economic Conditions in the South and was a founding mem-
ber and first president of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, although he was con-
cerned at getting too involved with Communists.
8
   Southern problems aggravated by the De-
pression gave way to opportunities illuminated by the New Deal and Graham understood that the 
South needed to change.  He was a southern liberal activist with a particular kind of humanitari-
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an vision, in that he believed all humans were equal in the eyes of God.  Graham personally be-
lieved that segregation was morally wrong and envisioned the end of segregation through educa-
tion and religion.  He also understood that, as a result of the New Deal, the South could benefit 
from federal intervention.   Graham had encountered resistance at times due to his activism in 
controversial issues concerning race relations, but he always held firm to his beliefs.   By 1940, 
he had earned a reputation as someone who was level headed and progressively minded.
9
    
During the first Roosevelt administration, Roosevelt sought Graham to chair the Adviso-
ry Council on Economic Security.
10
  In September 1936, toward the end of his first administra-
tion, Roosevelt again enlisted Graham, this time to chair a large committee for the initial purpose 
of evaluating vocational education.  By mid-1937 Roosevelt enlarged the committee’s scope to 
address the “relationship between the federal government and state and local education.”  By this 
time Graham was already a staunch supporter of federal aid to education so his membership in 
the Advisory Committee on Education seemed a natural fit for him.  This committee made a 
“radical” recommendation in 1938 to provide for “federal aid to public schools.”  The committee 
did discuss the matter of federal control over education and the committee “recommended that 
where there were racially segregated school systems there should be an equitable allocation of all 
federal funds without any cut in the existing state appropriations to Negro schools.”11  Graham 
understood that without federal aid, children in southern schools would continue to lag behind 
the other regions in the country and would lack “equal opportunity.”  A bill based on the com-
mittee’s recommendation made it to the House, where it died due to the fear of “federal control 
of schools.” 12 
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During Roosevelt’s third administration, Graham was highly sought after to serve on 
many committees, especially as the United States became fully involved in World War II.   In 
1941, Franklin Roosevelt called Graham to Washington, appointing him to the National Defense 
Mediation Board, which transformed into the War Labor Board after the United States officially 
entered World War II in December, 1941.   This started a pattern for Graham of living in Wash-
ington for much of the war and surprisingly, even as President of UNC, spending only weekends 
at the University in Chapel Hill. 
13
  Graham’s presence in Washington during the war meant ad-
ditional opportunities for him to join boards of other national organizations whose causes were 
meaningful to him.  
The racial genocide against Jews during the Holocaust awakened a greater concern about 
racism for many in America, and organizations such as the Council Against Intolerance (CAI) 
sought ways in which to teach tolerance in schools as a means of eradicating racism.  The CAI’s 
mission was to work within the schools to train teachers in educating white students about mi-
norities in order to dispel stereotypes about them, so that they would develop a sense of tolerance 
and fairness towards all.
14
  This organization was a natural fit for Graham because it identified 
education and the schools as a primary vehicle for social change, and he served on this council 
during the war.  Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple, Harold Ickes, A. Philip Randolph, and Bishop Francis J. Haas, who would later serve on the 
PCCR, all served on the CAI.  This organization published a monthly magazine, American Unity, 
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which was distributed nationwide to thousands of teachers claiming that it would build “a new 
generation – without prejudice towards any American.”15 
Graham also sat on the National Committee of the Friends of Democracy, which was 
founded in 1937.  Mary Bethune McLeod was among its other prominent board members.  As 
the end of World War II approached, this organization sought ways to prepare for and mitigate 
the upturn in racial violence that was expected after the war’s end.   Like the CAI, its tactic was 
education and exposing its members to information on “obstructionist newspapers such as the 
New York Daily News; the Chicago Tribune; the Washington Times-Herald” and other publica-
tions, and on subversive groups and personalities such as Gerald L. K. Smith.
16
    
Other organizations which had Graham as a member were the India Famine Relief Com-
mittee, Inc., on which he served alongside Will W. Alexander and, during the war, he served as a 
sponsor to the Japanese American Citizens League.
17
  During World War II this organization, 
among its other efforts, monitored the treatment of Japanese Americans who were imprisoned by 
the United States in internment camps following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
18
  As if his schedule 
was not demanding enough, in November 1943 Graham accepted an invitation to sit on the Na-
tional Fair Employment Practices Commission.   
Graham’s heavy involvement in federal committees during the 1940s, many of which 
dealt with minorities issues fulfilled his inherent need to be socially responsible and “to serve a 
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worthwhile cause.”19  These various organizations and federal commissions sought Graham not 
only because of his liberal stance but also for his influence.    Like Tilly, Graham was a human 
rights activist long before human rights became fashionable during the late war and post-war pe-
riod with the founding of the United Nations.  A radio address Graham gave in 1944 reveals his 
humanitarian beliefs and the strategy he believed would work best in eliminating prejudice and 
hate.  
There is no magic formula for the conquest of prejudices and animosities.  
The three main ways to overcome group animosities are by (1) education,  
(2) equality of opportunity, and (3) a spiritual sense of the sacredness of  
human personality.  By education we come to understand the profound  
origins of racial, religious, and social prejudice and through that  
understanding gradually overcome personal prejudice and group  
animosities. 
 
More powerful than even education and the American dream is the  
spiritual sense of one world, one human family, of all men as brothers and  
sons of God without regard for color, creed, or national origin.
20
 
 
The following month, in another attempt to educate whites about African Americans and 
inform listeners about what North Carolina was doing to improve the opportunities for them, 
Graham gave another radio address in which he stated: 
There is no more loyal group of our fellow citizens than the American  
Negroes, north and south.  In the last decade more negroes graduated  
from American colleges and universities than in all the previous history  
of the race.  In my own state of North Carolina, the legislature is providing 
for a twelve year, nine-months school system for all the white and colored  
children in the state, and is making further provision toward the equalization  
of pay for white and negro teachers in accordance with the opinion of  
Federal Judge Parker of North Carolina.
21
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Graham and others such as Joseph J. Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Con-
gress, participated in many radio broadcasts during the war, capitalizing on that medium to influ-
ence and educate audiences against intolerance and prejudice.
22
  By 1944 Graham had been ap-
pointed to sit on the National Committee of the National Urban League and, in recognition of his 
reputation for excellence in education, was also asked to join the National Advisory Committee 
of the newly founded United Negro College Fund.
23
  
On April 2, 1944, Graham gave the address on Founder’s Day at Tuskegee Institute, in 
which he explained that World War II was a watershed event that provided a unique opportunity 
to remake the world in the days after the war: 
World War II is a global, total and revolutionary war…This is not only 
 a global war involving all continents, seas, and skies, but it is a total  
war involving all the people and all their industries and institutions. 
The old victories for human liberty can be preserved only in the  
revised versions of the new struggles for democracy.  Liberty can  
be raised to higher levels by the widening of social security.  The  
old Bill of Rights can be saved only by provision for a new Bill of  
Rights.” 24   
 
Graham’s speech received wide publicity, including an article in TIME magazine.  Graham re-
ceived accolades, requests for advice, and criticism for his speech.   Russell B. Babcock, an Ar-
my officer whose primary job was training other military officers, asked for a copy of the speech 
because in his role he was:  
specifically interested in material which will make sense to Negro troops  
who ask ‘What has American democracy given me which warrants my  
sacrifice in this war effort?’  The TIME  Magazine (April 10, 1944) account  
of your address at Tuskegee is the type of information that would be most  
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helpful. 
 
I trust you will not think me presumptuous in writing you.  The information  
is important and the group of officers who attend this school are most important.
25
 
 
Within a month, a white Mississippian serving as a captain in the segregated United 
States Army wrote a letter to the editor of TIME magazine from Italy, expressing his dislike of 
TIME’s coverage of Graham’s Founder’s Day Speech.  He denounced and discredited any ad-
vancements made by African Americans and disparaged Graham as a “famed liberal.”  
I am certainly not as qualified to argue about vital statistics of the negro race  
and its accomplishments as is the noted educator Frank P. Graham, but being  
a native Mississippian, I do know and understand the negro and his capabilities.   
Let’s continue to help the negro when we can but on the other hand let’s not try  
to fool ourselves into believing he has contributed anything toward the develop- 
ment of higher civilization, because he hasn’t .  And when you ‘ponder’ over that  
and rack your brain to remember a few of the contributions of the negro race to socie-
ty, remember to consider only the real full blooded negro like the late Dr. George 
Washington Carver – not a few outstanding cases of ‘so-called’ negroes who have  
a lot of white blood flowing in their veins.” 26 
 
Graham also received the following criticism from a Savannah, Georgia resident who 
claimed that education would never improve the African American experience.  Like many white 
supremacists, the author of this letter could only point out that, in his opinion, ending segregation 
would only result in mongrelization of the races.    
    I note you keep in the public eye on the Negro situation.  You are one of three   
   things ignorant, fond of Negroes or get pay for it to promote Negro…. 
   The Negro is an ape he has always been a savage or a slave you can educate  
   him but he is still Negro, Education does not improve them except to be better  
   able to skin another Negro. 
 
   …God or Nature made the people and they were made to stay separated… 
   Did you ever see any other animals mix dog & cats, Ducks or chickens, lions  
   & tigers.  When you see white & black children in school together, they grow  
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   up without knowing the differences, they mary, and produce Mongrels….27 
 
After the Tuskegee speech, Graham received several letters from a variety of other southerners 
who voiced their displeasure with his viewpoints.
28
  By this stage in his activist career, Graham 
was accustomed to this criticism and it did not seem to distract or dissuade Graham from his 
work in human relations.  
Graham’s involvement with these varied liberal organizations and his role as a social 
commentator across the radio waves reveals not only his liberal stance toward race, but also that 
his position as a traditional southern liberal was expanding outside the region to concern himself 
with human rights issues for minorities other than African Americans and across the nation.  
Graham began reaching a national audience during the war as his various radio addresses permit-
ted him to share his humanitarian vision in seeking human rights for all.   Graham also broad-
ened his scope to include international humanitarian efforts with his work in Indonesia.  Interna-
tionalism was a natural extension of the work he was already performing.  Graham’s involve-
ment spanned many activities and work on behalf of many people.  Nevertheless, it was Gra-
ham’s work on behalf of African Americans in the American South that brought harsh criticism 
from southern white supremacists, who demanded that the southern customs of Jim Crow be 
maintained.   
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4.3 Southern Politicians React Against “To Secure These Rights” 
By January, 1946, with the war over and no need for a War Labor Board, Graham re-
turned to Chapel Hill to devote more of his energies to the university.  However, just before the 
year ended, Graham was once again tapped to serve on a presidential committee - this time by 
Harry S. Truman.  After many months of work on the PCCR, the committee issued its final re-
port in October, 1947. 
Although Graham wrote the dissent from the report’s recommendation to withhold feder-
al money from segregated schools, he did endorse the Committee’s report.  Graham, Tilly, and 
the others who dissented did so anonymously and their anonymity was deliberate, so as not to 
undermine the overall report.  Immediately after the report was published, Graham received 
many letters from southerners who wanted to know his stance on the matter of the dissent.
 29
   
Graham was a public figure, known nationally as a southern liberal, and he received both 
accolades and criticism for his role on the PCCR and for TSTR from people across the nation.  
Several who applauded Graham for his work, such as J. T. Taylor, perceived the TSTR as a criti-
cal step toward world peace: 
Yet, through the courageous efforts of leaders like yourself and Mrs.  
Tilly in this area, and countless others whose names never meet the  
public eye, we have every reason to be optimistic about America,  
not only as an arsenal of democracy but as a leader in the world’s  
struggle for peace.
30
 
 
S. Ralph Harlow, professor of  “religion and social action”31 at all-female Smith College 
in Northampton, Massachusetts and an NAACP board member, suggested to Graham in a letter 
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Papers; letter from W. J. Crutchfield to Graham, November 8, 1947, Folder 2028 in the Graham Papers.   
       
30
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178 
that Graham run as Truman’s Vice-Presidential candidate in the 1948 election.32  Graham was 
also well respected by other colleagues on the PCCR and his advice was highly sought, even by 
those who opposed his position on the matter of withholding federal funds from segregation 
schools, such as Sadie Alexander.  In December, 1947 Sadie Alexander wrote Graham asking for 
his help with ongoing activities related to the committee’s work.33 
Graham’s involvement in various committees that dealt with minorities issues across the 
nation prepared him for service on PCCR and his influence is seen in To Secure These Rights 
because it included many recommendations addressing all racial minorities in the United States – 
not just southern African Americans.  The report revealed that the Committee had gone far and 
wide in its research and recommendations, which included addressing issues such as “the evac-
uation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast” and the need to make “restitution.”  The re-
port also called for self-governance of U.S.-held territories such as Guam, the Panama Canal 
Zone, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands.  The PCCR also recommended 
Alaska and Hawaii for statehood.
34
  However it was the recommendations concerning the ending 
of segregation and the issue of segregated schools that alarmed white southerners – politicians, 
newspaper editors, and citizens alike. 
Within three weeks of the PCCR issuing its report, U.S. Representative Emanuel Celler, a 
Democrat from New York, introduced three bills into the Congress specifically “to carry out rec-
ommendations of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.”35  The Court of the Common 
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Council of Hartford, Connecticut petitioned the Committee on the Judiciary announcing its adop-
tion of a resolution “approving the report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.”36   
From the South, the reaction from elected officials was very different.  First and fore-
most, from the Deep South, Mississippi’s House of Representatives issued the following House 
Concurrent Resolution, explicitly denouncing the report and claiming to speak for all Mississip-
pians: 
A Concurrent Resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives  
of the State of Mississippi Memorializing the Congress of the United  
States of the Grave Apprehension and Vigorous opposition of the people  
of this state to the recommendations of President Truman’s Committee on  
Civil Rights, and urging opposition to Any Congressional enactment of Said 
Recommendations.
37
 
 
Furthermore, Mississippi’s “acting governor”38 Oscar Wolfe, who was temporarily sub-
stituting for vacationing governor Fielding White,  issued a strong statement decrying the 
PCCR’s recommendation to abolish segregation immediately.  Wolfe implored “all decent white 
people” to oppose the Committee’s call to end segregation, claiming in a hyperbolic statement 
that “[H]istory shows that where any nation has not practiced segregation of races, but allowed 
miscegenation and amalgamation of races, the custom has always resulted in the destruction of 
the nation that permitted this crime against nature.”  Wolfe accused “outside interference and 
meddlers” with creating this problem.39   
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Concurrent with the publication of TSTR was Mississippi’s senatorial election to replace 
the late Senator Theodore G. Bilbo, and the senatorial race could not help but focus on the 
PCCR’s recommendations.40   Several southern papers followed, noting how TSTR would influ-
ence this election.   On November 1, 1947, the Savannah Evening Press reported that as the six-
man race wound down, “[A] defense of Southern traditions and a condemnation of ‘outside in-
fluence’ of Mississippi affairs were the final battle cries of the campaigns on the road.”41  On 
November 2, 1947, the Atlanta Journal carried a similar story entitled, “‘Civil Rights’ Echo In 
Bilbo Seat Race:  Mississippi to Elect Senator Tuesday; Candidates Take Up ‘Interference’ Cry.”  
In this piece by Romney Wheeler, the various candidates were quoted about the PCCR and the 
TSTR.  Forrest Butler Jackson, whom the article indicated “claims to be Bilbo’s political heir…. 
called the committee’s report ‘an insulting demand on the people of Mississippi’ and predicted 
resentment would elect him.”  Another candidate, William Meyers Colmer, claimed the report 
meddled in the South’s business, and “cried it was ‘another effort to try to tell the South and 
Mississippi how to run its affairs.’”42  In northeast Mississippi John Rankin, whom Wheeler de-
scribed as a “shrill-voiced, tired old man of 65,” capitalized on the PCCR’s report and “heaped 
vituperation on the Committee and reiterated long-time convictions that Mississippi is white 
man’s country.” 43   The man who ultimately won the senatorial race, John Stennis, remained the 
most calm in his reaction to the PCCR and TSTR, but he was nevertheless adamant that Missis-
sippi would not be controlled by the federal government, stating “‘[o]ur customs and traditions 
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may be assailed, but we can stand firm in our rights to make our decisions about such mat-
ters.’”44  The more extreme race-baiters lost the election, yet their reactions to the PCCR’s report 
were quite negative and, along with the other unfavorable comments from southern politicians, 
foreshadowed the coming of a political backlash. 
In Georgia, a few days after the PCCR issued its report, Herman Talmadge, who had 
been ousted from his questionable appointment to the governor’s office earlier that year by the 
Supreme Court of Georgia, called TSTR “‘an insult to every Southerner…which insists on break-
ing down every prestige of segregation…which insists upon the passage of a Federal Employ-
ment Practices Law which would place a Government bureaucrat in control of every business in 
the United States.’”  Talmadge also insisted that the report would “destroy” the country’s democ-
racy and “would place in control of all businesses Government bureaucrats, tinged with Com-
munism.”45   
A few weeks later, on November 20, 1947, Clyde R. Hoey, United States Senator from 
the historically more politically moderate state of North Carolina, addressed the issue of segrega-
tion in the schools and defended the separate school system in his state as the “only basis upon 
which peaceful and harmonious relationship can be maintained throughout the South and the Na-
tion.”  His views against the end of segregation are clear in his condemnation of the PCCR’s re-
port as one that: 
betrays a woeful lack of understanding of the real conditions  
which exist in this country.  Some of its recommendations are 
good, but others fail utterly in offering any solution of the race 
problem.  To adopt the views of this committee throughout  
would result in chaos, rather than in orderly and peaceful conditions,  
and would hinder the great progress which is now being made in a  
fair and just determination of the race problem to the good of all  
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concerned.
46
   
 
Despite the negative reaction by southern politicians to TSTR, by the end of 1947 the ini-
tial reaction to the PCCR’s report had quieted down, and the Truman White House had done 
nothing further with the report.  This inaction likely relieved the southern politicians, while it 
certainly frustrated those who wanted Truman to make good on the recommendations put forth 
by the PCCR.  Nevertheless, southern politicians had their proverbial guard up, and rightly so, 
because by December 1947, the Truman administration realized it needed to do more than just 
endorse TSTR. 
 
4.4 Truman Takes the PCCR Recommendations to Congress   
In the weeks following the publication of To Secure These Rights, some northern state 
and local governments endorsed the report, while southern state and local governments and 
southern members of the United States House and Senate unequivocally denounced it on many 
levels.  Many white southern politicians took the Committee’s recommendations and Truman’s 
role in forming the Committee as an affront to their white supremacist southern heritage. 
In the late fall of 1947 and continuing into the early winter of 1948, Truman had at least 
three foes who wanted to succeed him as president – New York’s Governor Thomas E. Dewey; 
former Vice President Henry Wallace, and Governor Harold E. Stassen of Minnesota.  While the 
mainstream press may have been mainly focused on issues such as the situation in Europe and 
the mounting Cold War, minority publications such as the Atlanta Daily World would not allow 
its readership to forget about the recommendations made in TSTR.  In mid-December, it reported 
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about the lack of response by those seeking the presidential nomination in either party to the 
NAACP’s “request …for opinions on the Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.”  
In November, 1947 NAACP’s chair Walter White had asked all three:  “‘Do you approve of the 
Committee’s recommendations?  If not, will you tell us which ones you disapprove and the rea-
sons for your disapproval?’”  By mid-December only Stassen had responded, albeit cautiously, 
writing on December 5, 1947, “In response to your letter of November 14, I consider the report 
of the Wilson Committee on Civil Rights to be a superb document.  I give it general support now 
and intend to speak on its recommendations in detail in the coming months.”  New York’s Re-
publican Governor Thomas E. Dewey did not respond directly but rather his executive assistant 
James C. Hagerty did.  Hagerty wrote, “A careful reading of the recommendations leads me to 
believe that the State of New York under Governor Dewey’s leadership has already taken many 
of the steps which the report recommends.”47  
 The more radical Henry Wallace offered criticism of the PCCR and its report in late No-
vember because although the report commented on the decline in lynchings, it neglected to note 
the simultaneous rise of police brutality.  The Atlanta Daily World’s editor C.A. Scott agreed 
with Wallace, “[A] mere glance at the number of Negroes being killed by city and county offic-
ers of the law in most of the southern communities will convince us of the logic in Mr. Wallace’s 
speech.  Everywhere and under the slightest pretense, officers of the law in the South mow down 
Negroes and trump up satisfactory reasons for their action before the courts.”48   
Wallace also castigated Truman for his inaction on pushing forward the recommenda-
tions in the report.  In December the Atlanta Daily World reported that Wallace had demanded 
President Truman issue an executive order establishing an inter-departmental committee to abol-
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ish discrimination in federal employment.  Further, the newspaper article reported, Wallace 
“called for the enforcement of the report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights…” and 
quoted him as stating “‘I don’t want that report to be pigeonholed.  We simply cannot afford – in 
world affairs or in terms of our domestic economy—to neglect the important human problems 
involved.  The poll tax must go.’”  Lastly, Wallace declared :‘[D]iscrimination and segregation 
must be ended.  We can’t live, successfully --- by the double standard.’”49  In late December, 
1947, Wallace announced that he would be a candidate for President with the newly formed Pro-
gressive Party.
50
   
Clark Clifford, White House Counsel during Truman’s administration, had predicted ac-
curately that Wallace would go with another party and that Truman’s supporters would have to 
deal with Wallace as an opponent because he had such a strong following in New York.  Truman 
and his supporters believed strongly that Truman needed to win New York in order to be elected 
president in 1948.  As Clifford recalled: 
Yes, I felt very strongly that he’d be in it. He’d be the candidate of the  
party and we had to take him on. There just couldn’t be any question about  
it. I think my general attitude was to do it more in sorrow than in anger.  
The President had liked Henry Wallace and a great many people liked him.  
He was just misguided; he was unrealistic and impractical. We treated it that  
way, but we could not go along with the crowd that was for him. They were  
Reds and Red sympathizers and we had to hit them pretty hard. 
51
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Truman’s message to Congress on February 2, 1948 resulted directly from pressure ex-
erted by Wallace.  In order to counter the success Wallace was making with his liberal platform, 
Clifford suggested that Truman address Congress with a civil rights message.
52
   
Now I therefore advised him to go forward with a special message to  
Congress that demanded it take action with moving forward with the  
PCCR’s recommendations.  This would show Wallace supporters that  
Truman was serious about civil rights and was placing the responsibility  
now on the Republican Congress.
53
 
 
Truman and his advisors, especially Clifford, believed erroneously that Truman could 
push more liberal issues to gain political ground on Wallace without jeopardizing support from 
the southern Democrats, because as Clifford later explained:   
 
The South, historically, had gone Democratic in election, after election,  
after election. It had gone Democratic four straight times for Roosevelt,  
and it seemed a safe proposition at that time, but times were changing and  
changing more rapidly than I was able to foresee.
54
 
 
Clark sent a lengthy memorandum to Truman in the fall of 1947 in preparation for the 
upcoming 1948 presidential election.  The memo, prepared by James H. Rowe, Jr., was modified 
by Clifford and is known informally as “the Clifford memo.”55   In it Clifford practically guaran-
teed that the South would support Truman regardless of his stance on liberal issues, and it even 
stated that the South could be disregarded on such national matters.  Essentially, according to 
Clifford, the South was not a major player in this election. 
It is inconceivable that any policy initiated by the Truman Administration  
no matter how “liberal” could so alienate the South in the next year that it  
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would revolt. As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic.  
And in formulating national policy, it can be safely ignored.
56
 
 
In early January 1948, George Elsey, assistant to Clark Clifford, solicited input from 
Robert Carr, the PCCR’s Executive Director, for “any views or thoughts in regard to” Truman’s 
upcoming “special message” to Congress on Civil Rights.57  Carr, who coordinated the drafting 
of TSTR, replied at length, recommending at least eleven ideas from TSTR for Truman to use in 
his special message.
58
  Carr carefully selected these, acknowledging to Elsey that: 
it would be utterly unrealistic of him [Truman] to recommend everything  
that is contained in the Report of the Civil Rights Committee; on the other  
hand, he must not disappoint those people who have had their hopes aroused  
by the Report.  I think he can solve this dilemma by recommending a  
substantial, but minimum, program for immediate action and then call  
for further study of many additional items.
59
 
 
Of the items Truman enumerated in his special message to Congress on February 3, 1948, 
ten came directly from Carr’s response to Elsey and Carr took these ideas straight from TSTR, 
which he helped to author.
60
 Truman’s special message to Congress is, in actuality, a subset of 
the PCCR’s recommendations put forth in TSTR, which further emphasizes the effect of the 
PCCR’s work. 
Although Truman’s message only addressed about one-third of the PCCR’s thirty-five 
original recommendations – and avoided directly any mention of schools or the issue of segrega-
tion (except in interstate transportation) - his message supported unequivocally the PCCR’s rec-
ommendation that the federal government take the lead as guardian of Americans’ civil rights.  
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Truman began his speech with undeniable support for federal intervention via legislation in order 
to secure human rights for all Americans, explaining that “We shall not, however, finally achieve 
the ideals for which this Nation was founded so long as any American suffers discrimination as a 
result of his race, or religion, or color, or the land of origin of his forefathers.”61  After he lobbed 
his first salvo, Truman followed with a reference to the PCCR and its report,  
One year ago I appointed a committee of 15 distinguished Americans  
and asked them to appraise the condition of our civil rights and to  
recommend appropriate action by Federal, State, and local governments.   
The committee’s appraisal has resulted in a frank and revealing report.   
This report emphasizes that our basic human freedoms are better cared  
for and more vigilantly defended than ever before.  But it also makes clear  
that there is a serious gap between our ideals and some of our practices.   
This gap must be closed.
62
    
 
Truman made one overarching recommendation and that was for Congress to enact legislation at 
this session directed toward the following specific objectives: 
 Establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a Joint 
         Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a Civil Rights  
        division in the Department of Justice. 
 Strengthening existing civil-rights statutes. 
 Providing Federal protection against lynching. 
 Protecting more adequately the right to vote. 
 Establishing a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent 
unfair discrimination in employment. 
 Prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation facilities. 
 Providing home rule and suffrage in Presidential elections for the 
residents of the District of Columbia. 
 Providing statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure 
of self-government for our island possessions. 
 Equalizing the opportunities for residents of the United States to 
become naturalized citizens. 
 Settling the evacuation claims of Japanese Americans.63  
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Although Truman watered down the PCCR’s recommendations when addressing Con-
gress, the fact that he elevated even only one-third of the PCCR’s recommendations raised the ire 
of many southern Democrats.  In essence, Truman had picked off the scab of a festering wound 
that was slowly healing from the fall of 1947 after the initial publication of TSTR.  After his 
speech, southern politicians’ anger erupted against him and against the PCCR and its report all 
over again.
64
  Many of these southern congressmen and senators interpreted Truman’s speech to 
be an extension of TSTR.  Some believed Truman to be hoodwinked by the PCCR, while others 
accused him of complicity in the PCCR’s recommendations.  Clark Clifford’s seemingly innocu-
ous comment in his November 1947 memo to Truman that decidedly dismissed the South as a 
viable threat to Truman’s re-election could not have proved more incorrect.  Clifford admitted 
years later that his conclusion about the South “obviously constituted the one major gaffe in the 
memorandum.”65   
 
4.5 Southern Politicians React to Truman’s Message about PCCR Recommendations 
On the day following Truman’s speech, congressmen and senators from all parts of Dixie 
cried foul, as one after another rose to defend their southern way of life and speak adamantly 
against Truman, the PCCR, TSTR, and the ongoing threat of civil rights being enforced by the 
federal government.  In his speech Truman did not call for an end to segregation in general, but 
he did specifically call for its end within interstate travel.
66
  The southern politicians who had 
read TSTR when it was first published and listened to Truman’s message in February were con-
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vinced that Truman’s initial recommendations would be only the first in a series of steps to end 
segregation, which the PCCR had called for in October 1947. 
In review of the speeches made in reaction to Truman’s speech, two major overriding 
themes dominated the discussion on the floors of both the House and the Senate.  The one heard 
most prominently from southern congressmen and senators was the threat to punish Truman with 
a split in the Democratic Party, thus destroying him politically if he did not retreat from his civil 
rights assault on the South.   What angered these politicians primarily was the threatened loss of 
white supremacy with forced integration, and then secondly the fear of miscegenation.  A third, 
but nonetheless vital issue raised was the charge of communism, which they linked to integration 
and which they levied against Truman and his supporters.   In addition, the PCCR, its report, and 
some of its members were also targeted by some of these irate southern politicians.   
Ultra-conservative Congressman Eugene “Goober”67 Cox from Georgia was well known 
for his attacks against the Federal Communications Commission, resulting in the Red Scare in 
that agency.
68
  When he took the floor on February 3, 1948, he asked for “unanimous consent to 
address the House for 1 minute.”  After the Speaker granted permission, Cox hinted that Tru-
man’s actions were forcing southern politicians to reconsider their support for him in a presiden-
tial campaign.  
 I do not like to challenge any statement made by my President, but I would  
be a miserable slave to fear if I did not take exception to the recommendations 
made in his message of February 2.   
 
When I read this message I wonder if, after all, Henry Wallace is such a bad  
man. The President attacks the people of that section of the Country whose  
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support he must have if he is to hope to be re-elected.  The whole thing sickens 
me.
69
 
 
Following Cox’s statement, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers from South Carolina also re-
quested “unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.”  Rivers, however, was far more 
loquacious in his harangue against Truman and even criticized Graham and the Committee’s re-
port.  In his statements, Rivers not only linked TSTR directly with Truman’s February 2nd speech, 
he also claimed that Truman’s speech “gives Presidential backing and approval to the recent re-
port issued by the Committee on Civil Rights.”  Rivers also complained that “the South had no 
representation [on the PCCR] to amount to anything- save left-winger Frank Graham, of North 
Carolina”.  Rivers accused Graham of using his role in the PCCR and as co-author of TSTR to 
ensure that his home state, North Carolina, “got a pat on the back, and that the rest of the South 
was held up to ridicule, hatred, and contempt to the Nation.”70  Rivers was criticizing Graham 
who, unbeknownst to Rivers, had lobbied for a softer approach in the report back in September 
1947 and even wrote the dissent to TSTR.   Despite Graham’s pleas for the TSTR’s drafters to 
tone down the report, TSTR exposed the South for what it was, and southern politicians were ex-
tremely offended and defensive.   
Rivers also complained that the PCCR’s report neglected to praise the South for all it had 
done in the past to eradicate lynching and didn’t praise how “courageously the southern law-
enforcement officers have been combating this thing with encouraging success.”71  Rivers prob-
ably overlooked or ignored the following paragraph excerpted from TSTR, in which the Commit-
tee indeed applauded the efforts to reduce lynching. 
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Finally, the Committee wishes to call attention to the very substantial and  
steady decline in the number of lynchings which has occurred in the last  
two decades. From a high point of 64 lynchings in 1921, the figure fell during 
 the 1920's to a low of 10 in 1928. During the decade of the 1930's the total 
climbed again to a high of 28 in 1933, although the decade ended with a low  
of 3 in 1939. Since 1940, the annual figure has never exceeded 6; on the  
other hand, there has not yet been a year in which America has been  
completely free of the crime of lynching. The Committee believes that  
the striking improvement in the record is a thing to be devoutly thankful for;  
but it also believes that a single lynching is one too many!
72
 
 
Within the report the PCCR went into great detail describing the various lynchings which 
had occurred recently in the South, such as the Moore’s Ford quadruple lynching in Georgia and 
the Willie Earle lynching in South Carolina.  Additionally, TSTR displayed several graphs indi-
cating lynching incidence rates.  One compared the number of whites lynched versus African 
Americans lynched, while another indicated the number of lynchings in the 48 United States be-
tween 1882-1945.   These graphical depictions clearly indicated that African Americans suffered 
the crime of lynching much more than did whites, and the data showed clearly that the southern 
states had a much higher incidence of lynching than other areas of the country.  Georgia, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas shared the dubious distinction of having more than 300 
lynchings occur in their respective states between 1882 and 1945.
73
  Rivers focused his attention 
on this damaging and incriminating information, which he felt clearly overshadowed the brief 
concessionary language inserted by the PCCR staff on the overall details of lynching.   
Furthermore, Rivers voiced his great displeasure at Truman’s call for federal anti-
lynching legislation, the abolishment of poll tax in the seven states where it was still practiced, 
and “stronger statutory protection of the right to vote,”74 accusing Truman of courting the “Ne-
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gro vote of the North.” He further criticized To Secure These Rights, which he sarcastically re-
ferred to as “President Truman’s masterpiece” for ignoring heinous crimes occurring elsewhere 
in the country while unjustly singling out the South for criticism.  Convinced that the report un-
fairly targeted the South, his closing statement threatened the split in the Democratic party, 
“[T]he solid South one of these days is going to rise up and surprise some of the solid-headed 
leaders who think that the South is still in the bag.”75  Sentiments such as these from Rivers 
seemed to validate the fears that Tilly had shared with the PCCR’s chair Wilson and Executive 
Director Carr in the letter she wrote in September 1947 that the report, even in its draft form, was 
too critical of the South.
 76
   
Congressman Ed Lee Gossett of Texas also weighed in against Truman’s Civil Rights 
message to Congress, admitting that he was “saddened and disheartened by the President’s mes-
sage of yesterday.”  Rather than blaming Truman, he stated that the “electoral-college system of 
choosing Presidents” was flawed for the undemocratic way elections had been shanghaied by 
special interests, minorities, and the two controlling political machines - the one in Chicago and 
the one in New York.   In a dramatic description that offered a different solution, he suggested 
that “Both parties get down on their bellies and crawl in the dirt and kiss the feet of the organized 
minorities in the big pivotal states.  The only way we are going to be absolved from this igno-
minious procedure is to abolish the archaic system under which we elect Presidents.”  Gossett 
decried the treatment the South had received.  He claimed that it had “been used as a whipping 
boy by both parties” and had been “kicked around by the Democratic National Committee and 
also by our friends, the Republicans.”  Ultimately, Gossett accused Truman of “succumbing” to 
the evils of the system and encouraged Congress to pass the Judiciary Committee’s recommen-
                                                          
75
 80 Cong. Rec., p. 975-976, (1948).   
76
 Letter from Mrs. M.E. Tilly to Mr. C. E. Wilson and Mr. Robt. Carr, September 8, 1947, Microfilm # 
1729, Reel 3, PCCR Papers, Emory University.  For more of Tilly’s comments about the TSTR draft, see Chapter 2. 
193 
dation to “abolish the electoral college” in order to end the practice whereby presidents pander 
“to the minorities… for the sake of votes.”77 
Four of the most damning statements made against Truman, the PCCR, and TSTR came 
from the Deep South as the Mississippi politicians addressed their colleagues.  All four who 
spoke threatened a split in the Democratic Party, while two railed against the threat to end segre-
gation, two accused Truman of courting Communism, and two actually threatened violence if the 
assault against the white South’s established order was not squelched.   
Arch segregationist Mississippi Senator John Rankin asserted that “Harry Truman never 
had a better friend in this House than I have been, but that message of yesterday was the most 
discouraging thing I have ever heard read.”  In his remarks Rankin wondered aloud why the 
country would spend so much money fighting Communism on the international front when the 
“President of the United States, under some pressure we cannot understand, comes in with that 
message and tries to ram the platform of the Communist Party down the throats of the people of 
the United States?”  In his statement, Rankin indirectly accused the members of the PCCR of 
being Communists.  Rankin then urged the South to “take care of ourselves” by “elect[ing] inde-
pendent electors throughout the South…then let those electors decide who shall be President.”  
He believed that this would “put a stop to these smearing Communists who creep into every bu-
reau and every commission that is appointed and attempt to undermine and destroy everything 
our people have fought for and everything we hold dear.”78   
Rankin’s colleague and fellow Mississippian, Williams, also denounced Truman and his 
message.  Williams’ diatribe revealed that these politicians were only concerned with the white 
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South.   He depicted his native South as a victim which he must defend against the federal gov-
ernment, declaring “I also rise to protest this thing that the President is doing to the South.”  Wil-
liams interpreted Truman’s actions as a failure to appreciate the South’s contributions to the par-
ty when he stated “If it were not for southern Democrats, Henry Wallace would be in the White 
House today instead of Harry Truman.  Southern Democrats have always been the best friends 
that President Truman or the Democratic Party ever had.  May I say, Mr. Speaker, that this is a 
mighty poor way for him to evince his gratitude.”  Williams concluded by claiming that he 
would rather see Truman lose the southern Democrats’ support than have the party “win an emp-
ty victory by stabbing its friends in the back.”79   
Another member of the House from Mississippi, Jamie Lloyd Whitten, also an arch rac-
ist, spoke out even more forcefully than Rankin.  He used threatening language similar to that 
used by Mississippi’s governor, Fielding Wright, in his January 1948 gubernatorial inaugural 
speech, in which he “served notice on the leaders of the National Democratic Party that in view 
of their efforts to pass measures aimed at the South they had better stop, look, and listen, if they 
hoped to have the unqualified support of the South.”  From Truman’s speech, Whitten concluded 
that “This we have been urging for some time to no avail.  Party leaders will not learn.  The Pres-
ident’s message yesterday shows that these party leaders have neither stopped, looked, nor lis-
tened.”  Whitten then declared Truman’s “action of yesterday is deplored.  I believe his advisers 
have led him to make a serious mistake.  There can be no question that such message comes as a 
result of the charges of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the 
Communist Party, and various radical agitators, leveled against us in the South.”  Truman’s mes-
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sage, he continued, “presumes that such charges are well founded, it takes for granted that Ne-
groes are mistreated in the South.  Such is not the truth.”80  
Whitten pointed the accusatory finger not only at Truman and the NAACP, but also the 
PCCR: 
…the President says his recommendations follow that of his Committee  
which he appointed.  The recommendations are the same but the President  
knew or should have known what his committee would bring in, for 8 of  
the 15 members of that committee are members of racial minorities in this  
country, and of the other 7, several are well known for their charges against the 
South.  That kind of group started out to do just what the President has lent his  
aid to doing.
81
 
 
He then threatened “unrest and trouble” if the civil rights recommendations were passed. 
Then, pandering to the basic fear of white supremacists, he charged that “Negro organizations” 
wanted “amalgamation of the races; they want to break down segregation; they do not want 
equal treatment but want social intermingling – which they believe would follow the passage of 
such measures.”82   
Whitten ended his statement with another threat, alluding to a fracture in the Democratic 
Party that would ensure that Truman’s defeat in the next presidential election, “Today more and 
more southern Democrats are seeking ways and means of correcting the present intolerable situa-
tion which threatens not only the South but also our great Nation.  The President’s message will 
tend to speed up that hunt for a way to save the South and the Nation.”83  Survival of the South - 
the white South - was the crucial issue for Whitten, and the way to secure it was to get rid of 
Truman and squash the entire effort of civil rights and the push toward ending segregation.   
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The Macon Telegraph reported on February 10, 1948 that Senator James Eastland from 
Mississippi vehemently opposed “President Truman’s civil rights proposals” stating that Tru-
man’s “proposals on racial segregation and antidiscrimination would ‘degrade, mongrelize and 
destroy the South.’”  Eastland’s lengthy speech given the day before also mentioned the southern 
governor’s conference and the Committee that Strom Thurmond was heading to “recommend a 
policy to protect the dignity of the South, the rights of the States, and the social institutions of 
that great area.”84  Eastland then drew a line in the proverbial sand and threatened political muti-
ny when he said,  
 
I hope that this committee’s recommendations will not be for further  
appeasement and vacillation.  I hope that their recommendations will  
not mark another milestone in the destruction of southern institutions.   
Through recent years the South has retreated step by step until now it is  
spurned from the throne which we ourselves have created. 
Southern people do not desire to leave the Democratic Party.  We want  
to continue in the future as we have in the past.  However, we of the  
South must take whatever political steps are necessary to prevent our  
social institutions from being destroyed by the force and power of a  
Government which threatens through the FBI and the Department of  
Justice, in true Gestapo style, to go further than was done even in  
reconstruction days.”85   
 
Eastland’s words essentially echoed the others’ rallying call to the white South against 
the federal government’s intervention.  Eighty years after Reconstruction, there was, according 
to Eastland, no desire for ANY improvements for blacks in the South.  Eastland’s reference to 
Radical Reconstruction as a very painful period for the South honored not only his family’s past, 
but also his regional and racial identity as he described his ancestors who “wore the gray” and 
who “shed blood for the southern cause.”  He continued, “Both of my grandfathers, and all my 
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relatives did their part in throwing off the yoke of carpetbagger reconstruction and in setting up 
the present South with all that the name implies.  I am proud of the part they played.”86   
Eastland perceived the civil rights advances as attacks against the South and accused 
Truman of using civil rights for his own political advancement, at a great cost to the white South.  
Confronting Truman, he threatened dire consequences for the South if Truman continued his 
promotion and support of civil rights: “No, Mr. President, we cannot play politics with southern 
institutions.  We cannot, if we can help it, permit our party or any other political organization to 
follow a course that will result in tragedy for the South.  It is evident that the present policies of 
the Democratic Party now lead to this end.”87    
Eastland’s invocation of Reconstruction imagery was also a very deliberate tactic, be-
cause he wanted his audience to draw the parallels between the allegedly corrupt, overbearing, 
and draconian government under Radical Reconstruction and Truman’s civil right advances.   
Eastland understood that this language would evoke the emotion associated with Reconstruction 
– fear, anger, mistrust, and hatred of the federal government, and thus it would win support 
against Truman’s civil rights push.88  As if to further distance his position from the federal gov-
ernment, Eastland compared the issues facing the South with those that John C. Calhoun faced 
decades prior – that of States’ Rights and the imposition of the federal government in the South’s 
business prior to the Civil War.
89
   Eastland argued that his thoughts were shared with other 
deeply influential southerners, and the North did not understand how far the white South would 
go to prevent this assault.   
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Eastland continued railing against the PCCR and its recommendations, calling TSTR “the 
crowning effort of northern radicals to put over their anti-southern legislation….,” that had “be-
come the Bible of the radical movement in the United States.”   He cited as the “crux of the 
Committee’s report” its recommendation for “total elimination from American life of segrega-
tion based on race, color, creed, or national origin.” 90  Eastland criticized Tilly and Graham by 
inferring that the Committee was stacked against the segregationists when he said that “the 
southern people who were to be so vitally affected by the President’s so-called Civil Rights 
Committee were denied representation on the committee, except for two persons who had al-
ready by former action committed themselves to the course which they were expected to pur-
sue.”91   
Eastland’s threatening overtones continued as he continued to invoke Civil War rhetoric, 
urging,  “[D]o not blindly follow one party.  Put ourselves in a trading position.  Be sought after, 
instead of despised.”  Again, referencing Calhoun, he instructed the white South to  
go back to the Constitution, as Calhoun advised, when in 1851, with  
similar conditions, which he outlined, he predicted that the only thing  
that could save the Union and could save the South would be independent  
Presidential electors.  A reading of Calhoun’s words describing the conditions 
then prevailing will make any southern Senator think.  He predicted the  
Civil War….  Mr. President, southern Senators and southern leaders can read  
Mr. Calhoun’s words with great profit.”92   
 
Eastland then closed his argument with a plea to the Democratic Party leadership and also a call 
to action for white southerners: 
Mr. President, these are questions which must be decided alone by the  
people of the South.  I hope our political leaders do not stand between  
southern people and a clear analysis of their problem.  If the South loses,  
the people, not the politicians, will pay the penalty. 
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I hope our politics and patronage do not destroy our people, their 
culture and traditions.  I hope we can hand down our institutions 
pure and undefiled to our children and our children’s children.  This  
is a question for southern statesmanship.  With a firm leadership we  
can accomplish our salvation. 
 
I know, Mr. President, the movement to carry out this program must come 
from the people.  There must be a grass roots organization in every hamlet 
of the South.  The people must be informed of the dangers involved and 
of the results if the South is crushed.  This all-southern organization must 
be pushed.  There must be mass meetings.  The people are ready.  The South  
can be saved.
93
 
 
Eastland practically channeled John C. Calhoun in this speech as he portrayed himself as 
the bellwether in this over 100-year old struggle against rights for blacks and for continuation of 
white supremacy in the South.  His message was intended as a rallying cry and a call to action 
across the South for a massive grassroots uprising against the recent and seemingly unrelenting 
attacks against white supremacy and segregation from the federal government.  Eastland’s 
speech overtly threatened massive resistance.  That threat, coupled with the resurrection of the 
States’ Rights argument, foreshadowed the rise of all-white segregationist groups, particularly 
the Citizens Councils which formed after the Brown decision in 1954 and the federal intervention 
to push for desegregation of southern public schools following the 1955 Brown II decision.   
Five months later, in July 1948, during the National Democratic Convention, the Demo-
crats adopted an ambitious civil rights platform, thanks largely to United States Senator Hubert 
Humphrey of Minnesota.  The atmosphere in the convention hall was “pandemonium” following 
Humphrey’s speech. 94  The adoption of this platform became the proverbial final straw for some 
Deep South politicians.  Alabama’s delegation as well as Mississippi’s delegation left the con-
vention since neither was prepared to endorse a candidate that supported the strong civil rights 
                                                          
93
  Ibid., pp. 1197-1198. 
94
  Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968, (Chapel Hill:  Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 130-131.  
200 
platform that had been adopted.
95
   As if to add insult to injury, shortly after the convention Tru-
man continued his civil rights push by desegregating the Armed Forces via Executive Order.
96
  
The events of July 1948 proved to Truman’s detractors that the push for civil rights was 
not a trivial pursuit; rather, it had become an ongoing and escalating onslaught since Truman’s 
PCCR issued To Secure These Rights.  With resistance building and reaction that proved just as 
relentless, those who would secede from the party to form the States Rights Party (also known as 
the Dixiecrats) took the first step by walking out of the convention.
97
  Their actions culminated 
in the fracture of the Democratic Party in the summer of 1948.  This fissure, whose roots can be 
linked directly to the publication of To Secure These Rights, was a critical turning point in south-
ern politics because it foreshadowed the two-party South, which emerged in the 1960s.
98
  Strom 
Thurmond, who would be the presidential candidate for the States Rights party, ran a campaign 
against Truman that was overtly racist but ultimately unsuccessful.
99
   
The race-baiting political campaigns that began to characterize southern politics from this 
point and through the decades of the classic civil rights movement are, therefore, directly at-
tributable to the PCCR and its recommendations in TSTR.  Ironically, the white southerner, 
Frank Graham, who wrote the minority dissent opinion on the matter of segregation in education 
in TSTR,  would be one of the first victims of this new increasingly entrenched political backlash. 
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4.6 The Brief Career of Senator Frank Porter Graham 
Within two weeks of the PCCR’s concluding meeting in September 1947, Graham was 
traveling abroad in Indonesia.  Truman had appointed him as the United States’ Representative 
on the Good Offices Committee of the Security Council of the United Nations in order to help 
settle the issues in Indonesia between native Indonesians and the Dutch.  He was gone for about 
two months and did not return until December.
100
  Therefore, Graham was out of the country 
when TSTR was originally published. While the initial protests from southern segregationists had 
subsided by December 1947, after the turn of the year they began to heat up again, beginning 
with Truman’s State of the Union Address and escalating after his Civil Rights message on Feb-
ruary 2
nd
.   
By the time of the one-year anniversary in 1948 of the PCCR publishing TSTR, the Dem-
ocratic Party had witnessed a split, the Democrats had adopted a national platform that supported 
civil rights, Truman had issued an executive order that desegregated the military, and certain 
members of Congress were pushing for civil rights legislation.  Two weeks shy of the first anni-
versary of the publication of TSTR, a writer for TIME magazine accurately described the impact 
the Committee and its report had on the South when he wrote the PCCR had “dropped a match 
into the dry and prickly underbrush of Southern pride and fear.”101   
In February 1948, after Truman’s Civil Rights message to Congress, reactionary southern 
politicians perceived Graham to be a southern traitor and blamed him and others like him for the 
civil rights problems now plaguing the South.  When Senator O’Daniel from Texas mentioned 
Graham’s involvement with the PCCR, and claimed that Graham was a member of many Com-
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munist organizations, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon argued back to defend Graham.  Morse 
had worked with Graham during the war on the War Labor Board and therefore could vouch for 
Graham’s integrity.102  North Carolina’s senator Clyde Hoey also supported Graham by exoner-
ating him from the PCCR’s recommendations, because he believed Graham had nothing to do 
with the recommendations against segregation.  He referred to Graham’s and Tilly’s dissent. 
In justice to Dr. Graham, I think it should be said that when the Civil  
Rights committee, of which he is a member, submitted its report, the  
statement was made that several members of the Committee did not  
agree to many of the recommendations made in that report.  Dr. Graham’s  
friends know that he was among those who dissented from the extreme  
statements and recommendations by the Committee.  All who are acquainted  
with him would know that he does not approve, and would not support, the  
broadside assault contained in this report on the practices and customs of  
the South with reference to segregation.  Certainly, the Committee, in making  
its report, should have indicated the names of the members who dissented  
from the extremely prejudicial and unwise statements and recommendations  
contained in the report.
103
 
 
Despite Hoey’s remarks, Frank Graham’s dissent on the PCCR, described by Charles 
Luckman during the Committee debates as a “gracious out,” would not help him during a bitter, 
race-baiting senatorial primary campaign less than two years later.   When that primary was over, 
Graham would be defeated and become the second casualty (after Senator Claude Pepper’s de-
feat in the Florida primary) of the conservative political backlash that ensued with southern poli-
ticians’ universal vilification of the PCCR and denouncement of TSTR.104  
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In March, 1949 James Melville Broughton, United States Senator from North Carolina, 
died unexpectedly and the governor of North Carolina, W. Kerr Scott, in a surprise move named 
Frank Graham to fill the vacant seat.  Scott held a relatively moderate opinion on matters of race 
and had consulted with many about this appointment before selecting Graham.
105
  It did, howev-
er, take some coaxing to get Graham to commit, and he did so only after his friends convinced 
him that taking the junior Senator seat was his duty.
106
 
 Graham’s track record while in the Senate indicated that he did not unilaterally vote for 
liberal causes.   While he did favor anti-lynching legislation, he was opposed to a federally-
mandated FEPC at the state level.  His opposition was not grounded in the principles of the 
FEPC, but rather because he interpreted the move as imposing the federal government on the 
states.  In a position that resembled his perspective on segregation and education, Graham 
stressed that giving people the proper information and education to get them prepared for this 
type of change would ultimately make the transition voluntary and enduring.  Forcing an FEPC 
would result in resistance and the further continuation of the undesired practices.
 107
 
By the end of 1949, Graham was encouraged to continue in his role as Senator and ran in 
the primary to secure the nomination for the Democratic ticket.  The date for the primary was 
May 27, 1950, and it was a three-way race with Graham and two opponents, Willis Smith and 
Robert Reynolds (a former Senator).  Graham’s balanced track record in the Senate notwith-
standing, his opponent’s campaigns against him were characterized by smears against his charac-
ter due mainly to his participation on the PCCR, his position with respect to civil rights and race 
relations, and his association with organizations accused of being Communist fronts.    
                                                          
105
  Snider, p. 234.    
106
  Ibid.   
107
  Al G. Dickson, Editor, “Senator Graham and FEPC,” Sunday Star-News, Wilmington, North Carolina,  
Folder 4630 in the Graham Papers.   
204 
 Graham responded to these questions calmly, logically, and thoroughly.  In one statement devot-
ed entirely to his stance on civil rights, Graham explained that after the PCCR meetings had concluded, 
he had traveled back to Washington to write a statement of his philosophy regarding race relations, 
which became the general statement of dissent within the report.  He also reiterated that his approach to 
solving the race issues was “through religion and education.”108  Not surprisingly, one of his opponents, 
Willis Smith, claimed that no such dissenting opinion existed.
109
  
Perhaps the most extreme example of Smith’s race-baiting campaign was a flier which 
stated in bold capital letters “WHITE PEOPLE WAKE UP.”  In this flier, whites were told to 
wake up “Before it is too late” and asked whether or not they wanted “Negroes...” working 
alongside them or teaching their children.  The flier also charged that “FRANK GRAHAM FA-
VORS MINGLING OF THE RACES… He says so in the report he signed (For proof of this see 
p. 167, Civil Rights Report).”110    
In yet another flier, the Smith campaign declared its delight with the defeat of Claude 
Pepper, a liberal who had lost his primary race for re-election to the United States Senate from 
Florida.  The Smith campaign claimed Pepper’s defeat as a victory over Truman’s Fair Deal So-
cialism.  In that same flier, Smith’s campaign indicated the next target was to be Graham, with 
the ultimate goal of defeating Truman in 1952.  The flier’s message was urgent, “1950 is a criti-
cal year!! The foundations for Truman defeat in 1952 MUST BE LAID NOW! ! !”  The flier also 
contained yet another reference to Graham’s work on the PCCR, “Frank Graham was a member 
of Harry Truman’s notorious CIVIL RIGHTS committee, which recommended the passage of 
the iniquitous FEPC (Fair Employment Practices) law which would permit the GOVERN-
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MENT to DICTATE TO EVERY EMPLOYER WHOM HE COULD HIRE OR FIRE.”111  
Although Graham did not support a federally-mandated FEPC at the state level, this flier illus-
trates how Graham was targeted as part of the southern conservative political backlash, rooted in 
racial rhetoric and calls for individual rights, all of which had been brewing since the publication 
of TSTR. 
During the initial campaign, the Smith camp attacked Graham vociferously on the FEPC 
issue.  Another flier devoted to the FEPC matter provided inaccurate examples contrasting the 
current hiring practices of employers prior to the FEPC, and how restrictive and unfair hiring 
practices would be like under the auspices of the FEPC: 
1. A White man and a negro [sic] ask for the same job.  The employer would,  
prior to the F.E.P.C., feel free to select the white man.  After F.E.P.C., the  
employer could be forced to hire the negro and not the white man by a  
Federal Commission probably largely composed of Yankees. 
 
2.  If an employer had to fire one man – and he let go a negro, the F.E.P.C.  
machinery could force him to take the negro back on, with back pay from the  
time he was fired, that is if the Yankee Gestapo said he fired the negro on  
account of color or race.
112
 
 
To counter this, Graham’s campaign issued a press release on April 8, 1950 stressing 
again his opposition to a federally mandated FEPC, stating “I am for the principles of fair em-
ployment, but I am against coercion and the compulsory power of the federal government in the 
FEPC bill.”113  Graham’s sentiment on this matter ran true to his southern liberal beliefs.  Since 
his Senate record and his own word was seemingly not enough to counter his opponents, he 
turned to a third party to confirm his position against a federal FEPC.  Graham’s campaign solic-
ited a statement from former PCCR member Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.  Roosevelt, who was at 
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the time a member of the House of Representatives from New York, unequivocally stated that 
Graham was opposed to the PCCR’s recommendations regarding FEPC.   While some thought 
the statement would resolve the matter, it did not. 
114
  The Greensboro Daily News ran an edito-
rial condemning Graham’s campaign for bringing in “outsiders” to settle North Carolina’s af-
fairs, and Smith’s campaign used this article in yet another piece of campaign collateral against 
Graham.
115
   
Smith also attacked Graham on the basis that he opposed segregation in Washington, 
D.C., when in actuality what Graham had supported was home rule for residents of Washington, 
D.C.  A bill put forth for home rule in the nation’s capital was amended by Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi, who “tacked on a proposed amendment directing that a vote on segrega-
tion be called in the District.”116  Since Graham believed this amendment threatened the entire 
basis of the original bill, which was home rule, he felt he could no longer support it.
117
  
Although Graham won more votes than either opponent in the initial primary election, he 
did not get the majority of votes necessary to win.  The second place vote-getter in the race, Wil-
lis Smith, initially considered conceding the race to Graham until his campaign advisors, among 
them Jesse Helms, forced Graham into a runoff. 
118
  Smith was a “conservative Democrat” and a 
corporate lawyer from Raleigh, North Carolina.  He was a relative unknown, having been out of 
politics for nineteen years.
119
  In the runoff campaign, Smith again utilized smear tactics against 
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Graham, distorting the facts regarding Graham’s beliefs about race relations and his ties to or-
ganizations that were Communist fronts.  Smith’s campaign was indicative of the ability of white 
supremacists, even in relatively moderate states like North Carolina, to rally people against any 
sort of progress in race relations, perceived or real in the post-PCCR South.   
Smith’s decision to force a runoff may have also been influenced by three recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions that were handed down on June 5, 1950, two days before 
Smith’s campaign chose a run-off.120   Two of the three cases were Sweatt v. Painter and 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, in which the court ruled in favor of desegregation in pro-
fessional and graduate education.  In the third case, Henderson v. United States, the court made it 
unconstitutional for railroads to segregate dining cars.
121
   Senator Clyde Hoey’s reaction to these 
decisions was anger toward the court. Yet Graham’s reaction was calm and deliberate, reiterating 
his ideas to ensure a voluntary and enduring integration that would be achieved over time 
through religion and education and not something forced by the federal government.  Smith’s 
campaign took full advantage of Graham’s composed reaction to these decisions.  By not coming 
out against these decisions, Smith’s campaign accused Graham of supporting them, which meant 
that Graham supported the federal government’s continued attack against segregation.    
A primary runoff election was scheduled for June 24, 1950.  The Smith camp ran this se-
cond campaign almost solely on the race issue and, to a lesser extent, also introduced the Com-
munist tactic against Graham accusing him of Socialism.
122
  Once again, Smith resurrected the 
PCCR connection by reminding voters that Graham was part of the Committee that issued rec-
ommendations such as the abolition of segregation.  To further denigrate Graham as complicit in 
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this egregious action, Smith’s campaign dug up a two-and-a-half year old North Carolina news-
paper article from the Goldsboro News-Argus, which had run immediately after the publication 
of the PCCR’s report in October 1947.  It was entitled “End of Racial Segregation is Proposed:  
Civil Rights Committee Would Revise Several Laws.”  Below the article, the campaign flier con-
tinued, “WE WILL NOT VOTE FOR YOU FRANK GRAHAM, WE WILL VOTE FOR WIL-
LIS SMITH FOR U.S. SENATE, JUNE 24, 1950.”123   
In this run off campaign, rooted mainly in racial rhetoric, Smith defeated Graham by a 
landslide, with twenty thousand more votes, and became the Democratic candidate for United 
States Senator from North Carolina.  Smith went on to win the Senate seat in November.  After 
his defeat, a brokenhearted Graham returned to the Senate to complete his term.
124
 
On Graham’s penultimate day in the Senate, he introduced one last statement for the rec-
ord - his support for the bills that would make Alaska and Hawaii states, which was a recom-
mendation from the PCCR three years prior.
125
  On his last day in the Senate, Graham provided 
his farewell statement in which he explained his lifelong dedication to helping further the cause 
of human rights, and indicated the critical need for a strong and United States-supported United 
Nations.
126
  In 1951, Graham accepted a position with the United Nations as the “representative 
for India and Pakistan in the dispute over the Kashmir region.” 127  Graham continued in this po-
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sition until 1970, and for part of his tenure with the United Nations chaired the United Nations 
Speakers Bureau.
128
   
While he served as President of the University of North Carolina and on many commis-
sions and boards, Graham built his reputation as a southern liberal.  Once in office, Graham’s 
potential as a southern liberal became far more threatening to more conservative politicians, be-
cause Graham had been a member of the PCCR and this Committee had attacked the southern 
way of life in 1947, with a follow-up by Truman in 1948.  Conservative white southerners were 
desperately trying to cling to a way of life that Truman and his PCCR were trying to dismantle.   
They saw Graham as inextricably linked with Truman’s civil rights push.  Graham therefore be-
came the person to defeat in an effort to halt the progress being made on the civil rights frontier 
as recommended by the PCCR and Truman.  Truman’s political destruction was the ultimate 
goal of these southern Democrats, and Graham’s defeat was seen as a critical milestone in that 
effort.  Graham’s 1950 Senate primary race thus became illustrative of the fundamental race rela-
tions issue – that white racist attitudes were deeply rooted and very resistant to change, so Gra-
ham became an early casualty in a growing conservative political backlash that was rooted in 
racial rhetoric.   
The results of the racially charged 1950 Democratic Primary in North Carolina contrasted 
sharply with the results of the race-baiting presidential campaign of Strom Thurmond against 
Harry Truman two years earlier.  During that election, voters in the moderate state of North Car-
olina supported Truman and not the more reactionary Dixiecrats.
129
  Yet only two years later, 
Graham was defeated at the state-level primary in North Carolina by a reactionary white suprem-
acist opponent, whose campaign discredited Graham’s moderate record in the Senate.  Truman’s 
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support from North Carolina in the 1948 presidential election and Graham’s defeat in the 1950 
Senate primary election demonstrate how, during this two-year window, politics had narrowed 
markedly, becoming single-issue driven even in more moderate states like North Carolina.  
 
 
4.7 Graham and United States Civil Rights 
Frank Graham’s work in the United Nations meant that after he lost his primary bid for 
the Democratic nomination for United States Senate, he did not work in the South during the 
classical phase of the civil rights movement, or ever again.
130
  Graham worked mainly on the 
world stage of human rights, and yet he never lost sight of the United States’ own human rights 
movement and its subset, the modern civil rights movement.  During times of crises in America’s 
civil rights movement, Graham offered his advice and opinions on how the United States civil 
rights struggle played out against the “world neighborhood,” thereby providing his audiences a 
unique perspective of the civil rights struggle in the United States as part of the larger human 
rights struggle evidenced in many developing nations around the world.   
In the post-PCCR years, the southern states continued to oppose integration.  Graham 
hoped that the churches might provide leadership in this area, but they did not.   Seven years af-
ter the PCCR stated unequivocally that segregation had no place in American life, and further 
recommended sanctions for segregated schools with respect to federal grants in aid, the South 
still had not voluntarily moved any closer to eliminating segregation in public schools.  In 1954 
when the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark Brown decision, southern lib-
erals like Graham saw their role as one to rally the churches and other more liberally minded 
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people to help guide acceptance and obedience to the new law of the land. To that end, Graham 
spoke at length in a Presbyterian Conference held at Montreat, North Carolina in May 1954, just 
after the Brown decision had been finalized.  
He began by stating that the Court understood that the South had indeed made gains, de-
spite great odds, since the Civil War.  He also asserted that, in the wake of the global crisis of the 
cold war, the Court’s decision would now force the United States to be the “leader of the free 
world in actions as well as in words.”131  Although the Supreme Court had issued its decision, 
and Graham also knew that many in the South would continue to resist, he again called upon the 
churches to help in this time of great need. 
Now is the time of the Church’s great opportunity to use its influence and  
its commitments to the teachings of Jesus so that the decision of the Court  
will, in the deep South and in the communities of highest potential, result  
not in an intensification of the problem, but in co-operative adjustments  
for permanent progress. 
 
Humility in the presence of complex and stubborn problems, soul searching  
and fasting and prayer, the understanding heart, spiritual communion, and the 
sense of human brotherhood are deeply needed in this hour.   The churches  
which should have led the way must not now lag behind the states.  This is  
the great responsibility of the churches, under God,  and this is the high oppor-
tunity of the Church, in the spirit and mission of Jesus, to stand forth and work 
with understanding, sympathy, and spiritual guidance for the wise acceptance  
of the law of the land under the Fatherhood of one God in the brotherhood of  
all people.
132
 
 
He also called on other southern liberals for their assistance in this critical transitional time. 
…those who favored the solution of the problem through religious and  
democratic developments within the states now have the duty and opportunity  
to work for the acceptance of the decision in good spirit through the increasing  
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responsibility of the churches, prophetic with their interpretation of the meaning 
of brotherhood under God, incarnate in Jesus Christ, and in the rising responsibili-
ties and in the rising responsibilities of the colleges in their authentic interpreta-
tion of the American dream unfolding to this hour.
133
    
 
Then Graham, ever the defender of public education, stated unequivocally to those that would 
continue to fight for segregated schools that “the Supreme Court did not make any provision for 
this decision to be nullified.  We cannot afford to lose our public schools.  This is the way to pre-
serve our public school system.”134 
In the late 1950s, many activists in the civil rights movement focused on securing voting 
rights for minorities.  Graham spoke in favor of this effort when he addressed the United Nations 
Chautauqua Conference in August 1957 urging:  
 (1) the development of southern people of the sense of obligation to  
 prepare all their children, including Negro children, for full citizen-ship and  
(2) the faithful way in which Negro youth have prepared themselves for full citi-
zenship including the right to vote as the fundamental right in a democracy on 
which other rights so largely depend.   
 
His comments were entered into the Senate record by John Sherman Cooper, Senator from Ken-
tucky.
135
  
Later that year, Graham sent a statement to the State Commission Against Discrimination 
about the ongoing crisis across the South regarding desegregation of public schools, referencing 
his experience as a member of the PCCR: 
As one member of the [President’s] Committee [on Civil Rights] who  
thought that the wisest approach to the enduring solution of the problem  
of the races was through the influence of religion and education vigorously 
at work in the minds and hearts of the people within the States, I have said  
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in many Southern States that, in view of the local lags and global perils, the  
Supreme Court had no other alternative to making a fresh interpretation of the 
meaning of equal freedom and equal protection of the laws for all citizens of all 
the States as citizens of the United States.  Whatever have been our past differ-
ences, now is the time, when democratic unity is impaired in America and  
freedom is imperiled in the world, for all Americans to unite in support of two 
basic propositions:  obedience to the law of the land as interpreted by the  
Supreme Court, the bulwark of our liberties; and preservation and strengthening 
of the schools of the people as the source of equal opportunity and progress in  
a free society.
136
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Frank Graham was one of the most thoughtful liberal minds of his time.  He was able to 
accomplish much while safely ensconced as the president of the University of North Carolina.  
His involvement in progressive and liberal organizations afforded him the opportunity to share 
his liberal ideals and influence with those who would listen.  This type of volunteer work did not 
detract from the University’s reputation.  Once Graham entered the national discourse of race 
relations, he not only enlarged his scope of influence, but also exposed himself to an increasingly 
entrenched opposition to social change.  Graham became more of a threat to the white suprema-
cist order in the South due to his membership on the PCCR.  Two years later, as a junior Senator 
from North Carolina, he was perceived as even more dangerous, because his actions as a Senator 
and one who had been in favor of improved race relations and rights for minorities, would affect 
so many more people beyond just the university.   
The PCCR backlash was characterized by racial rhetoric that caught up with Graham in 
the spring of 1950,  two and a half years after the PCCR issued its report.  Although Graham 
continued true to his beliefs that voluntary integration would come with education and religious 
teachings and he dissented in the PCCR’s report with respect to its recommendation to end seg-
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regation in public schools, the PCCR experience and its groundbreaking report haunted him as 
he moved further into the political arena as a United States Senator.   
In 1963, Dorothy Tilly persuaded her church, Haygood Memorial Methodist Church in 
Atlanta, to sponsor one of the Annual Associations of United Nations meetings and to permit 
Frank Graham to be the keynote speaker.  Leslie Dunbar, who was at the time the executive di-
rector of the Southern Regional Council, picked up Graham at the Atlanta airport and drove him 
to his hotel.  The two conversed about the upcoming event, and Graham voiced his excitement 
about seeing Tilly again and also seeing their mutual friend and colleague Benjamin E. Mays, 
current president of Morehouse College, whom Graham expected to be at any event organized by 
Tilly.  What Graham did not realize was that Tilly could not invite Benjamin Mays to her church 
was still segregated.   Graham discovered that not only would Mays be absent but that Tilly had 
not invited him.  Dunbar spent the rest of the evening “mediating between these two extraordi-
nary people.”137   
Graham had not lived in the South for almost fifteen years, and although there had been 
gains in the South with respect to integration, there were many places in which the progress 
lagged.  Graham also knew that Tilly was someone who did not at all agree with segregation, and 
so he understandably thought that she would have invited Mays to the meeting.  Tilly, like Gra-
ham, did not believe in forcing integration so she worked within organizations to eventually ac-
cept African Americans.  In the case of her church, Tilly was still trying to bring it forward.   
Dunbar’s vignette demonstrates that the strategy that Graham and Tilly had espoused for eventu-
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al, meaningful, and enduring integration was still employed by Tilly sixteen years after the 
PCCR disbanded.   
Graham and Tilly are emblematic of the gendered experience of white southern human 
relations activists.  In the South, white women could more successfully work in human relations 
because those efforts could be perceived as charity work and something that women did without 
upsetting the social status quo.  Very few whites would feel threatened by white women’s work 
in human relations.  However, a white man working within the public sphere for African Ameri-
cans’ rights was a far different story.  Men who worked publicly to improve the lives of southern 
African Americans often jeopardized their jobs and their social club memberships.  Graham was 
the proverbial white male activist who, while within the confines of the university, could work 
fairly safely in southern human relations, though with considerable criticism.  Once he entered 
the national discourse on race relations as a political appointee on federal committees, he faced 
increased opposition to his beliefs and activism from a wider audience.  As a United States Sena-
tor, Graham was seen by white supremacists as one of Truman’s civil rights henchmen and, in 
the South, as having an affiliation with the PCCR report.  That was tantamount to treason.  Gra-
ham’s career in the Senate, therefore, threatened the South’s social order, and conservative 
southern Democrats in North Carolina ensured Graham’s political career would be short-lived.  
Following his defeat in the Senate primary, he left the South for the remainder of his career, 
while Tilly, a white woman, continued her work in southern human relations until illness forced 
her retirement in 1968.   
As Graham’s experience illustrates, by 1950s the southern political landscape at the state 
level had narrowed to the point of being driven almost solely on issues of race, so that even 
moderates like Graham did not stand a chance.   Moreover, Graham’s defeat and the political 
216 
fallout from the PCCR illustrate that federal intervention at the state level with respect to civil 
rights was required for any real improvement in race relations.   
  
217 
CHAPTER 5:  SEEDTIME FOR MASSIVE RESISTANCE
1
 
 
The general public of the south is often spoken of by Southern liberals as  
hopelessly backward, but at the same time it is flattered in the most extravagant 
terms of regional mythology.  It is made a main point that the Southern public 
must not be enraged into resistance.
2
  
Gunnar Myrdal 
 
5.1 Introduction 
On October 29, 1947, the PCCR stated unequivocally in To Secure These Rights: 
V. To strengthen the right to equality of opportunity, the President's  
Committee recommends: 
 
1. In general: 
The elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national  
origin, from American life.  
The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three important respects. First,  
it is inconsistent with the fundamental equalitarianism of the American way  
of life in that it marks groups with the brand of inferior status. Secondly, where 
it has been followed, the results have been separate and unequal facilities for  
minority peoples. Finally, it has kept people apart despite incontrovertible  
evidence that an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered whenever  
groups are permitted to live and work together. There is no adequate defense  
of segregation.
3
 
 
Within days of To Secure These Rights’ (TSTR) release, a multiracial group composed of 
whites and African Americans staged a sit-in protest at the segregated restaurant in Washington, 
D.C.’s Greyhound Bus terminal.  When the restaurant denied service to the African Americans in 
the group, their white colleagues refused to receive service until and unless all in their group 
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were served.  Although the restaurant’s owner tried to force the “sit-downers” to leave by pour-
ing bottles of ammonia onto the tables “and spraying the restaurant with DDT,” they refused to 
leave.  Eventually the owner closed the restaurant, and the protesters departed the establishment 
at approximately 1:00 a.m.  Upon leaving the restaurant one white protester, Lynn Seitter, “was 
thrown to the pavement by a white sailor who darted out of the crowd” that had gathered outside 
the restaurant.  The reporter from the Atlanta Daily World covering this story identified the pro-
testers as probably being members of the interracial activist organization, Committee of Racial 
Equality (CORE).
4
   
This early sit-in is indeed emblematic of the hope and courage the PCCR and TSTR in-
spired in some African Americans and liberal whites.  It also demonstrates the preparedness of 
interracial organizations such as CORE, whose members had already been testing the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Irene Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, which declared segregation un-
constitutional in interstate transportation.
5
  CORE activists were poised to act at this most oppor-
tune moment and illustrated that blacks and whites collaborated in their activism to bring about 
change.   
Conversely, the actions of the restaurateur, the gathering crowd, and the sailor who as-
saulted one of the white activists reveal the immediate and undeniable deep-rooted resistance to 
the challenge that threatened Jim Crow traditions.  The actions of those resisting the protest sig-
nify that they were willing to immediately resort to violence, even white-on-white violence, in an 
attempt to maintain segregation.  Superficially, these people reacted against the protest and pro-
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testers, but their defensive and then violent reaction may have also been resistance to the recom-
mendations made in TSTR to abolish segregation.  The protest provoked an immediate and vio-
lent reaction, and it portended the violent resistance that would erupt when school desegregation 
was ordered by the United States Supreme Court in the mid-1950s.
6
 
This chapter first recalls the white southern resistance to specific federal intervention in 
race relations from the 1930s into the 1940s and World War Two.  This resistance evolved into 
predictable and foreseen racial tension and violence as the war ended and African American vet-
erans returned to the South in the early post-war era.  Indeed these earlier episodes closely re-
sembled the resistance that was evidenced after TSTR was published.  For the first time in the 
nation’s history the federal government, via the PCCR and TSTR, threatened an end to legal seg-
regation with the overt goal of banishing it from American life.  That threat, coupled with the 
escalating civil rights push extending into 1948, impressed upon those that resisted it the seri-
ousness of the threat to segregation.  Civil rights activism had morphed from individual battles 
over race relations issues to a federally-induced directive for civil rights.  Detractors threatened 
violence but their immediate actions were focused on organizing resistance efforts across the re-
gion in order to be prepared for a longer and mass-based conflict which would ultimately decide 
the future of segregation.     
The chapter then explores the extremely hostile reaction of the southern press to TSTR 
and to Truman’s list of PCCR recommendations that he took to Congress in February 1948.  The 
outcry from the press demonstrates how southern newspaper editors and publishers used their 
newspapers to mobilize white southern opinion against TSTR and against the push for civil rights 
in general.  In doing so, they instigated support for a grass-roots resistance which planted the 
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seeds of massive resistance that took root and emerged seven years later after the Brown deci-
sions.  Lastly, the chapter argues that in issuing a death sentence for segregation, the PCCR en-
sured the premature death of southern liberalism.    
 
5.2 White Resistance and Violence Pre- and Post-TSTR  
Just as the civil rights movement witnessed unprecedented gains in the 1940s, so did the 
reaction against it.  Advances in civil rights even as far back as the 1930s had been challenged, 
and this pattern not only continued but also strengthened in the 1940s.
7
   The approach the feder-
al government took to race relations in the 1930s and into the mid-1940s was a piecemeal meth-
od - mainly reactive rather than proactive.  A useful analogy is one that compares different 
branches of the federal government that did intervene in matters of race (e.g., the Executive and 
the Judiciary branches) to medical specialists who focus only on symptoms that they can address 
rather than fixing the underlying cause(s) of the symptoms.  For example, the Executive branch 
under Roosevelt issued the executive order that created the FEPC in 1941.  Roosevelt acted in 
direct response to the threat of the March on Washington Movement, which would have ostensi-
bly compromised the war effort.  Roosevelt did not attempt to address the underlying causes of 
racial discrimination in the defense industry; he acted in order to thwart any protests that might 
endanger the war effort.  Following Roosevelt’s creation of the FEPC in 1941, Southern Demo-
crats expressed outrage at the potential loss of employment opportunities for whites and the pos-
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sibility of integrated workplaces, especially when this directive came from no less than the presi-
dent of the United States.
8
  
Additionally, the Judiciary heard the NAACP, from the 1930s forward, argue skillfully 
and successfully many cases against discrimination covering voting in the white primary, racial 
segregation in higher educational institutions, and racial segregation in housing.  These cases are 
examples of how the NAACP, in filing these suits in federal courts, ensured that this branch of 
the government tackled symptoms of the race relations problem, by hearing cases and ultimately 
handing down decisions that would chip away steadily against segregation and discrimination in 
targeted institutions.   Certain Supreme Court decisions also unleashed white southern conserva-
tives’ wrath.  When the court struck down the all-white primary in the 1944 Smith v. Allwright 
decision, it instigated a stream of cases from southern states, as many tried to skirt the ruling.
9
   
While the FEPC and various Supreme Court decisions were significant because they rep-
resented an increase in federal intervention with respect to civil rights, they did not represent a 
full scale assault on segregation, which was the bedrock of southern white supremacy.  Further-
more, the resistance against these milestone events, while notable, was not mass-based.   
Some federal interventions in civil rights were successful, while other attempts such as 
getting Congress to pass federal anti-lynching legislation, were not.  Resistance in the federal 
political realm often took the form of filibuster.   Theodore G. Bilbo, the infamous inflammatory, 
race-baiting, white supremacist, senator from Mississippi, who was a self-described lifetime 
member of the Ku Klux Klan, utilized this method along with other fellow southern Democrat 
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colleagues in 1938 to kill an anti-lynching bill.
10
    Bilbo threatened massive violence on the 
Senate floor during his attenuated filibuster:    
 
If you succeed in the passage of this bill, you will open the floodgates  
of hell in the South. Raping, mobbing, lynching, race riots, and crime  
will be increased a thousand fold; and upon your garments and the  
garments of those who are responsible for the passage of the measure 
will be the blood of the raped and outraged daughters of Dixie, as well 
as the blood of the perpetrators of these crimes that the red-blooded  
Anglo-Saxon White Southern men will not tolerate.
11
  
 
Bilbo believed that the state and “not the federal government should prohibit lynching” and 
promised that Christian southern women and “right-thinking” southern men who did not approve 
of lynching would ensure its demise.
12
    
Bilbo supported the Negro Nationalist movement, under which Marcus Garvey had en-
dorsed the migration of African Americans to Africa.
13
   His rationale for supporting this move-
ment differed from Garvey’s in that Bilbo thought that the removal of African Americans would 
help solve the country’s race problem.  Through the 1930s and 1940s, “as civil rights legislation 
slowly gained momentum … race became increasingly central to [Bilbo’s] philosophy, and he 
expressed his supremacist views in a more extreme fashion than most of his fellow southern poli-
ticians.”14   “[B]etween the spring of 1944 and the summer of 1946, changing perceptions of rac-
ism and nativism transformed Theodore Bilbo from an unremarkable southern senator to a na-
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tional and, indeed, international symbol of bigotry.”15    Bilbo became someone to be eschewed, 
not admired, and by 1946 many “northern and border state Democrats” no longer wanted to be 
associated with him, since it could mean the loss of elections and quite possibly “the presidency 
of the United States,” and he lacked their support when he ran for re-election.16  World War II’s 
influence had turned many southern politicians against his extreme brand of racism.   
1946 was also the first year of the post-war era in which returning African American vet-
erans expected and deserved better than the second class citizenship they had left behind when 
they departed for war.  The optimism that was fueled by winning a war against racism which 
should have spelled the end of racism everywhere was short-lived, because during 1946 a spate 
of lynchings  occurred against African American veterans in the South.   These acts were count-
ed along with other expressions of extreme racism that year, such as Eugene Talmadge’s last po-
litical race for governor in Georgia and the rise of the hate group, the Colombians.
17
  The Co-
lombians were the country’s “first postwar Nazi group” who “borrowed their uniforms and in-
signia from Hitler’s Third Reich.”18 That year the National Negro Congress blamed both Bilbo 
and Eugene Talmadge and their extreme brand of “race hatred” for the lynching of four African 
Americans in Monroe, Georgia.
19
 
The assertiveness of returning African American veterans was also evident in Mississip-
pi, where they expected to vote since the state had eliminated the poll tax for all veterans.  Addi-
tionally, the white primary had also been abolished.
20
  Bilbo, with the help of Mississippi news-
papers statewide, which printed his inflammatory and race-baiting rhetoric, reached those whites 
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who could be worked into a frenzy and form mobs to intimate by threats and deter, by violence if 
necessary, many of these upstart African Americans who attempted to register to vote.
21
  But that 
did not detract some blacks from voting in the election.   Approximately three to four thousand 
African Americans voted in the election apparently “without incident.” 22  Although Bilbo had 
become known nationally as a “polarizing figure,” that was not the case within his home state.  
With the help from journalists who reprinted his incendiary dialogue throughout Mississippi, he 
won re-election to the Senate handily taking “seventy-six out of eighty-two counties.”23  This 
spark of resistance demonstrated that the collusion between firebrand and newspaper could prove 
extremely powerful and that there was, indeed, an element of the population that was not willing 
to go along with “[T]he changing attitudes of white elites.”24  Despite the embarrassment that a 
man like Bilbo created for America in the wake of World War II and in the nascent Cold War, in 
the South he was not alone in his reaction against a law that permitted African American voters.  
His reaction foreshadowed the threats and vitriol that would be heaped upon Truman and south-
ern members of the PCCR within less than a year.   
 
5.3 Resurgence of Klan Activity 
Once To Secure These Rights was published, it exposed the harsh realities of a nation that 
had failed in its promise to secure the civil rights of every American.  Never before had the sub-
ject of civil rights been examined so thoroughly with the goal of exploring its shortcomings and 
proposing remedies.  In creating the PCCR the federal government, for the first time, approached 
the race problem holistically.  The PCCR’s goal was to determine the root cause of the civil 
                                                          
21
  Fleegler, p. 20.  
22
  Green p.109.  
23
  Fleegler, p. 20. 
24
  Ibid., p. 4. 
225 
rights deficiencies and propose solutions that would solve the problems for the foreseeable fu-
ture.  The PCCR and its overriding recommendation to abolish segregation marked the first time 
the federal government had put forth a general threat to ending segregation as a way of life.  The 
timing of TSTR’s publication also coincided with a decline in postwar idealism, a corresponding 
apathy toward anti-prejudice and anti-racism movements, an expansion of the reborn Ku Klux 
Klan, and the formation of other hate groups.   
The Klan in Georgia witnessed a renaissance in the post-war years but especially ran 
“parallel with the renewed dominance of the Talmadge faction.”   In Georgia, “the Associated 
Klans of Georgia reemerged from a wartime low of 12 Klaverns to over 110 Klaverns, with an 
estimated one hundred thousand members by the summer of 1949.”  Additionally, Georgia’s in-
crease in Klan membership occurred while other southern states were witnessing decreasing 
Klan membership and activity.
25
  
In 1946 the Klan experienced a revival in Georgia under the leadership of Atlanta obste-
trician Samuel Green.
26
  In early December 1947, just weeks after the PCCR published TSTR,  
the Atlanta Daily World carried a brief article about a Ku Klux Klan demonstration in Georgia.  
Grand Dragon Dr. Samuel Green downplayed the event, commenting that it was “‘just one of 
numerous ceremonies held at various times throughout the State.’”27  The journalist covering the 
story described it as a “procession of approximately 80 cars parading from Gainesville to 
Buford…with its participants clothed in full regalia…. and “[H]eaded by an automobile bearing 
a flaming cross.”28  The article was entitled, “Klan Parade Noted,” indicating perhaps that alt-
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hough no physical harm had resulted from the parade, the Atlanta Daily World was nonetheless 
taking note of it and alerting its readership.   
The re-emergence and expansion of the Klan in Georgia “translated into renewed racial 
violence.”  In Georgia, by mid-1948, the Southern Regional Council had accounted for “an un-
precedented dozen reported attacks in Georgia.”  As the 1948 presidential election approached, 
this violence heightened and focused on deterring blacks from voting.  However, African Ameri-
cans were not the only ones targeted.  In one case, white reporters secretly gained access to a 
Klan initiation near Columbus, Georgia.  When they were discovered, Klan members beat them 
and stabbed them “with hypodermic needles.”29   
On February 2, 1948, Truman spoke before Congress demanding that it act upon a subset 
of the PCCR’s civil rights recommendations.  The very next day, the Ku Klux Klan held an or-
ganized march and cross burning on the lawn of the Emanuel County courthouse in Swainsboro, 
Georgia.   This event made front page news the following day in the Macon Telegraph and also 
in Jackson, Mississippi’s Clarion-Ledger.30  Approximately 189 Klansmen participated in this 
demonstration.  Just prior to setting the cross alight, the group’s leader proclaimed, “May we re-
dedicate our lives to the protection of white womanhood.”31  This statement was the familiar re-
frain of white supremacists who used it to rationalize lynching and segregation.  Ed Fain of the 
Macon Telegraph reported that during the cross burning, Klan members taunted, “Where’s Drew 
Pearson!  Where’s Walter Winchell!”  The article explained that both of these radio and newspa-
per columnists had been focused on exposing the Klan (due in large part to Stetson Kennedy’s 
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work).
32
  Swainsboro’s mayor, Ralph Smith, Sr., claimed that this episode had been “the first 
time the Klan had demonstrated in this Southeast Georgia farming and lumbering community 
since the heyday of the invisible empire in the ‘20’s.”  The Klan’s re-emergence in this city after 
about a twenty-year slumber was front-page newsworthy.  The reporter quoted the leader as the 
cross continued burning, “‘We do not hate any race, color or creed,’” the leader said.  He added 
that the Klan had gathered to rededicate itself to maintenance of the Southern tradition of the 
races. ‘We intend to carry these traditions out and maintain segregation of the races.’ he said.”33  
His statement may have been a reactionary response to Truman’s speech to Congress the previ-
ous day, when the President reiterated many of the PCCR’s recommendations, namely calling for 
an end to segregation on interstate transport and for the District of Columbia to be under its own 
rule whereby, hopefully, they would end segregation in schools and other public arenas.   While 
there was no physical harm done during this demonstration, the Klan was sending a message that 
threatened resistance and violence in order to maintain the racial and social status quo.   
 
5.4 Rolling Out To Secure These Rights  
The culmination of the PCCR’s work occurred on October 29, 1947 when the committee 
presented its report to the president.  Throughout its ten-month assignment, PCCR committee 
members and staff had not publicized their work or their decisions.  Liberal and minority groups 
waited with anticipation for the report’s publication, because they really had no idea about the 
extent of the PCCR’s forthcoming recommendations.34  The PCCR’s executive staff also pre-
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pared the PCCR members for their necessary role in promoting TSTR.
35
  Members were instruct-
ed on how to conduct themselves during radio addresses and speeches, and PCCR chair Charles 
E. Wilson stressed the importance that the committee  “stand before the public with a point of 
view no less (or more) unified than that given in our report.”36  The promotional aspect of the 
PCCR’s work was very important to the success of the report, and Committee members and staff 
took this role very seriously.  Some held speaking engagements while others distributed abridged 
versions of the report.  Dorothy Tilly organized a conference on civil rights in Atlanta and one 
staff member, Milton Stewart, created a template for municipalities to use in auditing their civil 
rights activities.
37
  
The PCCR’s overriding recommendation in To Secure These Rights, to abolish segrega-
tion, threatened to thoroughly dismantle the South’s long established social order and also to re-
define southern liberalism and accelerate the pace of the civil rights movement.   The NAACP 
had already been attacking segregation in southern institutions of higher learning via the judicial 
system, but in the South’s interracial movement, progressive organizations such as the Southern 
Regional Council stalled in taking a firm stance against segregation.
38
   
Buttressed by Myrdal’s groundbreaking and best-selling 1944 work, An American Di-
lemma, and also from evidence gathered in the interviews and investigations conducted during its 
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tenure, the PCCR initiated a new way of thinking about the “race problem.”39  Rather than re-
main rooted in gradualism and not attacking segregation directly, the PCCR denounced segrega-
tion and called for its immediate abolition.
40
  In his epic study, Myrdal recommended that chang-
ing American whites’ attitudes about African Americans would require education, and he be-
lieved that the American press was the most expedient and logical vehicle to disseminate that 
information.
41
  Prior to the late 1940s, the northern mainstream press largely ignored stories of 
discrimination against blacks, leaving that task to the African American press.
42
  However, when 
the PCCR issued its report newspapers all across the nation, prominent and otherwise, were 
awash in articles (many of them front page articles and even headlines) covering the  
story.
43
  Therefore, the PCCR’s work broke through the barrier Myrdal had observed, and this 
occurred several years before the news media made the “classical phase”44 of the civil rights 
movement front page news.  TSTR was, indeed, huge news across the nation.  Philleo Nash’s 
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opinion of TSTR was that it was “sensational.” 45  Press reactions to the report ranged from ec-
static to cautioned optimism outside of the South to outrage in the South. 
In October 1947, for the first time, the issue of civil rights not only became newsworthy 
of mainstream America, but it also became front-page news in many cities across the nation.
46
  
The PCCR and its staff knew that their work and conclusions were vitally important to many 
across the country, but they were also critical to starting the process of shifting white racial atti-
tudes – and the best way to do that was to educate citizens.  Distribution of the report became a 
primary goal of the PCCR’s staff. 
The report struck a nerve with its audience.  Less than a week after it was issued, Nash 
wrote his boss, David Niles, claiming that “[D]emand for the Civil Rights Report has been so 
heavy that we are having a hard time keeping up with the requests and have begun to ration the 
remaining copies.”47   By January 1948, only three months after the PCCR issued its report, 
Niles wrote Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman, estimating that, including the 
“book and newspaper form to date,” over 900,000 copies of TSTR were in circulation.48  Despite 
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the large number of copies in circulation, the report’s distribution was limited to progressive 
agencies and church groups.  On March 31, 1948, the American Council on Race Relations 
(ACRR) issued a status regarding “State and Local Community Activities and Plans to Carry Out 
Recommendations of “TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS.”  This report focused on the distribution 
of TSTR in several cities and states across the nation and also on the various “Meetings and Oth-
er Activities” planned at the state and local level. The author of this report lamented that 
The reports from agencies reveal that approximately 16,000 copies of  
the Report were distributed in 13 communities.  If this distribution was  
typical for all local agencies and for other communities not reported the  
number distributed, or from which reports have not yet been received,  
the total number of copies or reprints distributed by local agencies was  
relatively low considering the importance of the Report to all citizens.  
 It is also significant that the distribution is selective, being primarily to  
persons who are members of intergroup relations agencies, to those 
attending meetings and to selected officials. 
 
Apparently, from the reports submitted, local activity is still in the  
education and discussion stage.  Even future plans indicate further  
discussion.  Only a few communities report development of action  
committees, and support of specific legislation.
49
 
 
Within five months of TSTR’s publication and two months after Truman’s February 1948 
Civil Rights speech to Congress, the expectations for community action and support of civil 
rights legislation had fallen short, perhaps foreshadowing possible resistance for change at the 
local level.   
Certainly most Americans did not read To Secure These Rights, but many widely circu-
lated mainstream newspapers offered broad coverage of the report.  The New York Times provid-
ed extremely thorough coverage of To Secure These Rights, beginning with an article on the 
front page and continuing with various articles within the issue devoted to various recommenda-
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tions made by the Committee, including voting rights, exposure of hate groups and subversives.
50
   
On page fourteen, the paper devoted almost an entire two page spread, complete with a photo-
graph of the PCCR with Truman and excerpts and diagrams from the report itself.  The diagram 
in the center of this spread clearly depicted the PCCR’s position that the United States federal 
government take a much stronger stance as the guardian of its citizens’ civil rights.  Not only 
would a permanent civil rights commission report directly to the President, but there would be 
standing House and Senate joint committees on civil rights, and under the Department of Justice 
and the FBI Civil Rights Unit, regional offices would be established throughout the country.  The 
flow chart indicated that the Permanent Civil Rights Commission would make recommendations 
to the President, who would in turn, make recommendations that would be forged into legislation 
for his approval.  At the heart of this flow chart stood the President of the United States, who 
would be ultimately responsible for guarding the civil rights of the nation’s citizens.51  This dia-
gram seemed to epitomize the phrase, “The Buck Stops Here,” which was closely associated 
with Truman.    
The report made front page news in some papers on the West Coast, too, as the San 
Francisco Chronicle covered the PCCR’s report in detail, devoting several articles in its October 
30, 1947 edition beginning with the front page article touting, “Civil Rights: Truman Board Re-
ports: ‘End All Discrimination.’”  Astutely, reporter Carroll Kirkpatrick noted that Truman 
“carefully avoided committing himself on the controversial recommendations of the report,” de-
spite the fact that he admitted that “he created the Committee ‘with a feeling of urgency’ when 
radical and religious intolerance began to appear after the war.”52   
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Kirkpatrick, the Washington correspondent to The Chronicle, not only covered the essen-
tials of the PCCR’s report but, cognizant of his audience, he also emphasized items that would be 
most pertinent to westerners.  His article included coverage of the PCCR’s criticism of the 
West’s mishandling of citizens of Japanese descent during World War II.  Quoting from the re-
port, he used the Committee’s words that described this egregious act as, “the most striking mass 
interference since slavery and the right to physical freedom was the evacuation and exclusion of 
persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast during the past war.”53   
Kilpatrick’s article also focused on the committee’s biggest target – the nation’s capital, 
Washington, D.C., explaining that  “[T]he most impassioned criticism was reserved for what the 
committee called widespread discriminatory practices in the District of Columbia.  It said the 
treatment of Negro Americans in the national capital is ‘shameful.’”  Kilpatrick further quoted 
the committee on this topic, “[T]he committee feels most deeply that … the situation that exists 
in the District of Columbia is intolerable.”54 
The Washington Post carried a total of four articles about TSTR.   Its front-page article 
characterized To Secure These Rights as “176 pages of social dynamite” and stated directly the 
crux of To Secure These Rights in the opening sentence:  “[T]he President’s Committee on Civil 
Rights called on the Nation to take immediate and bold action to wipe out segregation and dis-
crimination from the American way of life.”55  The Washington Post, noted for its liberal posi-
tion, continued to publish articles about the report and its recommendations for the next several 
weeks.  The articles proved too much for Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi, who, since 
Senator Theodore Bilbo’s death, had inherited the dubious distinction of being the most inflam-
matory racist politician from Mississippi.  In December 1947, The Atlanta Daily World com-
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mented that Rankin had “blasted” The Washington Post and its owner, Eugene Meyer, for using 
the paper “against white people of the District of Columbia to stir up race trouble and to try to 
force Negroes into the white public schools of the city of Washington.”56   
While Rankin accused the Washington Post of stirring up “race trouble” and potentially 
agitating African Americans to action, the southern press could have been similarly accused of 
stirring up white racist sentiment against TSTR.  In other sections of the country, newspapers re-
printed excerpts of the report but, in the South, coverage was largely characterized by sensation-
alized newspaper accounts and editorials that focused mainly on the PCCR’s most radical rec-
ommendations.   The majority of white southerners learned about the report from these newspa-
per editorials and articles.  While TSTR may have “sparked a national discussion on civil rights,” 
southern newspapers editors and publishers used their influence to rally many whites against civ-
il rights and the recommendations put forth in TSTR.
 57
 
 
5.5 The Southern Press Reacts to “176 Pages of Social Dynamite”58  
About six weeks after the PCCR issued its report, Dorothy Tilly was asked to speak to 
the Women’s National Press Club on December 11, 1947 about the Committee and its recom-
mendations.
59
   After concluding her speech Tilly fielded questions from the audience.  One of 
the journalists asked Tilly about the South’s reaction to TSTR.  Tilly responded directly and hon-
estly, “If you have seen the editorials, you’ll know it’s not so good.”60   Undoubtedly, the most 
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heated reaction from the newspapers came from the southern press.  The prescient Tilly had pre-
dicted a southern outcry even before the report was published.  In the September 12-13, 1947 
PCCR meetings, in which the Committee reviewed the report’s draft, Tilly cautioned that the 
southern papers would denounce the report:  “I talked to one of the editors in the South about it.  
He is the editor of the Atlanta Journal.  He is one of the most liberal and outstanding men in the 
South, Mr. Biggers.”  Tilly had spoken with Biggers about the PCCR’s recommendation to with-
hold federal aid from schools that were segregated.  She relayed that his reaction would be that 
“the Atlanta Journal itself would have to attack the report.”61   
Even months before the PCCR published its report, certain southern newspaper editors 
offered commentary on the supposed recommendations the Committee was considering.  In Feb-
ruary 1947 Louisiana’s The Shreveport Times sarcastically referred to the PCCR as an “impartial 
committee” and singled out PCCR member attorney Morris Ernst for most of its criticism, refer-
encing descriptions of him as “radical rather than liberal” and “perhaps extremely leftist.”  Also 
troublesome to this editor was his interpretation that the committee, largely due to Ernst’s influ-
ence, focused on “racial ‘rights’ and social equality.”62  The Times referenced the Dallas, Texas 
publication, The Southern Weekly, whose coverage of the PCCR “accuses Mr. Ernst, in effect, of 
gross hypocrisy in his approach”…in the…”study of civil rights by the Truman Committee.” 63   
According to this editorial, Ernst had suggested to his colleagues during PCCR meetings that 
“the Ku Klux Klan, the Columbians, and Gerald L.K. Smith all be invited to appear before the 
committee so that it might have ‘two sides’ of civil rights issues involving the South.”    The Co-
lombians were a new group that rivaled the Ku Klux Klan.  Gerald L. K. Smith had aligned him-
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self with Huey Long, but after Long’s assassination veered to the far right and became an ardent 
anti-Semite.
64
 According to The Shreveport Times, “the Southern Weekly infers Mr. Ernst sug-
gested this solely to hold before the nation such persons as Gerald Smith and such organizations 
as the Klan as representative of the South as a whole; to create a field day of headlines pictures 
millions of Southerners as ‘Gerald Smiths.’”65 
Not surprisingly, the Times also opposed the FEPC and noted that those on the PCCR 
who “favor” the FEPC did so “because they are of communist philosophy in such matters even if 
not of Communist party membership.”  This editor further denounced the Committee’s work be-
cause it favored social equality.
66
 
Nashville, Tennessee’s conservative Banner also voiced its opposition to the PCCR’s 
recommendations, focusing mainly on its call for “withhold[ing] federal funds ‘from state uni-
versities which discriminate against racial and religious groups.’”  The Banner cautioned its 
readers about the danger of “subsidy,” meaning if one accepts money for educational and other 
institutions, then ultimately the control of these institutions lay in the hands of those who are 
subsidizing.  The Banner perceived the PCCR as another vehicle by which outsiders were at-
tempting to control the South, and concluded with the following warning:  “[I]f public education 
were subsidized, it would be every school in that system – and no local authority would have any 
voice in it.”67   
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As predicted, the outcry against TSTR from southern newspaper editors began on October 
30, 1947, the day after the PCCR presented its report to Truman.  By November 9, 1947, Wil-
liam A. Fowlkes of the Atlanta Daily World wrote of the Southern editors,  
I have read scores of editorials from the metropolitan press over the nation,  
and, except for in the South, the attitude has been laudatory [sic].  It’s a  
funny thing about our South, the land of the ex-masters and ex-slaves, there  
is an almost fanatical determination that the Negro shall ‘stay in his place,’  
hang all democracy, Christianity and all else.  This determination, this attitude 
may prove our undoing, however.”68  
 
In Atlanta, Georgia, arguably the most progressive city in the South, the initial coverage 
of the PCCR’s report was subdued.  In fact, in reading the Atlanta Journal, which was more con-
servative than the Atlanta Constitution, one might have missed the coverage entirely since it did 
not appear as front page news.  On October 29
th
, the day the PCCR issued its report, two articles 
appeared about the event buried on page thirty-one.  As Tilly predicted, these articles focused on 
the threat to end segregation in schools via restricting federal grants to schools that were segre-
gated - the very point on which Tilly and Graham had dissented.  While the first article, written 
by Max Hall, sported an inflammatory-yet-accurate headline, “Ban Segregation Now Truman 
Group Urges,” it did not castigate the PCCR but rather reported the news in a balanced manner.  
Hall revealed that the Committee had focused on the flawed “separate but equal” argument, in-
sisting that it “‘is one of the outstanding myths of American history’”  mainly due to the school 
systems, “because: ‘It is almost always true that while indeed separate, these facilities are far 
from equal.’”  Hall also listed all members of the Committee, rather than singling out the two 
southern members.
69
  Just below Hall’s article appeared one by Ken Turner entitled, “Loss of 
Federal Funds Feared in Rights Move.”  Compared with Hall’s article, Turner’s was hyperbolic 
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and he blasted the PCCR for “whooping up a lot of financial dynamite” and threatened “political 
repercussions” due to certain recommendations by the Committee. 70  The recommendation to 
withhold federal funds from “any public or private agency permitting discrimination or segrega-
tion based on race, color, creed or national origin,”  Turner described as something that “would 
give this state [Georgia] a hangover that would take years to get over.”71  The very next day,  
Atlantan Dorothy Tilly (one of the dissenters against the recommendation to withhold federal 
funds from segregated schools) spoke publicly against the idea in another Atlanta Journal article 
written by Turner.  Tilly argued that “shutting off of federal funds for grants in aid – public hous-
ing and hospitals for example – because segregation exists ‘is not the remedy.’”  Tilly suggested 
that “‘[W]hat we should have instead is a much larger proportion of such funds because our need 
is greater.”72  In this article, Tilly tried to assuage southerners who might feel as if the TSTR sin-
gled out the South by admitting that “she had pleaded with the entire committee for ‘some under-
standing of the South and the background problem this report treats.’” 73  Nevertheless, she held 
fast in her support of the report because the South did indeed have issues, and she admitted that 
the South had more problems than other parts of the nation.  In fact, she explained that  
“‘[B]ecause we have a greater proportion of one of the nation’s minorities in the South, we must 
admit that our problem is more widespread than in some other sections of the country.”74   
A few days after these articles appeared, Journal’s editor Biggers followed through on 
his earlier threat to Tilly when he voiced his opposition to TSTR.  In his November 2, 1947 edito-
rial, Biggers declared the report “a dismaying document” and “an example of the extremes to 
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which headstrong theory, divorced from common sense, will run and of the intolerance into 
which self-assured crusaders for tolerance too frequently fall.” 75  Biggers claimed that he did not 
disagree with the entire report – just, as he wrote, “the most salient of its recommendations – 
those aimed especially at the South” because of its “light-minded indifference to consequences.” 
76
  He defended the separate but equal stance, not only because “[S]egregation is a fact deep-
rooted in Southern life,” but also because “it will be a safeguard against racial tensions and con-
flicts.”  He further claimed that “wiping out overnight a whole region’s long-inherited pattern of 
living is simply preposterous.” 77 
Biggers not only stressed gradualism, but he defended it in this editorial – ostensibly for 
safety reasons.  He argued that recommendations such as those in the TSTR “serve only to em-
barrass the efforts of Southern leaders who are working for the substantial rights of the minority 
race.”  Furthermore, he claimed that this report and others like it fuel the fire of race baiting and 
“strengthen the hand of the Bilboes.”78  Biggers’ fear that the report would “strengthen the hand 
of the  Bilboes” was well-founded; and he also claimed that TSTR would awaken the “dema-
gogues who traffic in prejudice and passion.”  Basically, Biggers believed the PCCR and all as-
sociated with it had handed the extremists “their most fertile opportunity.”79 
A few days following the printing of Biggers’ editorial, two letters to the editor appeared 
in the Atlanta Journal.  One, sent by E. A. Rogers of Atlanta, was complimentary of the editor’s 
opinion while critical of Truman and the PCCR.   
 I want to congratulate you on the editorial that appeared in the issue 
of The Journal which I bought tonite, with reference to the Report on  
Truman’s Civil Rights Committee.  Its logic is simply unanswerable. 
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 Personally, I don’t think Truman has the slightest hope of such a  
 program being enacted.  We are on the eve of another presidential 
 election and I believe this is an attempt on his part to hold the 
 Negro vote. 
 
 After all, neither Truman nor this Committee should be criticized. 
 They are simply delivering to the Negroes what little of the  
 Democratic party is left after Roosevelt got through selling it 
 to them in return for votes.
80
 
 
In contrast a second letter was printed, written by Witherspoon Dodge of Atlanta, who 
was an outspoken advocate for racial justice.  Dodge was a former Protestant pastor who in the 
1930s became a union activist and organizer and a member of the Southern Conference for Hu-
man Welfare (SCHW).  Dodge also served as the FEPC director for Region VII in the mid-
1940s.
81
  In this letter, Dodge enumerated the “eight indubitable signs” exhibited in the country, 
more so in the South, that lead to fascism:  “Racial supremacy, hostility to labor unions, appeal 
to prejudice and hate instead of reason, destruction of civil liberties, growing corporate control of 
the state, inflation, a campaign of anticommunism, and military mindedness.”  In closing, Dodge 
questioned whether the South was “the seed-plot of a future Fascist America.” 82 
Paul Cummings of Atlanta wrote a letter to the editor of the Journal that was printed on  
November 7, 1947.  In it he chastised Biggers for the hyperbolic tone that characterized Biggers’ 
editorial, especially when the editorial proclaimed that the report was “an example of the ex-
tremes to which headstrong theory divorced from common sense will run, and of the intolerance 
into which self-assured crusaders for tolerance too frequently fall.” 83  To this, Cummings tried to 
apply some logic when he retorted, “Now, Mr. Editor, in all fairness, tell your readers that 
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Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric, was chairman of the Committee that wrote the 
report.  Let them judge whether he is the type of man who runs to headstrong theories or whether 
he builds on sound principles.”  To further smear the Committee and its recommendations, Big-
gers drew upon negative World War II rhetoric in describing the PCCR’s recommendation for an 
FEPC as “the makings of a veritable Gestapo.”  Cummings criticized Biggers’ on this point as 
well, chiding “Now really, gentlemen, if you’ve read the only Federal FEPC bill that was ever 
given serious consideration, you’d see that it was patterned after the National Labor Relations 
Act.  You may not like that one either, but it’s [sic] agency has been in existence almost 10 years 
and even Messrs. Taft and Hartley don’t say it is a Gestapo agency.”  Cummings also corrected 
Biggers for inaccurately claiming that those who wrote the report were outside agitators trying to 
force their ‘long distance doctrinaires’ on the South, “when another member of the Committee is 
Frank Graham, president of the University of North Carolina and not the only Southerner on the 
Committee.”84  In conclusion, Cummings responded to the Biggers’ claim that the rights of the 
majority should supersede those of the minority with this final reprimand, “No, we won’t be 
‘jeopardizing the rights of us all’ -- only seeing that the majority group shares its extra privileges 
with those of the minority.  That’s just good democracy.”85  Although admittedly in the minority, 
some southern voices favored the PCCR and its report and, to its credit, The Journal published 
letters both for and against TSTR.  
In contrast to the conservative Journal’s editorial on TSTR, the more liberal Atlanta Con-
stitution’s editor, Ralph McGill, wrote a far less damning piece that was published on October 
31, 1947.
86
   In it, McGill conceded that the “objectives laid down by the President’s Committee” 
                                                          
84
  Paul Cummings to Editor, The Journal, The Atlanta Journal, November 7, 1947, p. 18.  
85
  Ibid.  
86
  For more information on Ralph McGill, see for example, Leonard Ray Teel, Ralph Emerson McGill: 
Voice of a Southern Conscience, (Knoxville:  University of Tennessee Press, 2001).  
242 
might be “laudable.”  Nevertheless, McGill believed that in issuing such a report, “little good is 
accomplished” and warned that “much harm may result from any attempt to force reforms which 
legitimately may come only in the course of time.”87  At this stage in his life, McGill favored a 
gradualist stance to solving the race issue, explaining that “racial segregation is merely an out-
ward manifestation of an inner state of mind.  Whether this state of mind is proper or improper is 
immaterial.  It is there, and it can be eradicated not by laws but only by the evolutionary process 
and the acquirement by the human race of the spiritual qualities which effectively eliminate it.”88   
In another editorial he wrote a few days later, McGill described several letters that had been sent 
to him about the PCCR and TSTR, indicating that many accused the report of being part of  “a 
Communist plot to bring about social equality in the South,”  while “[a]nother spoke of the 
Communist effort to smash the traditions in the South and promised to wallow in blood up to his 
umbilicus before he would allow it.”89  McGill acknowledged the goodness in the report, stating 
that “[i]t is a report with Christian aims, just as the Bible is a good book.”  Despite the praise for 
the work, McGill opined that it was flawed because “it can’t be enforced, even with troops.  It 
still has to be accomplished by improving the human heart.”  As it is, “[i]t will harden resistance 
and widen the gulf.”90  McGill believed that southerners needed to fix the race problem in the 
South and not have the federal government fix it for them.
91
 
One letter to the editor at the Constitution targeted Tilly and suggested that she mind her 
own business and start civil rights improvements within her own neighborhood.
92
  In another let-
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ter John A. Wagnon condemned TSTR’s call for “social quality,” describing it as ‘”the most 
damnable thing I ever read.  Wagnon continued his tirade by calling for “red-blooded Southern 
white men” to “tell that crowd in language they will be able to understand that we do not propose 
to tolerate any such situation.”  He predicted that “we will wade through blood up to our necks 
before we will have this blight forced upon the culture and traditions of the Southern white race,” 
and he ended with “[t]he Southern white man has not forgotten how to fight and he is becoming 
really aroused and angry.”93 A third letter against the PCCR and its report claimed that “Tru-
man’s Committee poured a fresh supply of fuel on flames already beyond control in the South 
and Georgia in particular.”94  
Elsewhere in Georgia, newspaper coverage ranged from one rather innocuous piece to 
unbridled criticism of the PCCR, TSTR, and Truman.  In this fairly noncommittal editorial, “Re-
Dedication For All” that ran on October 30, 1947 in The Albany Herald, the author neither con-
doned nor condemned the PCCR or its report, but rather encouraged Americans to embrace a 
more worldly outlook and hoped that TSTR would unravel America’s complacency.95   The cov-
erage on the Savannah Morning News’ front page on October 30, 1947 regarding the PCCR and 
TSTR highlighted the report’s extensive criticism of the South and, in an accusatory tone, named 
the two Committee members that “live in the South.”96  Following the initial coverage, editorials 
written subsequently revealed the resentment and displeasure at Truman, the Committee, its 
white southern members, and its recommendations. 
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 “Aimed At the South” was the title of the Savannah Morning News’ editorial published 
on October 31, 1947.  Despite the broad scope of TSTR, this southern newspaper editor read the 
report as a castigation of the Jim Crow South and blasted the Committee and its report on several 
counts, accusing them of being “brain-trusters of the Roosevelt-Truman camp”97 and compared 
the PCCR’s recommendations to Reconstruction legislation: 
 The report, almost from beginning to end, would disrupt the established  
economic and social traditions and customs of the South, especially in  
connection with race relationships, to an extent as great if not greater  
than the famed proposed force bills aimed at the South during Reconstruction 
Days! 
 
The editor singled out and disparaged Graham and Tilly as southern traitors, when he wrote,  
[I]t is no credit to this region, moreover that among the fifteen  
members of the committee are Dr. Frank P. Graham, president  
of the University of North Carolina and Mrs. M.E. Tilly of Atlanta,  
an official of the Women’s Society of Christian Service of the  
Methodist Church. 
 
The editorial continued in its criticism of several other PCCR recommendations by call-
ing the FEPC “outrageous,” declaring that it was “spuriously designed to do away with what is 
called “‘discrimination.’” In discrediting the PCCR’s recommendation to end the poll-tax, this 
editor reminded his readers that “Georgia’s poll-tax already has been repealed by our state Legis-
lature,” and then educated his readers on the damaging consequences of that action: “ and it is 
costing the state approximately $400,000 a year for school purposes at a time when our schools 
were never in greater need.”   In defending the poll-tax, which practically ensured the disfran-
chisement of many southern African Americans, he wrote, “…it can also be argued with reason 
that it is little enough to pay a dollar or more for the privilege of voting – and that any citizen 
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which is incapable of doing so, white or black, is hardly qualified to choose between men and 
measures at the ballot box.”98 
For several days after TSTR’s publication, the Savannah Morning News editor continued 
his attack against the PCCR and its report.  To further discredit the Committee, its work, and its 
recommendations, the News published an article that suggested not all African Americans want-
ed civil rights.   The News quoted African American leader H.W. Newell of Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee who denounced the PCCR’s recommendation to end segregation.  Newell claimed, “’ All 
the negro people want is to be left alone…Personally I think the President is gunning for 
votes…I believe the negro is better treated in the South than in the North.  Equality up there is a 
lot of hooey.’”  Newell concluded by stating that he did not believe that “‘intelligent Southern 
negroes want to try to do away with segregation at this time.’”99 
The Savannah Morning News also treated its readers to the opinions of other mainstream 
southern newspaper editorials to demonstrate that the South was united against the PCCR’s rec-
ommendation to end segregation.  In particular, the News focused on two editorials – one from 
the Atlanta Constitution and one from the Richmond Times-Dispatch.  Both newspapers’ editors, 
Ralph McGill and Virginius Dabney respectively, were noted for their southern liberalism.  The 
News highlighted this fact and noted that the PCCR “is coming in for sharp criticism from some 
sources which, judging by their past records, would be expected to support its recommenda-
tions.”100  On November 4, 1947, the Savannah Morning News reprinted McGill’s October 31, 
1947 editorial from the Atlanta Constitution.  It also shared the Dabney’s Richmond Times-
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Dispatch editorial in which he cautioned against the PCCR’s recommendations for legislation, 
quoting Dabney, “’Coercive laws are unwise and dangerous!’”101  Concluding his own editorial, 
the Savannah Morning News editor quoted Dabney’s editorial at length, which predicted dire 
consequences :   
‘[I]f the program of federal legislation now proposed by the Civil Rights  
Commission were to be adopted by Congress in the near future…the results  
in the Southern states would be even worse than those in the nation under  
prohibition.  They would be worse because the explosive issue of race  
relations is involved, and it has been demonstrated time and again that  
when efforts are made to settle that question through passing coercive laws,  
conditions are made worse rather than better.’102   
 
In his editorial, Dabney communicated his disagreement with the PCCR’s report and re-
vealed the origins of his rupture with this new-fangled definition of southern liberalism that now 
included a South without segregation, intervention by the federal government, and an accelera-
tion of the civil rights movement.
103
  The Savannah Morning News editor closed his own editori-
al with this pithy yet cautionary remark to those in favor of the proposed changes, “[A] word to 
the wise ought to be sufficient.” 104   
In other North Carolina papers, editors gave a mixed review to the PCCR and its work.  
Like Dabney, The Charlotte News editor condemned the PCCR’s recommendation to end segre-
gation and also portended violence if the changes were implemented : 
The committee’s bombastic demand for upheaval now, certain to kindle  
anew the flames of Southern resentment, will only serve to complicate that  
task (full realization of the democratic ideals of freedom and equality) and  
to delay its ultimate accomplishment.
105
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While The Raleigh Times gave a mixed review, claiming that the PCCR had recommend-
ed “‘some worthwhile sentiments’” the editorial was also direct in its pronouncement against the 
committee when the editor concluded, “some of its recommendations are unfortunate, from the 
Southern viewpoint.”  This editor also predicted violence and impasse when he wrote, “‘Its rec-
ommendation to ban all manner of racial segregation, if put into effect, would tend to do irrepa-
rable harm to interracial relations which have been steadily improving in the South over a period 
of years.’”106   Even a year later, Raleigh News and Observer’s editor, Jonathan Daniels, who 
had worked with Philleo Nash under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in the area of race rela-
tions and who was a good friend of Frank Graham, described the PCCR’s recommendations as 
“radical” and applauded Truman’s rejection of some of them.107   
When commenting on the recommendation to remove racial segregation, the Nashville, 
Tennessee Banner’s editor blasted the PCCR and alluded that the PCCR’s recommendation was 
influenced by communists and by Henry Wallace: 
It is no accident, certainly that the hue and cry now echoed by this  
committee originated in the left wing on imported politics is most  
assiduously cultivated by an agency personifying a political system  
under which there are no ‘civil rights’ and that the recommendations  
are identical with what Henry Wallace has been hewing as his own plank.   
As a matter of fact, were Mr. Truman to stand on this platform, he would  
first have to crowd Henry off of it.
108
   
 
Elsewhere in Tennessee, the Chattanooga Times voiced a unique perspective of the 
South’s civil rights - those of white citizens: 
We are in agreement with many indictments as harsh as they are 
because we know them to be essentially true.  The committee’s 
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recommendations, we believe, in some instances border upon the 
very thing it seeks to eliminate- the violation of civil rights.  True, 
the committee’s proposals concern themselves with civil rights 
of minorities but they tend to overlook similar rights of a majority  
as far as our own section is concerned.  The South has a long way  
to go in the field of racial cooperation.  But federal imposition of  
changes which would do violence to the region’s basic structure  
is not the answer.
109
 
 
In another perverse argument, the editor of Florence, South Carolina’s Morning News 
compared segregation with the fundamental ideal of freedom, writing, “This newspaper is liberal 
in its view of the racial issue…but we reject completely that a correction of the evils can be 
found in breaking down the principle of racial segregation, a principle which is just as cardinal 
and traditional to Southern society as is the principle of freedom in democratic circles.”110   
In Alabama, The Mobile Register attempted to be balanced in its critique of TSTR but es-
sentially criticized it for singling out the South: 
Something can be said for a portion of its proposals- in some 
cases much can be said.  Yet the committee went to such lengths 
in the unwarranted and impractical – it showed so little regard for 
states’ rights and so little respect for the South – that the merit in its  
report is more than offset by the unmerited. 
111
     
 
Another Alabama newspaper, the Montgomery Advertiser published an article on the day 
that the PCCR issued its report to Truman.  The author attempted balance by explaining that in 
the report “Discrimination against Negroes in the South was criticized at length, but other re-
gions in the North and West were singled out for violations of civil rights.  The nation’s capital 
itself was scored as a ‘graphic illustration of a failure of democracy’ and as the gateway to ‘Jim 
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Crow’ transportation in the South.”112  To offset the neutral tone of this article, another one ap-
peared below it, in which several southern editors’ comments were quoted – mostly in harsh re-
action against the PCCR’s recommendations.113 
In Huntsville, Alabama, The Huntsville Times also reported at length on Truman’s Com-
mittee and its recommendations.  Part of one article singled out the Committee’s two southern 
members yet no other committee members were named.
 114
  As if blaming Graham and Tilly, the 
article, directly after their mention, stated that “Much of the report deals with the South, and with 
the Negroes of America.  But the committee said the other regions also have their ‘interferences’ 
with the rights of individuals.”115    
  In Greenville, Mississippi, the southern liberal editor of the Delta Democrat-Times, 
Hodding Carter, editorialized against the report mainly on the basis of federal intervention in 
creating legislation to cure the South’s ills of lynching, poll taxes, and employment discrimina-
tion.
116
   Elsewhere in the Magnolia State, the reaction against the PCCR and TSTR in newsprint 
was angry and defensive.  In Mississippi’s state capital, Jackson, the ultra-conservative Clarion-
Ledger printed a subset of the article found in The Huntsville Times with a headline that, despite 
its typo, would catch readers’ attention: “Report Demands Segregation of Races ‘At Once’:  
Truman Board OKs Anti-Lynch, FEPC Legislation’”.117  The article’s author wrote that the 
PCCR “made 35 recommendations on explosive subjects in the whole civil rights field.”  Then 
the author listed several of the recommendations put forth by the PCCR, including one “that 
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Congress and the state legislatures outlaw segregation and discrimination based on race, color, 
creed, or national origin, in such places as trains, buses, schools, hospitals, theaters, hotels, res-
taurants, the armed services, and private employment.” 118 
The backdrop against which Mississippi faced the PCCR’s recommendations included a 
heated senatorial election campaign, with several candidates vying for the late Theodore Bilbo’s 
Senate seat.
119
  Two articles in the October 31, 1947 Jackson Daily News described two of these 
candidates’ reaction to the PCCR’s recommendations.  One article about Forrest B. Jackson de-
scribed him as “reading from a Jackson newspaper that told of the Civil Rights committee’s de-
mand that segregation be abolished.”  Jackson then stated “‘it is high time for the would-be tra-
ducers of our southern customs to realize the people of Mississippi are not asleep, nor are they 
like a bunch of cattle that can be pushed or led around.’”120 In the very next column an article 
quoted senatorial candidate Bill Colmer as saying, “‘All the legislative experience and ability of 
Southern Senators will be taxed to the limit to block the passage of anti-South legislation in the 
next Congress.  If Mississippi sends an inexperienced newcomer to the Senate, he will be cooling 
his heels in the back rows while anti-segregation and anti-poll tax bills are passed and made into 
Federal Law.’”  Colmer continued, “‘It’s going to take more than votes against the bills to defeat 
them.  It’s going to take a lot of legislative know-how on the part of Southern Senators, with the 
Mississippi Senators necessarily taking an important part to maneuver effectively and keep such 
legislation from passing the Senate.  Because, if they are ever brought up for vote, the coalition 
of northern Democrats and Republicans will, for political reasons, certainly pass the bills.’”121 
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Headlines from the Jackson Clarion Ledger conveyed a sense of emergency because of the 
PCCR’s report and articles in this newspaper also threatened the white South’s defiance against 
the PCCR’s recommendations, whatever the cost. 122   
Tilly was correct in her fears – southern editors excoriated the PCCR and its report.  The 
newspaper editors’ commentary across the South in the late autumn of 1947 was just to be the 
beginning of the vitriol against the PCCR and its recommendations.  1948 would bring another 
round of civil rights advances and this would again arouse the white South’s ire, which would be 
reflected in newspapers across the region.   
5.6 The Southern Press Helps Plant the Seed of Resistance  
After the initial furor in the southern newspapers against TSTR  in late October and early 
November 1947, the coverage of it in the mainstream southern press died off through the holiday 
season.  Nevertheless, when the New Year began, the topic of race relations was very  much on 
the minds of southern editors, journalists, columnists, politicians, and even some influential 
businessmen.   
On January 1, 1948, the Clarion-Ledger reported that South Carolina was about to lose 
its all-white primary.
123
  The news foreshadowed more unraveling of white political control over 
the South.  In Alabama, Judy Brown’s New Year’s Day column in the Birmingham News  re-
flected a defensive tone as she criticized national and syndicated columnist Walter Winchell for 
what she deemed to be his overall lack of understanding about the South.  Winchell was a na-
tionally syndicated columnist known for his criticism of the South.  Brown was subtly reassuring 
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and reminding her readers why things should stay the same in the South with respect to race rela-
tions:  
…Walter Winchell, like others not born and bred Southerners, does not  
‘get us’ down here.  He does not understand our relations with the Negroes,  
who are so important a part of our lives that it is only natural that we should  
be good to them. 
 
To understand Southerners and their point of view one must live in the South,  
and even then it takes years to grasp the idea that our attitude towards much 
which Northerners deplore is actuated not by any desire to be unjust or unkind, 
but by a determination to do what is right and best for this section as a whole –  
in other words, for the greatest good of the greatest number, of whatever  
race or creed.
124
 
 
Almost a week later on January 6, the Birmingham News featured an article in which 
Georgia’s governor Herman Talmadge lauded Alabama’s new Boswell Amendment, which was 
the latest scheme devised by Alabama politicians to keep African Americans from voting.
125
   
The next day Truman issued his 1948 State of the Union address, appealing to the citi-
zens of the United States to think about the opportunities and challenges facing the country in 
“the changing nature of the modern world.”  In this speech Truman resurrected the dialogue on 
the PCCR and its recommendations by informing  the country that the civil rights foundation set 
down by the PCCR, calling for action by the Federal government would be the subject of a future 
address by him to Congress.   
The United States has always had a deep concern for human rights. Religious 
freedom, free speech, and freedom of thought are cherished realities in our land. 
Any denial of human rights is a denial of the basic beliefs of democracy and of 
our regard for the worth of each individual.  
 
Today, however, some of our citizens are still denied equal opportunity for educa-
tion, for jobs and economic advancement, and for the expression of their views at 
the polls. Most serious of all, some are denied equal protection under laws. 
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Whether discrimination is based on race, or creed, or color, or land of origin, it is 
utterly contrary to American ideals of democracy.  
The recent report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights points the way to 
corrective action by the Federal Government and by State and local governments. 
Because of the need for effective Federal action, I shall send a special message to 
the Congress on this important subject.
126
  
 
Less than a month later on February 2, 1948, Truman, faithful to his word, presented to 
Congress a subset of the PCCR’s recommendations which commanded Congress to act.  Tru-
man’s speech stoked the ire of southern politicians, editors, journalists, and individuals; an ire 
that had been quiet since late November 1947.  Across the region newspaper editors and journal-
ists condemned Truman, the PCCR, and civil rights even more aggressively than they had three 
months prior.  In reaction to Truman’s civil rights push, many newspapers utilized the vitriol 
from southern politicians’ speeches and comments to incite people at the local level against civil 
rights.     
Georgia’s Albany Herald reported on February 3rd that Truman’s civil rights proposal 
was “flayed” by the southern congressmen and that as a result of his speech, some were threaten-
ing a split in the Democratic Party.  The article quoted Senator Eastland from Mississippi, who 
called Truman’s proposals “‘outrageous,’” and whose words could only serve to spread alarm 
and anger when he predicted that the “recommendations would destroy the last vestige of the 
South’s social institutions and mongrelize her people.”127 Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender, 
threatened “[I]f legislation of this character is passed, I know well that the South will bolt the 
Democratic Party.”128 
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On February 4, 1948, the Macon Telegraph reported that Congressman Thomas Aber-
nethy of Mississippi had proposed that the southern governors (who were attending their annual 
conference in Tallahassee, Florida)  “ask for a ‘showdown’ meeting in Washington with party 
leaders” over the assault from Truman on civil rights. 129  The Congressman stated,  
The time has arrived for concerted action and for all true southerners to  
stand up and be counted.  If there is any doubt in the minds of Southern 
people that the present leaders of the Democratic party are hell bent on 
bartering or destroying us, our southern institutions and traditions for  
the support of radical Negro minorities, then they need only examine  
the message which the president sent to congress yesterday recommending, 
among other things, the immediate enactment of FEPC, anti-poll tax and  
anti-lynching bill and breaking down of segregation of races.
130
 
 
Abernethy’s words were intended for a white audience in an effort to rally them against 
Truman and likely against the Democratic Party.  Less than seven years later, in Abernathy’s 
home state of Mississippi, the first Citizens Council would be organized, and its “rallying cry” 
would become the very words this politician had used in his diatribe against Truman:  “Stand Up 
and Be Counted.”131  What politicians such as Abernethy did in 1948 with the help of the south-
ern newspapers was sow seeds of massive resistance that would be harvested less than seven 
years later to be driven at the state level. 
The Macon Telegraph reported on February 10, 1948 that Senator Eastland vehemently 
opposed “President Truman’s civil rights proposals,” stating that Truman’s “proposals on racial 
segregation and antidiscrimination would ‘degrade, mongrelize and destroy the South.’” 132 This  
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paper was also critical of Truman’s stance on segregation, and the editor wrote about that on 
February 11, 1948 in an editorial entitled “Out of Step With Himself.”  The editorial suggested 
that “the President of the United States and the commander-in-chief of our armed forces ought to 
go into a huddle and decide what is their attitude towards segregation.”  The editor’s alleged con-
fusion arose because of recent events regarding the desegregation of New Jersey’s National 
Guard, based on its right as a state to not follow the federal government’s practice of segregated 
Armed Forces.  New Jersey would continue to receive federal funding for its branch of the Na-
tional Guard.  The editor took umbrage with two issues.  The first was that New Jersey was enti-
tled to claim “state sovereignty” in the matter of segregation, and second, that it would continue 
to receive federal funding for the National Guard although it was not following federal practice 
with respect to segregation.  It was the issue of state sovereignty that aroused the ire of this editor 
who wrote, “we may note the irony in this special recognition of state sovereignty.”  He contin-
ued, reminding his audience of the importance of states’ rights in the South,  “Of course, this has 
been the traditional policy of the South for which essentially we went to war in 1861.  It seems a 
little curious to the southern people that segregation is now recognized on the basis of this same 
state sovereignty.”  The author questioned, “why segregation should be good in private enter-
prise and yet frowned upon in the largest business in which the United States could possibly en-
gage, namely, making war.”133  
Beginning on February 4, Georgia’s Albany Herald began a series of editorials against 
the PCCR and Truman.  Much of the editorial page was devoted to a piece entitled, “A Political 
Legislative Program.”  In this article, the author blamed the PCCR and its recommendations as 
the reason behind “two Southern States already threatening to secede from the Democratic Par-
ty.”  The author also acknowledged that Truman’s civil rights speech to Congress was one in 
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which he adopted many of the PCCR’s recommendations.  After explaining why the South 
would not approve many of the recommendations, he warned that, “Truman is banking heavily 
on the fact that the Solid South will remain solid, despite his taunts and jibes, but sentiment 
which is growing rapidly in Dixie may cause him to commit the first grave blunder of his 1948 
campaign.”134 
 Two days later, on February 6, 1948, the editorial page included another commentary en-
titled, “Presidential Worries,” in which the author claimed that the “talk of a ‘secession’ of 
Southern Democrats will amount to nothing in November.”  Like many other white southerners, 
this editor curious and worried about Truman’s next move with respect to civil rights and cau-
tioned Truman against further angering southern Democrats. “Just what his approach will be 
does not yet appear, though it is certain he will not continue to ignore the Southern outburst.  He 
can’t afford to.  He can shake his fist at Congress as a whole, but he dares not estrange the Dem-
ocratic South.”135 
On that same day, the Albany Herald’s front page headline read, “SOUTHERNERS LAY 
FILIBUSTER PLANS:  Bitter Feud at New High in Dixie.”  The article quoted Senator Richard 
Russell of Georgia at length in his harangue against Truman, civil rights, and the possible end of 
segregation.
136
  Invoking World War II rhetoric intended to smear Truman, he claimed that Tru-
man’s recommendation for the FBI to work with the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Divi-
sion was the equivalent of putting a Gestapo in place “‘to break down race segregation in the 
South.’”137     
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The next day, the Herald’s editor emeritus, H. T. McIntosh, wrote an editorial entitled, 
“Senator Russell Scores Truman.”  McIntosh described in detail Russell’s anger at Truman, 
claiming that “It is clear that the Senator is greatly concerned, and also that his dander is up.”  
McIntosh cautioned readers that while Russell was claiming that Truman would use “the power 
of the Federal Government to require whites and Negroes to attend the same schools, swim in the 
same pools, eat together and, eventually intermarry,” Truman “has not presented his case in just 
those words.”  Nevertheless, this editor ensured that his readers received the full import of Tru-
man’s message via Russell’s inflammatory language.  McIntosh described Russell as “one of a 
number of Southern members of Congress who are raging at what thy[sic] see as an administra-
tion scheme to hog-tie the South and force upon it something which intelligent Negroes no more 
want than do the white people of this section.”  He ended his editorial with a prescient warning: 
If Senator Russell’s understanding of what the President has in mind is  
correct, instead of improving racial relations in the South it will embitter  
them beyond repair for years to come.  There are some problems which  
neither lawmaking nor force can solve.
138
 
 
McIntosh’s words were incendiaries to white supremacists intent on maintaining the social status 
quo, and they were also intended as a warning to southern African Americans – to go along with 
what white supremacists wanted, or else face violence.  
Two days later, on February 9, 1948, the Albany Herald published a letter to the editor 
which was written by John U. Barr of New Orleans, Louisiana.  In this letter, Barr attempted to 
portray Truman as a labor-loving communist sympathizer who was abusing power in his threat to 
use “FEDERAL POWER AND SNOOPERS to abolish sensible race segregation.”  Furthermore, 
Truman’s plans to end “sensible segregation and states’ rights could prove a calamity to the en-
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tire nation, including the deluded Negroes whose votes are being bought by this Truman alliance 
with the creed of the CIO and the Communist Party.”  Barr then challenged southerners to create 
“a REAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY” that only included whites.  Using hyperbole to describe the 
upcoming Democratic National Convention, calling it the  “the PHILADELPHIA MONGREL 
CONVENTION,” Barr charged his fellow white Southerners to call a genuine Democratic Con-
vention, and NOT IN PHILADELPHIA.”139 
Barr’s letter complemented a flier that he wrote and mailed to people all over the South at 
about the same time, also calling for a separate Democratic convention.  D. E. Moore of Fort 
Worth, Texas received one of Barr’s fliers, which began with “FOR WHITE MEN AND WOM-
EN EVERYWHERE For the sake of our COUNTRY and the SOUTH I plead that you read the 
following:”140  Barr’s letter called for a “DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION BELOW THE MA-
SON AND DIXON LINE” in an effort to save the “genuine” Democratic Party from the “alleged 
Negro-LOVING, pink and red MONGRELS who FALSELY called themselves Democrats.”  
Barr’s language harkened back to the bitter 1860 Democratic Convention in Charleston, South 
Carolina, in which disgruntled pro-slavery delegates bolted the convention to meet separately, 
and it also referred to the growing anti-communist fervor.    In this letter, Barr hoped to spur his 
readers to action in getting “five million white men and women of the South” to “get a message 
of approval to the” South’s “thirteen governors” by signing “their name and address to one of 
these circulars and mail or carry it to their governor, ASKING FOR A DEMOCRATIC CON-
VENTION BELOW THE MASON-DIXON LINE.”  He closed the letter by laying the responsi-
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bility for the white South’s future on his readers, “Your political leaders are waiting to HEAR 
FROM YOU – if you fail it will not be their fault.  ‘THE HOPE OF THE NATION RESTS 
WAY DOWN SOUTH IN DIXIE!’”  In small print at the bottom of the flier, Barr gave explicit 
permission for the readers of his flier to photocopy it and instructed them how to get more cop-
ies.  Barr was reaching out to the common white men and women of the South through the 
newspapers and via mass mailings, imploring people to act politically to assist him in spreading 
his message in building grass roots and widespread support against civil rights.
141
  This flier, as 
well as his letter to the editor of the Albany Herald, marked his attempts to create a groundswell 
of resistance against the PCCR’s recommendations at the local level in every town across the 
South.    
Barr’s letters are particularly interesting because of the trajectory of his career as a white 
supremacist.  Barr, a prominent businessman in New Orleans, was an ardent states’ rights advo-
cate and an avowed segregationist.  Through his letters, Barr sowed seeds of massive resistance 
that he would reap seven years later when he became the head of an interstate umbrella organiza-
tion of White Citizens Councils, as massive resistance was swelling in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s landmark Brown decision.  The organization he would lead, called the Federation for 
Constitutional Government, would be created in Memphis, Tennessee in 1955 under the direc-
tion of Mississippi’s Senator James Eastland.  Although this coalition was short-lived, it was 
successfully usurped by another rival white supremacist national organization, Citizens Councils 
of America, headed by Citizen Councils original founder, Robert B. “Tut” Patterson.142  Barr’s 
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letters in 1948 demonstrate a direct link between the reaction against To Secure These Rights and 
the massive resistance that erupts after forced desegregation in southern schools in the mid-
1950s. 
In the Deep South, newspapers in Alabama and Mississippi excoriated Truman and re-
ported on the rumored secession from the Democratic Party.  The February 3, 1948 headline 
from the Birmingham News read, “Dixie Demos Accuse President of Stabbing South By Asking 
Non-Lynch, Non-Discrimination.”  The editorial from the February 4th Birmingham News at-
tempted to calm the bolters by writing that “[W]hen tempers cool, surely Southern Democrats 
will see the wisdom of remaining within the party, and there working for moderation and a real-
istic understanding of the South’s position.”  Although not an advocate for party secession, this 
editor made it clear that he agreed that anti-lynching legislation, poll-tax legislation, and an 
FEPC were not necessary – and could be dangerous at the federal level – and were “matters” that 
“should be handled by state action.”143  The editor from the Huntsville Times on February 3rd and 
5
th
 called Truman’s civil rights message a purely political move.144  The same editor reinforced 
this message by stating that Truman’s message was nothing for southerners to worry about, let 
alone “bolt” from the Democratic Party, writing that such an action “smacks of cutting off one’s 
nose to spite the face.”145  Despite their attempts to calm down the rhetoric, both the Birmingham 
News and the Huntsville Times continued to run front page and other stories about the South’s 
threatened secession from the Democratic Party.
146
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On February 5
th
, the Birmingham News ran an intriguing article about a poll that had been 
taken by one of its news staff writers, John B. Atkins.  Atkins asked people on the street their 
opinion on Truman’s recommendations.  All ten interviewed, including a high school senior,  
were knowledgeable about Truman’s special message to Congress, demonstrating that this topic 
was of great interest to common people in the South and not just southern politicians.  The main 
points raised by Atkins were:  federal anti-lynching legislation, ending segregation, a permanent 
FEPC, and federal anti-poll tax legislation.  All ten of those interviewed were described as “bit-
terly opposed to lynching” and nine claimed to support federal anti-lynching legislation.  Five 
interviewees agreed with the creation of the permanent FEPC, and four said they would support a 
federal anti-poll tax law.  Only one person interviewed favored an end to segregation and that 
was in transportation.  One interviewee commented that, “’Not all Southerners are boiling mad 
over” (President Truman’s civil rights program), as the informal survey indicated.  This man was 
willing to voice his minority opinion yet he refused to have his name published as part of the ar-
ticle, fearing he might lose business.  The other nine agreed to have their names and photos as 
part of the article.
147
   
In Mississippi, newspaper headlines indicated that the Southern politicians were indeed 
“boiling mad” at Truman.  On February 3rd, Jackson’s Clarion-Ledger ran no less than three 
front page articles about civil rights with the following front page headline: “ ‘Time for Action’:  
Governor Aims Hot Blast At Civil Rights Program of President:  ‘Ten-Point Plan Is Stab In The 
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South’s Back’ Says Wright.”148  The very next day, the newspaper again ran two articles with 
eye-catching headlines about the furor that had erupted, and included quotes from several infuri-
ated southern senators and congressmen.
149
  Both articles reported a rumored split in the Demo-
cratic Party, brought on by Truman’s seemingly unyielding civil rights advances.  The Clarion-
Ledger also included an article on its front page for February 4
th
 about the Ku Klux Klan parade 
that had occurred on February 3
rd
 in Swainsboro, Georgia.
150
  Not only did the newspaper want 
its readers to know of the reaction from the South’s leaders against civil rights, but also that the 
Klan continued to be a viable organization.    
Three days later, on February 7, 1948, the Clarion-Ledger ran the following exclusive:  
“DIXIE ASSEMBLY CALL!” Journalist Charles M. Hill’s headline was a banner across the en-
tire top of the front page.  Hill opened his article with “Gov. Fielding L. Wright will issue a call 
for an all-South convention of Democratic political leaders to be held in Jackson March 1, it was 
announced exclusively to the Clarion-Ledger by telephone early today.”151  Mississippi journal-
ists were tracking Governor Wright’s movements and comments very closely during this period, 
as another front page article announced that he had arrived in Tallahassee for the southern gov-
ernors’ conference, calling Wright “the man sworn to rebellion against Democratic Party policy 
of racial equality.”152   
                                                          
148
  ‘Time for Action’:  Governor Aims Hot Blast at Civil Rights Program of President:  ‘Ten-Point Plan Is 
Stab In The South’s Back’ Says Wright,’” Clarion-Ledger February 3, 1948 page , Reel 29196, MDAH; “Negro 
Leader Slaps Wright, Eastland in Race Testimony,”  Clarion-Ledger February 3, 1948 page 1, Reel 29196, MDAH; 
“Truman Urges Anti-Lynch Bill:  Would Ban ‘Jim Crow’ Laws,” Clarion-Ledger February 3, 1948 page 1, Reel 
29196, MDAH. 
149
 John R. Henry, “Resentment Flames Across Southland, Leaders Speak: Wright Leads Wide Rebellion” 
and “‘Extreme Measures’ Talked By Dixie Spokesmen both from Clarion-Ledger February 4, 1948 page 1, Reel 
29196, MDAH.  
150
  “Klan Parades in Georgia:  ‘Fiery Cross’ Burns Again,” Clarion-Ledger February 4, 1948 page 1.1, 
Reel 29196, MDAH.   
151
 Hills, “DIXIE ASSEMBLLY CALL…”  
152
  “Wright Arrives In Tallahassee:  Nine Executives Expected At Meet,” Clarion-Ledger February 7, 
1948 page 1, Reel 29196, MDAH.  
263 
Mississippi’s lawmakers were also vocal and spurred to action.  The State’s House put 
forth a resolution which was covered in another front page article of the Clarion-Ledger.  The 
resolution reportedly invited “persons dissatisfied with” the southern “way of life to leave the 
state and country.”  According to the journalist, this resolution “was introduced amid applause 
from the state’s lawmakers.”153 
Editorials in the Clarion-Ledger supported the threatened revolt and, in one of these edi-
torials, invoked Reconstruction rhetoric.
154
  An article on February 8
th
 also referenced Recon-
struction and how the South, back in 1877, was able to use its political clout to end it.  This arti-
cle intended to send a message to Truman, because it reminded readers that the South did not 
support the Democrat, Samuel Tilden in 1876, and instead chose Rutherford B. Hayes, who 
promised to remove federal troops from the South if elected president.
155
   Hayes became presi-
dent and made good on his promise by withdrawing federal troops and officially ending federal-
ly-governed Reconstruction, leaving the South to figure out its own problems.   
On February 13
th
, the Clarion-Ledger’s headline read, “State Unfurls Rebel Flag, En-
dorses Stand for South:  Issue Call to White Democrats.”  This article reported that “A nation-
wide call for all true white Jeffersonian Democrats to meet in convention in Jackson” had been 
put forth.
156
  A secondary article reported that “White Mississippians, blood of the Confederacy 
and of true Jeffersonian Democracy, overflowed onto the streets from Jackson’s city auditorium 
Thursday to express and to act upon their sentiments against proposed anti-southern legislation.  
This ‘voice’ of the people, united as one voice, represented men and women from all sections of 
                                                          
153
 “Dislike the South? – Solon Has Remedy Merely Pick Up And Move Elsewhere,” Clarion-Ledger Feb-
ruary 7, 1948 page 1, Reel 29196, MDAH.  
154
  Editorial, “A Vice-Presidential Choice Would Not Pacify the South,” Clarion-Ledger February 7, 1948 
p. 14, Reel 29196, MDAH and “The Crisis Facing the South Yields The Most Important News,” Clarion-Ledger 
February 8, 1948 p. 6, Reel 29196, MDAH.     
155
 It Worked in ’76: --Party Revolt Won GOP Action On Withdrawal of Troops From South,” Clarion-
Ledger February 8, 1948,  p. 8, Reel 29196, MDAH.   
156
  “State Unfurls Rebel Flag….Clarion Ledger, February 13, 1948, p. 1, Reel 29196, MDAH.   
264 
the state and from all walks of life…Enthusiastic but orderly, calm but determined, the boys 
from the ‘forks of the creek,’ from hamlets and villages, towns and cities, met and agreed:  ‘It is 
time to act’.”157  These politicians, with the assistance of the press, succeeded in simultaneously 
galvanizing and then mobilizing many white supremacist Mississippians against Truman’s and 
the PCCR’s push for civil rights.    
 
5.7 Conclusion 
By the mid-1940s fissures began to weaken the southern liberal approach to solving race 
relations.  A greater insurgency on the part of African American activists and the Left exposed 
the weaknesses of southern liberalism, and the reaction against the atrocities of World War II’s 
racial genocide supported the notion that the South’s treatment of minorities was anachronistic 
and inhumane.  In 1943, Howard Odum, one of the leaders of southern liberalism acknowledged 
the ironic failings of it. 
The rest of the world, thinking in terms of global democracy and  
our Negroes and northern friends thinking in terms of forcing the hand  
of the South have set goals so far ahead of us that relatively we are  
taking the stand of opposing something rather than trying to go forward.
158
   
 
By the late 1930s, Odum already was being outpaced by other southern liberals, whom he 
believed were moving too quickly.  He did not agree with “legal and political challenges to Jim 
Crow” because he believed that “folkways” were superior to governmentally imposed societal 
changes.  Even his argument for regionalism offered an excuse for inertia in the South.
159
  Dur-
ing this same timeframe, African American liberal counterparts such as Gordon Hancock tried to 
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convince their white colleagues that the white southern liberals were the ones restricting southern 
liberalism.  The black activists understood that if the South did not change on its own, then the 
change was going to be forced from the outside.   
I believe we interracialists should go as fast as we can and as far as we can  
to secure the physical and spiritual life of the Negroes and let the opponents  
say what cannot be done rather than dwell upon the impossibilities ourselves.  
I have a white friend who is an interracialist and when he sits in the meetings  
he seems absolutely incapable of seeing anything but what cannot be done…. 
This kind of interracialism is killing the cause in the South.  Our great need  
in this hour is for white and Negro interracialists to see what can be done  
among ourselves rather than wait for outside interference.
160
    
 
World War II caught white southern liberalism off guard and essentially called its bluff 
against the backdrop of a World War ostensibly fought against racism.  Southern liberals were 
willing to have the United States fight and kill Germans and Japanese to end those racist re-
gimes, but they did not want the United States government to force an end to racial segregation 
in the South.  Despite growing African American activism, World War II inroads in civil rights, 
heinous white-on-black violence following World War II, and the PCCR’s report, the southern 
liberals under the leadership of figures such as Tilly, Graham, McGill, Dabney, Carter, and Od-
um were still unwilling to take a bold move to end segregation.  Their main argument was two-
fold:  forcing the matter with legislation would not change the hearts and minds of white racists 
and would therefore not result in sustainable change and, if the matter were forced, unspeakable 
racial violence would ensue.  
By the late 1940s, the southern liberal tradition failed to bring about meaningful social 
change in a timeframe that suited not only southern African Americans, but also the rest of the 
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country and many other countries who increasingly looked to the United States as the leader of 
the free world.  Because the South would not change on its own, the PCCR put the federal gov-
ernment in charge of forcing the change.  The white South reacted angrily, defiantly, and in some 
cases, violently, to this perceived hostile intervention as many southern liberals predicted it 
would.   TSTR issued a death sentence for the segregated South.  Southern liberalism, had it 
achieved its long range goal of ultimate integration, would have died a natural death.  Instead 
southern liberalism became impotent once TSTR was published and therefore became another 
casualty of the post-TSTR era.   
Despite the attempt made at softening sections of the report with respect to the South, the 
reality was that TSTR singled out the South as the area of the country whose civil rights record 
was the most egregious.  Newspaper editors and journalists across the South ensured that the 
coverage of TSTR and later Truman’s civil rights recommendations to Congress were perceived 
as one elongated and unmitigated attack on the traditions upheld by the white South, which trans-
lated into newspaper coverage in the South that was overwhelmingly hostile to these civil rights 
advances. 
The PCCR’s report issued in October 1947 with thirty-five recommendations ignited a 
fire in the South which then smoldered as 1947 drew to an end.  The smoldering fire was then 
very quickly stoked into a conflagration after Truman, in February 1948, demanded civil rights 
actions from Congress based on a subset of the PCCR recommendations.  The southern main-
stream newspapers did an especially thorough job in covering this unfolding story, including 
printing increasingly inflammatory headlines in regional newspapers, especially in Mississippi, 
where the headlines fanned the flames of defiance and stirred the passions and memories of a lost 
cause, providing southern whites a new cause for which to fight and ultimately lose.  
267 
The publication of To Secure These Rights and Truman’s February 2, 1948 speech to 
Congress provided a common enemy across southern state lines, against which white suprema-
cists could focus resistance and “stand up and be counted” by signing petitions and demanding of 
their leaders a separate Democratic convention.  The newspaper coverage of rabble-rousing let-
ters to the editor and politicians’ defiance to the President were the vehicles by which everyday 
white southerners were being challenged to take up the new cause against civil rights and the de-
fense of the South’s segregated way of life.  This newspaper coverage helped sow the seeds of 
focused, regional massive resistance seven years before the Brown v. Board of Education deci-
sion that declared segregation unconstitutional. 
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CONCLUSION:  MANY A TANGLE AND MANY A BACK-SET 
It would be wonderful to come back to earth again in 2047 or in 2147  
and see just how good people have worked out this matter of minorities,  
- and especially the negro problem.  I know it will be worked out, - tho  
with many a tangle and many a back-set.
1
   
 
       D.P. McGeachy to Dorothy Tilly 
       December 5, 1947 
 
The PCCR was arguably more important than other presidential commissions that had 
preceded it.  Truman’s advisors had collected a group of intelligent, dedicated, and highly moti-
vated people who, in the process of carrying out their mission, forged a very new and very 
“modern” understanding of civil rights that challenged the essential basis of race relations in seg-
regation.  The PCCR’s recommendations were, as committee member Morris Ernst indicated 
during the final review of the report’s draft, “a real revolution in the pattern of our national think-
ing, because we started as 13 separate Colonies, and there was no idea that the Federal Govern-
ment would ever have anything to say about it, the local choice of election or the local choice of 
free speech.”2  Furthermore, the PCCR was integrated not only racially but also regionally – 
making it a nationally integrated Committee tackling the issue of race relations and civil rights 
for all Americans.  
Philleo Nash, who had been studying racial tension and race relations throughout the war 
and into the postwar period, believed at that time that, given the Cold War conservative Con-
gress,  the PCCR was the only viable solution to the racial issues plaguing the nation : 
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Congress was obviously not ready to act, and neither were the courts.  Civil  
rights legislation and the watershed court decisions were still years away.   
Presidential action was required, yet there were limits on presidential power.  
What to do?   
 
In the files, ready for use if the time should ever seem right, was a proposal  
going back to the early years of the war – a proposal to create a national  
commission on race relations.  It had been rejected then, because it seemed  
inadequate to the emergency.  Now it was all that was possible.  Staff work  
was begun at once under [David] Niles’s direction, and the outcome was the  
President’s Committee on Civil Rights.3 
 
Nash admitted that although the end result of the PCCR was only a document, this report…  
was the first presidentially based document that dealt directly and across the  
board with such divisive issues as segregation.  Some of its most basic recom-
mendations were not acted upon for 17 years, and others have never been  
adopted.  But it began a dialogue about human rights that was necessary to  
start the process of change.  It was a key element in the campaign of 1948 and  
in Truman’s victory.  The issue was dramatized as never before in modern  
times, and successor presidents were bound to follow the lead.
4
 
 
Seventeen years elapsed before Congress would pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
eighteen before it passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  In a prescient statement during the heated 
debate over segregation and education in September, 1947, PCCR member Franklin D. Roose-
velt, Jr. predicted the length of time it would take for the PCCR’s recommendations to come to 
fruition. 
The interesting thing is that 20 years from now probably Mrs. Tilly and  
Dr. Graham will have led this very fight the way this report reads, and  
20 years from now they will accomplish it….5  
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Not everyone associated with the PCCR was as optimistic about the report’s staying 
power.  Robert K. Carr, the PCCR’s executive director, expressed uncertainty about it during the 
last review of the report’s draft in September, 1947, stating,  “This report, I hope, will have vital-
ity over the next decade.”6   The report would have vitality for almost twenty years after its pub-
lication, but the progress over the first ten years of its life was achieved without federal legisla-
tion; it was accomplished through executive order, the judiciary, civil rights organizations, state 
and local governments, religious groups, and in some cases individuals. 
In 1958, the American Jewish Congress compiled a group of essays written by prominent 
political, business, religious, civic, and civil rights leaders into a collection entitled, The People 
Take the Lead:  A Record of Progress in Civil Rights, 1948-1958 (TPTL).  This ten-year mile-
stone report card indicated that the progress achieved toward meeting the objectives set forth in 
TSTR was impressive, if still incomplete, and had been achieved despite many obstacles. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote the keynote article for TPTL.  His predecessor 
and creator of the PCCR, Harry S. Truman, wrote the introduction, comparing the PCCR’s report 
to the United States Constitution and the 13
th
, 14
th
, and 15
th
 amendments, noting that the PCCR 
was the third time in American history that this country “took stock of its freedoms.”  In his in-
troductory essay to TPTL, Truman noted that since the PCCR had published its report, “Civic 
and religious organizations, veterans groups, labor unions and business associations, women’s 
clubs, youth councils – men and women in every walk of life and in every section of our land 
joined to close the gap between our ideals and our practices.”   He stated that “The people led the 
way, and our courts, our Federal Government, our state and municipal legislators, our religious 
and civic leaders all continued the forward march.” Truman acknowledged that there was still 
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“much work to be done but that the current report [TPTL] would prove that America was making 
progress in the arena of civil rights.”7   
Vice-President Richard Nixon wrote the first essay for TPTL, highlighting changes in 
Washington, D.C., and the desegregation of the Armed Forces and transportation as the major 
accomplishments in the ten years since TSTR had been published.   
Integration of the armed forces was accomplished, and segregation banned from 
all Veterans Administration hospitals and military post schools.  Loans were 
withheld from new housing covered by racial or religious restrictive covenants – 
both the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans’ Administration took 
this firm stand.  In Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States, practically 
complete desegregation has been achieved.  Discrimination and segregation were 
banned in parks, schools, public swimming pools, restaurants, government facili-
ties, theatres and all forms of public accommodations by virtue of either direct ac-
tion by the Federal Government or persuasive efforts employed in conjunction 
with private community leadership. Federal regulatory agencies exerted their in-
fluence too – the Interstate Commerce Commission, for instance, banned segrega-
tion in interstate transportation and waiting rooms, and the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration forbade the use of federal funds for building segregated rest rooms, 
dining rooms and other airport facilities.  And finally, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation launched an ambitious plan:  special civil rights training courses, to be 
held in cooperation with state and local police, for the nation’s 200,000 law en-
forcement officers.
8
 
 
What was conspicuously absent from the list was new legislation, but Nixon attempted to 
turn the inability of Congress to enact civil rights legislation for the past ten years into a positive 
when he added at the end, “With such a bold and varied program of action, the Federal Govern-
ment has performed an impressive job in protecting and expanding civil rights – not by imposing 
legislation or by forceful authority, but rather by establishing the moral tone and serving as a 
pace setter for the rest of the nation.”9  His statement seemed to harken back to the old southern 
liberal position.  Furthermore, his conciliatory tone may have also been in part to placate the 
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southern Democrats since civil rights legislation had been passed in 1957 but, oddly, Nixon did 
not mention it.   
Several civil rights authorities wrote articles for TPTL, including two former PCCR 
members: Channing Tobias, who at the time was the chair of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Dorothy Tilly.  Tobias wrote about the progress 
made in the area of public accommodations in “Public Accommodations,” while Tilly’s article 
entitled, “Citizenship” addressed the status of citizenship and voting rights.10 Tilly reflected on 
progress made since the PCCR had issued its report, homing in on the recently passed Civil 
Rights Act of 1957. 
Today, we are looking back at the road we have traveled since then.   
One of the most important milestones was passed only recently when  
the Congress of the United States broke an 82-year deadlock to adopt  
a civil rights law guaranteeing federal protection of the right to vote.
11
 
 
Although Tilly gave credit where it was due, she also acknowledged the shortcomings of the 
Congress when she wrote: 
Of course, it may be said that it is rather late in the day for such a law 
—That the 15th amendment to the Constitution, passed just after the Civil  
War, was intended to insure that right.  All this is true – and has been  
pointed out to our shame not only by our enemies in many parts of the  
globe, but also by our friends and those who would like to be our friends.   
Yet those with a genuine concern for the rights of man know that not much  
is gained by dwelling on past injustices, grave though these may be.   The 
 important fact is that a Congressional Law was needed, and it was passed.
12
   
 
Tilly cautioned readers that this new legislation did not signify the end of the struggle for 
civil rights, claiming  “It would be foolish indeed to pretend that all these abuses are erased.  All 
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is not well by any means.”13 Her conclusion, however, was characteristically optimistic when 
referring to what improvements had been accomplished:  
These are the guideposts to the future.  Ten years ago, we on the  
President’s Committee dared dream that the day would come when  
the Constitution would be the abiding government of all our people 
 – and that our land would be what it started out to be, a nation without  
frontiers.  Ten years is a short span as one measures history.  But as  
the record clearly shows, our dream is today much closer to reality.
14
    
 
In 1958, the most burning issue with respect to civil rights was the desegregation of 
schools.  Father Paul C. Reinert, President of St. Louis University, tackled this topic in his up-
date on public education for TPTL.  Reinert acknowledged the work of the PCCR and also of the 
judiciary’s role in education’s progress.  Reinert then focused on the accomplishments, but he 
also referred explicitly to state-level strategy of massive resistance and violence that had ensued 
in many southern communities as desegregation of schools was attempted.  Reinert tasked all 
Americans with the job of eradicating the unlawful and violent resistance to these civil rights ef-
forts.    
Temporary setbacks notwithstanding, the record over the past three  
years shows remarkable progress.  Prior to May 1954, 17 states and  
the District of Columbia maintained separate schools for Negro and  
white children. As of September 1957, 350,000 Negro children and  
2 million white children in this area were enrolled in integrated schools. 
All of the Southern and border states but seven ‘hard-core’ holdouts –   
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and  
Virginia – have desegregated at least one school district; in several, complete  
integration is on well on the way.   
 
It would be naïve, indeed, to suggest that progress has come without painful 
struggle.  Nor can we ignore the long road ahead.  There are still ‘hard-core’  
recalcitrants in many sections of the country.  And, as their numbers and  
strength decline, these elements, it is clear, do not hesitate to use violence to 
achieve their ends.   
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When such violence is permitted to explode – as it did in Birmingham, Ala.,  
Little Rock, Ark., and Nashville, Tenn. – it is not a minority group alone that  
is threatened, but rather the morality, law and order of the nation as a whole.   
The American people, North and South alike, cannot remain silent in the face  
of lawlessness.  Our repudiation of those who would set themselves above the  
law of the land and enforce their views with onslaughts against innocent  
children must be unmistakable.
15
    
 
In a 1972 oral history, former United States Supreme Court Justice, Tom Clark, who had 
been Harry Truman’s attorney general during the PCCR’s tenure, offered the following about To 
Secure These Rights: “if you will study [the report]…you will find it is a blueprint of most eve-
rything that’s been done in the area of civil rights since that time.”16  Despite concerns that the 
PCCR might have been a blue ribbon commission without a lot of substance, the PCCR’s mem-
bers took their collective job very seriously and produced a document that, in retrospect, can be 
seen as the charter for civil rights reform between 1947 and 1965.
17
  Moreover, in spite of the 
resistance encountered in implementing the Committee’s recommendations in TSTR, the PCCR 
had a profound impact.  The process of assembling the PCCR’s report forged a new approach to 
civil rights for the postwar generation that would have a lasting influence on liberal thought and 
government action well into the 1960s.  The committee’s report also signified a watershed, be-
cause once the extent of racism was officially documented, the federal government could no 
longer shut its eyes to the problem.   
Congress took almost twenty years to pass the necessary and long overdue civil rights 
legislation in 1964 and the voting rights legislation in 1965.  In the interim, other significant ad-
vancements in civil rights did occur through other means, and in the larger scheme of the history 
                                                          
15
  Ibid., pp. 15-16.   
16
  Oral history interview, Tom Clark, October 17, 1972, Truman Library 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarktc.htm#oh1 (accessed March 26, 2012). 
17
  Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize:  The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human 
Rights, 1944-1955, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 3, 68-69, 104.  One infers from Ander-
son’s comments about the PCCR was that it was a disappointment.  
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of slavery and the long civil rights movement, twenty years was not such a lengthy amount of 
time.   
The landmark legislation of 1964 and 1965 did not eradicate racism, nor did it end re-
sistance to civil rights or violent resistance to oppression.  Twenty years after the horrible crimes 
of 1946 that preceded the formation of the PCCR, two northern cities exploded in race riots in 
the summer of 1967.  Violent race riots erupted in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan.  
In response to these tragedies that left several dead and communities shattered, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson created the Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly known as the Kerner Com-
mission, to investigate the riots and propose recommendations.  The result of this Committee’s 
work was a shocking report entitled REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 
ON CIVIL DISORDERS, published in 1968.  The committee’s findings harkened back to those 
exposed by Gunnar Myrdal more than twenty years prior in An American Dilemma, because they 
revealed that white racism had persisted and expanded despite the changes brought about by the 
civil rights movement.
18
   
The modern civil rights movement is a long, ongoing struggle that had its origins in the 
1930s and extends beyond its “classic phase” of the 1950s and 1960s.19  Yet an examination of 
the 1940s reveals this decade to be arguably the pivotal one in the civil rights struggle.  During 
this decade, a World War fought against racism galvanized African American veterans, a critical 
shift in liberal thought occurred, the federal government intervened in civil rights and began a 
sustained twenty-year commitment, and anti-communist fervor underscored by a growing re-
sistance movement combined to fight against the nascent federal civil rights movement.  As the 
                                                          
18
  National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, Report of the Kerner Commission, (New York: Ban-
tam Books, 1968.   
19
  Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of 
American History,
 
91 (March 2005): 1233-1263, pp.1234, 1245.  
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previously inchoate civil rights movement became better defined with strategies and goals, it also 
became a clearer target for an increasingly better organized opposition. Many of these goals, 
such as ending segregation, were articulated by the PCCR in its 1947 report, To Secure These 
Rights thus setting the liberal agenda for reform for the next twenty years, with the expectation 
for future federal intervention in the matter of civil rights. 
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